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Abstract 
As a result of the development and recognition of human rights and of the 
principle of normalisation, in recent decades sweeping changes have 
occurred in the living conditions of many people with intellectual disability. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 
(1971) contains statements to the effect that, as far as possible, the lives of 
disabled persons should resemble those of their non-disabled peers, and 
this presumably extends to sexual expression. However, the words “as far 
as possible” imply that in some circumstances, limitations on a right may be 
justifiable. One such circumstance is where a competing right exists, for 
example, the right to sexual expression has to be balanced against a right to 
protection. Under some conditions, the provision of protective measures may 
fall to the criminal justice system, which may be used to afford protection to 
persons with intellectual disability. Australian jurisdictions have used three 
different approaches in current legislation: to set a minimum standard of 
sexual knowledge that must be present before the person is deemed 
capable of consent to sexual activities; to prohibit sexual relations with 
persons holding power or authority over the person; and to proscribe all 
sexual exploitation. This thesis contains proposals for reforms to each 
category of legislative provisions. First, it is suggested that the standard of 
knowledge required to support consent should more closely resemble the 
knowledge required for informed consent to medical procedures. Second, 
restrictions on sexual activity with persons with intellectual disability based  
 
iv
on employment status should be relaxed where the role of the staff member 
does not confer power to coerce people with intellectual disability. Third, with 
regard to the prosecution of offences against incapable persons with mental 
impairment, it is proposed that the charge should be sex without consent. On 
the other hand, it is argued that prosecution under criminal law is 
inappropriate where a vulnerable but capable person is deemed to have 
been exploited. The thesis contains a number of further recommendations 
for the reform of anomalies which exist between the general law of sexual 
offences and those committed specifically against persons with mental 
impairment. It is suggested that marriage be abolished as a defence to 
sexual acts with an incapable person and that offences against persons with 
mental impairment carry equivalent penalties to general sexual offences. On 
the basis of literature reviewed in this thesis, two additional proposals have 
been made. First, that education in the sexual rights of persons with 
intellectual impairment should be given to carers so that they do not unduly 
inhibit the development of sexual relationships by that person. The second 
proposal is that reform should be accompanied by the provision of repeated, 
appropriate, detailed and specific sex education of all persons with 
intellectual impairment and that this education should be based on needs 
identified in the aforementioned research. The tentative outcome of 
proposals contained in this thesis is that persons capable of consent would 
enjoy enhanced freedom to exercise their right to sexual expression, and 
those incapable of consent would be afforded more certain protection.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
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The focus of this thesis is those sections of Australian law that define sexual 
offences where one person is incapable of consent due to mental 
impairment. Due to that incapacity, any sexual act involving that person 
constitutes sex without consent. In Australian jurisdictions, such crimes are 
defined separately in legislation from other sexual offences in which the 
external element is that the act is non-consensual. A benefit of these special 
sections is that they afford protection to vulnerable persons with mental 
impairment, because such persons may acquiesce to another person’s 
sexual advances without any real understanding of sexual acts. There are, 
however, costs associated with this approach such as paternalistic 
interference in the basic rights of those affected by this legislation. This 
thesis will examine the relevant legislation with reference to basic human 
rights and to normalisation theory. 
 
Normalisation theory 
According to normalisation theory, the person with mental impairment 
should be aided to achieve a valued role in society, and be encouraged and 
supported in his or her efforts to live as normal a life as possible. 
Normalisation has been defined as: 
The utilisation of culturally normative means (familiar, valued 
techniques, tools, methods), in order to enable persons life conditions 
(income, housing, health services etc) which are at least as good as 
that of average citizens, and to as much as possible, enhance or  
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support their behaviour (skills, competencies, etc), appearances 
(clothes, grooming, etc), experiences (adjustment, feelings etc) and 
status and reputation (labels, attitudes of others etc) (Wolfensberger, 
1980, p. 80).  
 
This formulation included the notion that people with disabilities should be 
shaped and changed, through their image and competencies, to be more 
acceptable to the community, and as such, it signalled a move away from an 
initial rights orientation and placed more emphasis on the roles of services 
and professionals in preparing people for community living (Chenoweth, 
2000). Because of concerns that it was greatly misunderstood, 
misinterpreted and misused, Wolfensberger (1983) later reconceptualised 
normalisation as social role valorisation (SRV). He defined SRV as “the 
creation, maintenance and defence of valued social roles for people, 
particularly those at value risk, by the use, as much as possible, of culturally 
valued means” (Wolfensberger, 1983, p. 234). 
In Australia in the 1980s, normalisation and later SRV were quickly 
embraced by the Commonwealth and State Labor governments as part of 
their social justice agenda. These policies provided the theoretical base for 
the Commonwealth Disability Services Act 1986. Its principles and 
objectives were heavily oriented towards community integration and a policy 
of deinstitutionalisation (Chenoweth, 2000).    
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Because the person’s adult peers without disability are free, within 
some limits, to express their sexuality, normalisation theory would suggest 
that adults with mental impairment should also be free to express their 
sexuality unless such expression put them at risk of being unacceptably 
exploited or harmed in any other manner.  
 
Human rights 
According to the human rights perspective, it is commonly said that 
two competing rights exist: a right to protection and a right to sexual 
expression (see, for example, Carmody, 1990, 1991; Hayes, 1993; Kennedy, 
1999; Kennedy & Niederbuhl, 2000; Sundram & Stavis, 1994). These 
statements are usually accepted without question, and this might well be 
appropriate in some jurisdictions. However, its acceptance in Australian 
jurisdictions is a matter I would like to examine here.  
UN Declarations. Australia does not have a Bill of Rights. However, 
two UN declarations ratified by Australia contain the rights of persons with 
impairment. The Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons states that 
persons with disabilities have “the same fundamental rights as their fellow-
citizens of the same age, which implies first and foremost the right to enjoy a 
decent life, as normal and full as possible” (Article 3), and that they have “the 
same fundamental rights and civil and political rights as other human beings” 
(Article 4). The Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 
states that “the mentally retarded person has, to the maximum degree of  
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feasibility the same rights as other human beings” (Article 1). Article 5 states: 
“The mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified guardian when this is 
required to protect his personal well-being and interests.”  
A third UN document. A third UN document, the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, has been signed but not yet ratified by 
Australia. In it, Article 16 (1) states that “states parties shall take all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, social, educational and other 
measures to protect persons with disabilities, both within and outside the 
home, from all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse, including their 
gender-based aspects.” Article 22 states: “No person with disabilities, 
regardless of place of residence or living arrangements, shall be subjected 
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or 
correspondence or other types of communication or to unlawful attacks on 
his or her honour and reputation. Persons with disabilities have the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” According to 
Article 25 (a), states parties must “provide persons with disabilities with the 
same range, quality and standard of free or affordable health care and 
programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual 
and reproductive health and population-based public health programmes”. 
Finally, in Article 28, states parties “recognize the right of persons with 
disabilities to social protection and to the enjoyment of that right without 
discrimination on the basis of disability…”.   
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As Australia is a signatory to all three documents, it appears that 
Australia has indicated its willingness to abide by the rights set out therein. It 
appears that, when the rights have been drafted into domestic law, persons 
with disabilities have the same rights as other citizens and that their rights 
may be limited only where justification is provided. The right of persons with 
mental impairment to protection is specifically enunciated.  
The right to sexual expression. The right to sexual expression has 
been enunciated in the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth). 
Section 4 (1) reads: “Sexual conduct involving only consenting adults acting 
in private is not to be subject, by or under any law of the Commonwealth, a 
State or a Territory, to any arbitrary interference with privacy within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.”  
The position adopted in this thesis. In this thesis I will adopt the 
position that both the right to sexual expression and the right to protection do 
in fact exist. The ideal is to achieve a balance between these competing 
rights. If a high standard of knowledge is demanded in order that the person 
with mental impairment is deemed capable of consent to sexual expression, 
the number of individuals who are able to achieve capacity will be 
diminished. The advantage of this position is that more persons will then be 
afforded whatever protection the law can provide. The cost associated with 
this approach is that it restricts freedom of sexual expression. Yet if the right 
to sexual expression is prioritised, the protection that can be given to  
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vulnerable people is undermined. The challenge is to set a legislated 
standard so that those persons who require protection are given it, and 
those who are capable are allowed the freedom to express their sexuality by 
avoiding unnecessarily paternalistic interference from the law. This thesis 
will focus upon these questions: How well does existing law fulfill the 
function of protecting persons with mental impairment from harm? How well 
does it support the right to sexual expression? What changes could be 
implemented in law to support both rights concurrently? 
 
A note on the interface between psychology and law 
Before concluding this introduction I would like to comment on the 
interface between the disciplines of psychology and law. There are quite 
significant problems where these two sit together. Psychology works in 
multifactorial space, using continuous variables. In other words, psychology 
takes account of the whole range of human experience. It does this by 
looking at a person’s position on each variable, and it examines their 
position on many variables. With regard to establishing each person’s 
capacity to consent to sexual acts, some of the variables psychology would 
be interested in are the person’s sexual knowledge, interest and desire; 
emotional volatility; self control; their ability to avoid danger; decision making 
ability; assertiveness, socialisation for compliance; life experience and 
intelligence. It is not possible to say that persons whose IQ (intelligence 
quotient) is less than a certain figure are automatically incapable of consent.  
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According to psychology, a person’s capacity to consent depends on their 
understanding of the many aspects of life, including the variables mentioned 
above, and their IQ alone is not a determining factor in their capacity to 
consent. Intelligence must be considered against a background made up of 
other variables. In contrast, the law has to make a decision on capacity 
within its framework of dichotomous variables. At the heart of the matter is 
the determination of guilt or innocence, or the capacity or incapacity of the 
complainant. In general, in law a person is either guilty or not guilty, has 
capacity or does not have capacity. There are usually no half measures or 
shades of grey. Discrimination between degrees of guilt is not possible until 
the process of sentencing.  
 
Format of the thesis. The format of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 
2, contextual and background information on the types of mental impairment 
that make suspect a person’s capacity to give consent to sexual acts, with 
special focus on intellectual disability, is given. I also examine the definitions 
of mental impairment drawn from the law and other sources. Moreover, I 
identify the Australian laws that pertain to capacity to consent. The aim of 
this section is to present a framework within which to situate the thesis.  
A history of intellectual disability and the law, from the earliest 
descriptions of mental illness and intellectual impairment, including the era of 
popularity enjoyed by the “science” of eugenics, the political policies that 
developed from that and the outcome of those policies, followed by the  
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present day laws and social strategies including the development of 
normalisation theory is presented in Chapter 3. In this section the changes in 
public and government attitudes over time and between nations are 
examined.  
Following this I begin an examination of existing Australian law in 
terms of its content. I have found three types of legislative provision: those 
that proscribe the sexual exploitation of persons with mental impairment, 
those that set out a standard of knowledge that the person with mental 
impairment must have in order to be deemed capable of consenting to a 
sexual act, and those that ban sexual relations between the person with 
mental impairment and persons who provide them with services or who are 
in a position of authority over them.  
Chapter 4 is a multi-authored published paper which examines the 
value (or lack of it) of using the term “sexual exploitation” in the law. My co-
authors and I also discuss at length laws that ban sexual relations between 
carers and those in their care and those that set out a standard of 
knowledge that the person must have in order to be deemed capable of 
giving consent to a sexual act. We examine the validity of drafting law that 
applies only to a subsection of the population, asking whether such law is 
discriminatory or paternalistic.  
Chapter 5, a second multi-authored published paper, examines the 
laws that set out a standard of necessary knowledge. It questions whether 
consent that is based on only knowledge of the nature and character of the  
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act, but specifically not the consequences of the act, as widely required by 
current law, can result in valid consent. Again, the contrast is made between 
the law as it applies to the general population and a subsection of it.  
Chapter 6 further examines the validity of consent not underpinned by 
knowledge of the consequences of the act, positing that such a decision 
does not allow the person to make a decision in their own best interests. In it 
I argue that the current standard of sexual knowledge is too low to ensure 
that any person, not necessarily a person with mental impairment, is able to 
make a real choice in their own best interests.  
Chapter 7 looks at two major discrepancies between the law that 
applies to the general population and that which applies only to the 
population with mental impairment. The first is the fact that marriage is 
allowed as a defence to charges under the relevant legislation. It is common 
knowledge that the marriage defence to charges of rape or sexual assault by 
a married person against their husband or wife has been removed from 
Australian law applying to the mainstream population.  
The second discrepancy between provisions of the general law and 
that which applies to persons with mental impairment is that in some 
jurisdictions, the penalties that apply to an offence against a mentally 
impaired person are substantially less severe than those for an offence 
against a member of the general population. It is my position that this 
inequity reflects an attitude that offences against those with mental  
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impairment are less serious than those against a member of the general 
population. This type of law can be argued to be discriminatory. 
Chapter 8 reviews the arguments made in Chapters 4 to 7 and 
extrapolates from them proposed amendments to existing law with the view 
to reducing discrepancies between the general law of sexual offences and 
those that apply only to offences committed against persons with mental 
impairment. The recommended legislative changes must deal with difficulties 
surrounding the notions of “relationship”, “exploitation”, “consent” and 
“protection”, terms that even a legal draftsperson would find difficult to deal 
with. I have advanced definitions of these terms based in part on existing 
legal definitions and on definitions drawn from other areas such as ethics.  
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises and presents the conclusions I have 
derived from my work.  
Existing literature. As I commence, I would like to note that because 
there is only a comparatively small body of legal literature on the topic of 
capacity to consent and sexuality, some citations appear repeatedly in this 
thesis. Second, there is some repetition of background information because 
chapters were written as stand alone papers and it was necessary to provide 
a context in which to situate each set of arguments. In addition, I have drawn 
on literature from the fields of disability studies; psychology; philosophy, 
especially ethics; human rights; and women’s studies. The inclusion of work 
that falls within these disciplines is useful, I believe, in that it provides a 
broad framework in which to place the thesis. It also arguably provides a  
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more contemporary context than that provided by the law alone, given the 
law’s self-referential discourse.   
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Chapter 2: Context and background 
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The difficulties of defining intellectual disability 
It has long been recognised that there are different degrees of 
cognitive impairment, and levels of impairment have been named (and 
renamed in more politically correct ways). With regard to cutoff points for 
each level of impairment, the reason that I will use approximations is that 
different sources contain small differences in cutoff points for mild, 
moderate, severe and profound classifications. Furthermore, a low IQ score 
alone is not taken to be necessarily indicative of intellectual disability, though 
it should be reason for further assessment. For example, the definition of 
intellectual disability offered by the American Association on Mental 
Retardation (AAMR) reads:  
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present 
functioning. It is characterised by significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or 
more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, 
self care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, 
health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work. Mental 
retardation manifests before age 18 (AAMR, 1992, p. 1). 
 
The AAMR designates the cutoff point for intellectual impairment as IQ 
scores of between 70 and 75. In a similar vein, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV-TR, 1994, p. 46) 
defines mental retardation according to three major criteria:  
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A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test (for 
infants, a clinical judgment of significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning). 
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning 
(i.e., the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for 
his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the 
following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety. 
C. Onset is before age 18 years. 
 
It can be seen that while there are commonalities between these definitions, 
namely the presence of significantly subaverage IQ, deficits in life skills and 
onset before age 18, there is controversy over the point at which IQ scores 
should be recognised as indicators of serious deficits in intellectual function 
when combined with other adaptive deficits. For the purpose of this thesis, 
cutoff points are probably moot, since most people whose IQ is 
approximately 70 would usually be capable of consent (O’Callaghan & 
Murphy, 2002), unless education in sexual matters had been withheld. 
People with IQ scores around 70 are usually able meet some Australian 
jurisdiction’s current criteria for capacity to consent, meaning that they are 
aware of the nature of sexual relations, are usually able to protect  
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themselves against exploitation and in many cases are aware of the 
consequences of sexual activity. The intellectual functioning of a 
complainant who was alleged to be incapable of consent would be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis by an expert on intellectual disability (McSherry, 
1998a). Of course, the assessment process must be conducted using a set 
of criteria; it is the validity of the criteria that are being used to establish 
whether or not the individual is capable that is central to this thesis. 
According to Davis (1996), the courts are likely to examine the chronological 
and mental ages of the person, their IQ, their adaptive skills, school 
attendance, knowledge not only of the sexual act but also of pregnancy and 
STDs, ability to resist coercion, and understanding of the moral dimensions 
of sex.  
 
Incidence 
The incidence of persons with intellectual disability is estimated to be 
between 2 and 3 percent of the population (McSherry, 1999; Wen, 1997). 
Most intellectual disability is classified as mild, which means that the person 
has an IQ score between approximately 50 and 70, where 100 is the 
population mean (Irish Law Reform Commission, 1990; Oltmanns & Emery, 
2001). IQ scores between approximately 35 and 49 signify moderate 
impairment, those between 20 and 34 are categorised as severe 
impairment, and persons whose IQ score is less than 20 are classified as 
having profound impairment. These classifications are listed in descending  
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order of prevalence; mild levels of disability are much more common than 
profound disability, which is least likely to occur. Individuals with a mild level 
of disability are usually able to live relatively independently (Wen, 1997). Of 
all gradations of intellectual disability, these individuals would be the most 
likely to be deemed capable of consenting to sexual acts according to 
current law, assuming that they had received education in sexual matters.   
 
Description of the relevant laws 
There are differences in the mental conditions that render a 
prosecution possible under legislation that defines sexual offences against 
persons with mental impairment. In the past, the Criminal Code (WA) 
contained statutory sexual offences against women with mental impairment. 
In R v Lindsay (1984), it was stated: "For the purposes of ss 188 and 189 of 
the Criminal Code (WA) an imbecile is a person in whose case there exists 
mental defectiveness, which though not amounting to idiocy, (as defined in 
the Mental Deficiency Act 1927 (Imp)), is yet so pronounced that she is 
incapable of managing herself or her affairs, such incapacity extending to 
and including an incapacity to make a reasoned judgment as to whether she 
should or should not consent to an act of a sexual nature proposed in 
relation to her."  
Under contemporary law, Western Australia’s Criminal Code s 330 
defines offences that may under some circumstances be committed against 
persons who are mentally impaired. The term “mental impairment” is defined  
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in the Criminal Code (WA) s 1 as intellectual disability, mental illness, brain 
damage or senility. “Mental illness” is defined under the same section as an 
underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of short or long 
duration and whether permanent or temporary, but does not include a 
condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary 
stimuli. Intellectual disability is left undefined.   
The precise contemporary definition of incapacity to consent, initiated 
into the WA Criminal Code by the Acts Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act of 
1992, is specified in the new section, which states:   
In this section a reference to an incapable person is a reference to a 
person who is so mentally impaired as to be incapable — 
(a) of understanding the nature of the act the subject of the charge 
against the accused person; or 
(b) of guarding himself or herself against sexual exploitation. 
The remaining subsections define specific offences, penalties and defences 
available to charges under this section. 
In the ACT, no precise definition is given in the Crimes Act 1900 
(ACT) of the underlying reason for mental incapacity that vitiates consent. 
Section 67 simply states that consent is negated by mental incapacity to 
understand the nature of the act in relation to which the consent is given.  
The legislation of South Australia and New South Wales prohibits 
sexual offences with incapable persons where the incapacity is caused by  
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intellectual disability. In South Australia, no definition is given of the term 
“intellectual disability”. The New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 s 61H (1A) 
defines intellectual disability as appreciably below average general 
intellectual function that results in the person requiring supervision or social 
habilitation in connection with daily life activities.  
Sexual offences against “intellectually impaired persons” are defined 
in the Criminal Code (Qld) s216. Under s 229F, "intellectually impaired 
persons" are persons who have a disability attributable to an intellectual, 
psychiatric, cognitive or neurological impairment or a combination of these 
that results in a substantial reduction of the person's capacity for 
communication, social interaction or learning and the person needing 
support.  
In Tasmania, the term mental impairment covers senility, intellectual 
disability, mental illness and brain damage (Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 
1924  s 126). The Northern Territory Criminal Code s130 defines offences 
against persons with mental illness or handicap. However, these terms are 
not defined in the Criminal Code.  
The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 50 defines offences against persons 
with “cognitive impairment”. Section 50 states that the impairment may result 
from mental illness, intellectual disability, dementia or brain injury. 
Intellectual disability, in relation to a person over the age of 5 years, means 
the concurrent existence of significant sub-average general intellectual  
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functioning, and significant deficits in adaptive behaviour, each of which 
became manifest before the age of 18 years. 
The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49 (6) applies only 
in respect of intellectually disabled persons who do not understand the 
nature or consequences of the sexual act, and so where the victim describes 
his or her own understanding in terms that are sufficient there cannot be a 
conviction unless expert or other evidence clearly shows that this apparent 
understanding was not real (R v Richardson, 1990, SCSA). In cases of 
sexual offences against a person whose lack of knowledge vitiates consent, 
intellectual disability need only be a substantial contributing cause of the 
victim’s lack of understanding and not the sole cause (R v Beattie, 1981, 
SCSA).   
The Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 7.3 (8) defines 
mental impairment as including senility, intellectual disability, mental illness, 
brain damage and severe personality disorder. 
Evaluation of definitions of intellectual disability found in Australian 
law. It seems that the definition of cognitive impairment found in Victorian 
law is the most similar to the definition found in DSM-IV-TR. The law of the 
other Australian jurisdictions is consistent with sound psychological 
understandings of domain-specific IQ and decision-making capacity. 
Types of legislative provisions. Statutes defining sexual offences 
against persons with mental impairment have been enacted in all Australian 
states and territories. These statutes may be categorised by the physical or  
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external element relating to the victim. The first type of statute adopted in 
Australian jurisdictions criminalises the sexual exploitation of persons with 
mental impairment. This category of law has been adopted by New South 
Wales (Crimes Act 1900 s 66F) and Western Australia (Criminal Code s 
330). Conversely, Queensland allows a defence if the prosecution is unable 
to prove that the act was exploitative (Criminal Code s 216). The major 
problem with prohibiting exploitation is that this term is impossible to define 
with any precision, and therefore judgments must be made on a case by 
case basis. The benefit of leaving exploitation undefined is that it does not 
limit the kind of case that can be tried. Although the normal practice of the 
criminal law is to judge each case according to its peculiar facts, it is usual to 
have guidelines according to precedent and statute that provide direction to 
judges and juries as to the placement of this particular case among others of 
the same general type. In the case of sexual exploitation, however, no 
guidance from statute is available, and there is very little case law on which 
to rely.  
A second form of provision is to set out a standard of knowledge that 
the person must have before they are deemed capable of consent. In 
Western Australia (Criminal Code s 330) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(Crimes Act 1900 s 67), the person with mental impairment must understand 
the physical and sexual nature of the act to which they are consenting. 
South Australia is unique among Australian jurisdictions in requiring not only  
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capacity to understand the nature of the act, but also the consequences of 
the act (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 49).  
The final category of statute is that which prohibits sexual relations 
between a person with mental impairment and persons involved in their 
care. Victoria (Crimes Act 1958 ss 51 & 52), New South Wales (Crimes Act 
1900 s 66F), Tasmania (Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126) and the Northern 
Territory (Criminal Code s 130) have adopted this approach. The 
vulnerability of an impaired person to overt or covert coercion by a person on 
whom they are dependent for care is immediately apparent. The 
disadvantage of these statutes is that they restrict an already limited number 
of potential sexual partners to people who are not in a position of 
responsibility 
Differences in the victim’s mental condition. There are differences in 
the mental conditions of the victim that render a prosecution possible under 
legislation that defines sexual offences against persons with mental 
impairment. Western Australia’s Criminal Code s 330 defines offences. The 
term “mental impairment” is defined in the Criminal Code (WA) s 1 as 
intellectual disability, mental illness, brain damage or senility. “Mental illness” 
is defined under the same section as an underlying pathological infirmity of 
the mind, whether of short or long duration and whether permanent or 
temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of 
a healthy mind to extraordinary stimuli. Intellectual disability is left undefined.    
 
23
In the ACT, no precise definition is given in the Crimes Act 1900 
(ACT) of the underlying reason for mental incapacity that vitiates consent. 
Section 67 simply states that consent is negated by mental incapacity to 
understand the nature of the act in relation to which the consent is given.  
The legislation of South Australia and New South Wales prohibits 
sexual offences with incapable persons where the incapacity is caused by 
intellectual disability. In South Australia, no definition is given of the term 
“intellectual disability”. The New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 s 661H 
defines intellectual disability as appreciably below average general 
intellectual function that results in the person requiring supervision or social 
habilitation in connection with daily life activities.  
Sexual offences against “intellectually impaired persons” are defined 
in the Criminal Code (Qld) s 216. Under s 229F, "intellectually impaired 
persons" are persons who have a disability attributable to an intellectual, 
psychiatric, cognitive or neurological impairment or a combination of these 
that results in a substantial reduction of the person's capacity for 
communication, social interaction or learning and the person needing 
support.  
In Tasmania, the term mental impairment covers senility, intellectual 
disability, mental illness and brain damage (Tasmanian Criminal Code Act  
1924 s 126). The Northern Territory Criminal Code s 130 defines offences  
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against persons with mental illness or handicap. However, these terms are 
not defined in the Criminal Code.  
The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 50 defines offences against persons 
with “cognitive impairment”. Section 50 states that the impairment may result 
from mental illness, intellectual disability, dementia or brain injury. 
Intellectual disability, in relation to a person over the age of 5 years, means 
the concurrent existence of significant sub-average general intellectual 
functioning, and significant deficits in adaptive behaviour, each of which 
became manifest before the age of 18 years. 
The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49 (6) applies only 
in respect of intellectually disabled persons who do not understand the 
nature or consequences of the sexual act, and so where the victim describes 
his or her own understanding in terms that are sufficient there cannot be a 
conviction unless expert or other evidence clearly shows that this apparent 
understanding was not real (R v Richardson, 1990, SCSA). In cases of 
sexual offences against a person whose lack of knowledge vitiates consent, 
intellectual disability need only be a substantial contributing cause of the 
victim’s lack of understanding and not the sole cause (R v Beattie, 1981, 
SCSA).  
In all jurisdictions, the intellectual disability of the victim that interferes 
with understanding the nature of the sexual act provides sufficient cause to 
make charges under the special sections of legislation that define offences 
of incapacity, although in NSW no charges may be laid without prior referral  
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to the Attorney General.
1 In this thesis, sustained attention is given to the 
application of the law in cases where persons with intellectual disability are 
involved, because catering to the needs of these persons presents complex 
and unique issues not found when dealing with other forms of mental 
impairment. Persons with intellectual disability are perhaps the most 
challenging subpopulation in terms of drafting legislation that is protective 
without being unnecessarily restrictive of sexual freedom. I explore this topic 
in depth when discussing sexual exploitation in Chapter 4.  
Without consent. A key concept is to distinguish between acts that are 
apparently consensual and those that are definitely non-consensual. 
Although in law a sexual act that occurs without consent due to the fact that 
one person is incapable of giving consent is the equivalent of an act that is 
against the person’s will, it is non-consensual acts which are due to 
incapacity which are the focus of this thesis. Just as acts committed without 
consent because the victim is unconscious or asleep can form the subject of 
criminal charges, so too can sexual acts with an apparently acquiescent 
person who cannot give consent because they are incapable. 
2 
A person who is incapable by definition cannot consent to sex. But 
they may still refuse to engage in a proposed act. In other words, being 
incapable of giving consent does not mean that the individual is incapable of 
withholding consent. Although an incapable person cannot legally say “yes” 
to a sexual act, they can say “no” to the same act. An incapable person may 
                                            
1 Crimes Act 1900 s 66F (6). 
2 See Banditt v R (2005) 224 CLR 262.  
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be quite able to indicate that they definitely do not want to participate, 
although of course there does not have to be overt resistance for the act to 
constitute sexual assault. According to the Victorian Crimes Act 1958 s 
37AAA (d): “that the fact that a person did not say or do anything to indicate 
free agreement to a sexual act at the time at which the act took place is 
enough to show that the act took place without that person's free 
agreement”. Similarly, s 61HA(3) (c) (d) and (e) of the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) state: “A person who has sexual intercourse with another person 
without the consent of the other person knows that the other person does 
not consent to the sexual intercourse if: (c) the person has no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the other person consents to the sexual 
intercourse. For the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of fact 
must have regard to all the circumstances of the case: (d) including any 
steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents to 
the sexual intercourse, but (e) not including any self-induced intoxication of 
the person.” Statements with similar meanings are to be found in the laws of 
other Australian jurisdictions.
 3 
I will examine the relevant law of all Australian jurisdictions, but 
Western Australian law forms the major focus of this thesis. The first reason 
for this is that Western Australia has, on a number of occasions, developed 
social policies that are at the forefront of thinking in this area. One example 
is the use of a scheme to grade hostel residents according to their life skills, 
and to allow those who acquired more sophisticated skills to graduate to a 
                                            
3 For example: SA Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 s 48; WA Criminal Code s 319.  
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more skilled hostel and so on until their eventual move into the community. 
Another is the introduction of a policy of sex education of persons with 
intellectual disability who had been recently deinstitutionalised. The course 
included in matters such as sexuality, sexual exploitation and human 
relations. The second reason for my choice of a Western Australian setting 
for this thesis is the historical treatment of persons with intellectual disability 
in Western Australia, which has in many respects typified that of many other 
jurisdictions. Thus Western Australia provides an enlightened framework in 
which to place the thesis.   
I will not review the literature on consent in contexts other than sexual 
offences, such as tort or contract law. The meaning of consent varies 
according to the area of law under consideration (Young, 1986). Even in one 
context, determination of capacity to consent may be extremely difficult: a 
person may possess capacity to consent to some activities but not to others, 
or they may have possessed capacity at one time but have lost it through 
permanent or temporary mental impairment. In the latter situation capacity 
may be regained, though evaluation of the presence or absence of capacity 
may be difficult, especially when understanding of the act, its positive and 
negative consequences, and alternative courses of action, which underpins 
informed consent, is not legally required. This is the case with matters of 
sexuality.     
Returning to capacity to consent to sexual acts in Australian law, in 
the Victorian case R v Morgan (1970) VR 337 at 341, it was held that for  
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incapacity to consent to be proved it must be shown that “[a person] has not 
sufficient knowledge or understanding to comprehend (a) that what is 
proposed to be done is the physical fact of penetration of her body by the 
male organ or, if that is not proved, (b) that the act of penetration proposed 
is one of sexual connexion as distinct from one of totally different character.” 
This precedent has never been overturned, so it would be likely to be relied 
upon in the common law jurisdictions except South Australia, where it is an 
offence to knowingly have sexual intercourse with a person who is by reason 
of intellectual disability unable to understand the nature or consequences of 
the act (SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 49).  
Legal advances in the determination of informed consent may have 
been driven by legal obligations to obtain informed consent, especially in 
relation to capacity to consent to medical procedures and to participation in 
research. There is wide acceptance of, and adherence to, the following 
principles among bodies that regulate such activities: the person must be 
given the relevant information regarding risks, harms, benefits, and 
alternatives to the proposed course of action; they must have the capacity to 
comprehend that information; they must understand it; they must actually 
make a decision; and that decision must be voluntary and free of coercion 
(Dharmananda, 1992). In the case of a medical procedure, it may be a 
relatively simple matter to establish whether the person has the required 
level of understanding. Indeed, questions of capacity tend to be forgotten if 
the person makes a decision that is consistent with the opinion of the  
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medical practitioner. It is decisions that are incongruent with those of the 
clinician that sometimes raise questions of capacity (Eastman & Dahr, 
2000).  
In theory, competence is judged according to a person’s cognitive 
capacity, and not on the basis of the exercise of this per se, and 
therefore, not on the basis of the content of the decision the person 
reaches. In practice, these latter features often play a role in the 
determination of competence, because they can be used as evidence 
indicating a lack of the necessary cognitive capacity (Somerville, 
1994, p. 192). 
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Chapter 3: A history of intellectual disability, sexuality, and 
the developing law 
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Academic aptitude was less necessary to successful living in earlier, 
agrarian societies than it is in our modern, technological world. Thus 
many people seen as having mild mental retardation today would not 
have been viewed as having notable problems in the past. Even 
today, mental retardation is defined differently in more industrialized 
countries than in less industrialized ones because of the educational 
and technological requirements for work in the industrialized countries 
(Oltmanns & Emery, 2001, p. 516).  
 
Although academic achievement was less important in earlier times, and 
individuals with mild mental impairment would have blended more easily into 
society than they do today, there is evidence that intellectual impairment was 
in actual fact not as common in archaic society as it is in contemporary 
society. The incidence of Down syndrome, which in modern society is the 
most common cause of intellectual disability, occurring in 0.11% of persons, 
is positively correlated to maternal age. The probability of having a baby with 
the syndrome increases as the mother ages. Women over 35 are particularly 
at risk of having a child with Down syndrome. In ancient times, however, life 
expectancy was only 20 to 30 years. Women had children at earlier ages, 
and therefore it might be expected that the incidence of Down syndrome 
would be much lower than it is today. An examination of European 
graveyard remains dating from 3200BC to 800AD for the cranio-facial 
features indicative of Down syndrome revealed that of 7063 bodies, only 1  
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showed the facial bone structure typical of the condition. This reflects an 
incidence of Down syndrome approximately one tenth of the modern rate 
(Czarnetzki, Blin & Pusch, 2003). 
Bragg (1997) is also of the opinion that disabilities were both less 
common and less limiting than they are in modern society. He reported 
evidence that in early societies, the killing of infants born with congenital 
abnormalities was common practice. This he attributed to the fact that a 
community that depended on the contribution of each individual for its 
survival could not support a person who required lifelong care. In the Middle 
Ages, however, people with acquired disability (as opposed to congenital 
abnormality) were often chosen for important roles such as mystic, shaman, 
or priest. These persons were not in any sense marginalised, but rather 
were respected members of the community. Indeed, some conditions that 
would be called disabilities today were valued in early societies. It was 
thought that such persons had traded ordinary sensation such as sight for 
the extraordinary ability to see the future. Behaviour that would be identified 
as psychotic in modern society was regarded as evidence of connection with 
divine entities (Bragg, 1997).  
A special connection to God was sometimes also attributed to 
persons with intellectual disabilities, although Martin Luther promoted a 
converse belief that people with intellectual disability had no souls and 
should be killed (Megahey, 2000). Thus, throughout history persons with 
mental impairment or illness have been the subjects of polarised opinion and  
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treatment, depending on the era and society in which they found 
themselves. 
Mental illness and intellectual disability. Although it is often said that 
the concept of intellectual disability did not emerge as distinct from mental 
illness until the end of the seventeenth century, the distinction was made in 
thirteenth century English law, where the “natural fool” was described as 
witless from birth, in contrast to the lunatic who had lost the use of his 
reason through a variety of causes (Megahey, 2000). Under the thirteenth 
century Statute of Prerogatives in the Common Law, intellectually impaired 
individuals were stripped of their right of inheritance (Davis, 1996). Thus 
those with intellectual disability were sometimes recognised and were the 
victims of discrimination. 
A trio of physicians who lived between the end of the fifteenth and the 
mid seventeenth centuries, namely Paracelsus, Platter and Willis, are 
commonly credited with early descriptions of intellectual disability (Goodey, 
2004; Megahey, 2000). Goodey argued that these physicians use of the 
terms stultitia, fatuitas, or stupiditas, signifying “foolishness” was so broad 
and imprecise that they could not be equated with any modern definition of 
intellectual impairment. Yet Goodey’s criticism may be due to his 
underestimation of the difficulty of defining intellectual disability. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, the criteria for intellectual disability are still disputed today.  
Labelling and categorisation. Nevertheless, the labelling (stemming 
from the recognition) of people with obvious deficits in intellectual ability as  
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“idiots” dates back to at least the Middle Ages (Megahey, 2000). These 
unfortunates were likely to find themselves cast out on the streets, living in 
poorhouses, or confined to institutions or asylums for the mentally ill 
(Oltmanns & Emery, 2001). By the nineteenth century, categories such as 
“imbecile” and “moron” emerged to denote gradations in the severity of 
disability (Megahey, 2000). The term “feebleminded” was coined in 1866 by 
P. Martin Duncan and William Millard in their publication A Manual for the 
Classification, Training and Education of the Feebleminded, Imbecile, and 
Idiotic, and was applied to persons with mild intellectual disability who had 
not been institutionalised but who were deficient in academic or social 
achievement (Jackson, 2003).  
Incurable or not? Most eighteenth and nineteenth century writers 
regarded intellectual disability that warranted institutionalisation as incurable, 
due to their belief in biological determinism. An exception was Itard, director 
of the Institute for Deaf Mutes in Paris, who believed that changes in 
environment would impact upon achievement. He was able to test his idea 
when he was brought a child who had been discovered running wild in the 
forest. “The Wild Boy of Aveyron”, called Victor by Itard, was given basic 
socialisation training. After five years, he was able to understand speech, 
recognise objects, and had acquired some social skills. But Victor did not 
learn to speak, which Itard interpreted as evidence of his failure as a teacher 
rather than evidence of the intractable nature of intellectual impairment 
(Megahey, 2000).   
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Itard’s protégé Seguin undertook the education of a number of 
children with intellectual disabilities and in 1846 published a book on training 
and treatment. He immigrated to the United States where a number of 
residential schools that operated on his methods were opened. The results 
produced in these schools demonstrated that intellectual disability was not 
always immutable. Indeed, many techniques in use today are based on 
Seguin’s work (Megahey, 2000).  
So successful was Seguin’s training that it gave rise to the belief that 
given sufficient intervention, all persons with intellectual disability could 
eventually return to the community (Mesibov, 1976). This of course was not 
the case, and with this discovery came disillusionment, especially when the 
numbers of people with intellectual disability appeared to be increasing as 
the nineteenth century progressed (Ryan & Thomas, 1987). It is not clear 
whether this increase was real or illusory, and, real or not, what might have 
brought it to attention, but it resulted in a return to the custodial model and a 
swing away from the educational approach (Megahey, 2000).  
 
Western Australia 
In the early Western Australian colony the educational approach had 
never been implemented. Megahey (2000) attributed this adherence to the 
custodial model to the early struggle of the colonial population for survival. In 
times of privation, no public resources were available to provide food or 
shelter for persons with mental impairment. From the time of first settlement 
in 1829 until the Fremantle Asylum was built in 1857, persons with mental  
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illness and intellectual impairment who could not be cared for by family were 
sent either to gaol or to the Colonial Hospital. The fate of such persons 
rested with the Governor, rather than with medical authority. Although few 
records remain of this era, it seems clear that little medical or psychological 
expertise was available locally, and in any case there were no facilities for 
the treatment of persons with mental impairment. As a result, inmates with 
mental illness or mental impairment were viewed by authorities as a 
nuisance or worse. They were isolated from other inmates and restraint was 
commonly used to ensure compliance (Megahey, 2000).  
Ellis (1984) noted an increase in the numbers of reports of “criminal 
lunatics” in the years following the introduction of convicts to Western 
Australia in 1850. This increase led to the establishment of the Fremantle 
Asylum in 1857. According to Megahey (2000), over the next several 
decades, Western Australian medical personnel showed a puzzling inability 
to discriminate between mental illness and intellectual disability, despite the 
well-established distinction made between these conditions in Europe. In 
law, Western Australia followed an outdated 1845 British model when 
enacting the Lunacy Act 1871, which stated: “Lunacy shall mean and include 
every person of unsound mind and every person being an idiot.” In 1903 a 
new Lunacy Act was passed, which retained this definition, though “lunatic” 
was replaced with “insane person”. As a result, many persons with 
intellectual disability were incarcerated with persons with mental illness in 
the Fremantle Asylum. Similarly, people perceived as economic or moral  
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threats were sent to the Asylum by doctors even in the absence of any 
evidence of mental impairment. Paupers were routinely incarcerated, as was 
a woman whose grief over the death of her child was interpreted as mental 
illness. Even intellectually impaired children as young as 9 were sent to the 
Asylum. Not surprisingly, the 45-bed facility became overcrowded; by 1896 it 
accommodated 190 people (Megahey, 2000). 
In 1900, conditions in the Fremantle Asylum were brought to public 
attention by the press (Gillgren, 2000). The government-appointed Vosper 
Inquiry recommended a new institution be built and a new superintendent be 
appointed to replace the incumbent who devoted little time and attention to 
the Asylum (Megahey, 2000). These recommendations were followed: the 
new institution was Claremont Hospital for the Insane and the new 
superintendent was Dr Montgomery. Montgomery was instrumental in the 
enactment of the 1903 Lunacy Act. It introduced the requirement that 
insanity be medically certified by two doctors, and it prohibited doctors from 
treating persons they had committed. But it still failed to discriminate 
between mental illness and intellectual impairment. The widespread belief in 
Europe and America that the incidence of the latter condition was rising was 
echoed in Australia (Gillgren, 2000). This perceived rise in the incidence of 
intellectual deficit may have been a contributory factor to the enthusiastic 
and widespread reception of eugenic ideals. Eugenics emerged at a time 
that was curiously suited to it in terms of political, social and economic 
attitudes. Whether the new “science” was a product of such attitudes or  
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whether it helped to shape popular opinion is a moot point. Eugenics quickly 
became one of the most influential social policies of the early twentieth 
century. 
 
The eugenic era 
 
UNFIT HUMAN TRAITS such as feeblemindedness, epilepsy, 
criminality, insanity, alcoholism, pauperism and many others, run in 
families and are inherited in exactly the same way as color in guinea 
pigs. If ALL MARRIAGES WERE EUGENIC we could BREED OUT 
most of this unfitness in THREE GENERATIONS (Wording of a poster 
that was shown at American state fairs in the 1930s; Kevles, 1999, 
p. 436).  
 
The term eugenics was first used in 1883 by Francis Galton to 
indicate the improvement of the human species through selective breeding 
(Engs, 2005). By 1900 eugenics had gained popularity due to the 
reemergence of Mendel’s theory of genetic inheritance and its application to 
human heredity (Kevles, 1999). It was widely believed that 
feeblemindedness was inherited, that it was linked to crime, prostitution, 
poverty and a variety of other social problems (Kevles, 1999; Williams, 
2000), and that the feebleminded were prolific breeders (Williams, 2000).   
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In Australia, as elsewhere, there were fears that the “lower classes” 
would proliferate at a rate that would swamp the “upper classes”; this 
concern led to a series of surveys to establish the incidence of 
feeblemindedness. The first report of 1902 has not survived, but the 
Australasian Medical Congress committee report of 1914 stated that 4% of 
schoolchildren were definitely feebleminded and a further 12% were dull and 
required special training (Williams, 2000). Although Williams noted that a 
large amount of data was missing from the report, the reason for these high 
figures is not clear. It may be that standardised testing was not used, or it 
may be that cut-off points for determining intellectual disability were high (at 
one time the United States cut-off was one standard deviation below the 
mean intelligence quotient with the result that almost 15% of the population 
were classified as mentally defective: Oltmanns & Emery, 2001). Whatever 
its cause, such figures lent credence to eugenic claims.  
In 1904, Galton addressed a meeting of the Sociological Society: 
“The aim of eugenics is to bring as many influences as can be reasonably 
employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute more 
than their proportion to the next generation” (italics in original, p. 3). Galton 
advocated “education” of the public on the laws of heredity. He 
recommended that research be conducted into the reasons behind the rise 
and fall of civilisation, which he believed was attributable to a lack of fertility 
amongst the upper classes. He also advocated investigation into the 
circumstances that produced “thriving families”, which he defined as those  
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with at least three adult male children who had risen socially above others of 
their class and who therefore could be regarded as a success; the social 
disapproval of eugenically unsuitable marriages; and introduction of 
eugenics “into the national conscience, like a new religion” (Galton, 1904, p. 
5). 
Positive and negative measures were advocated by Galton and his 
fellow eugenicists to bring about the improvement of the quality of the 
human race. Positive eugenic acts were aimed at manipulating human 
heredity or breeding, or both, to produce superior people; the goal of 
negative eugenics was to eliminate or exclude biologically inferior people 
from the population (Kevles, 1999). By the end of the nineteenth century, it 
had been recognised that mildly feebleminded women were vulnerable to 
exploitation and were therefore thought to be legitimate targets for 
paternalistic intervention. This intervention took the form of segregation in 
homes, schools, or agricultural colonies, where close supervision would not 
only limit reproduction, but would allow both male and female inmates to be 
taught to work and so contribute to their own upkeep (Jackson, 2003).  
That the institutionalised feebleminded should contribute to their own 
upkeep was an appealing concept to wealthy conservatives. Moreover, 
adoption of a policy of eugenics would restrict the reproduction of the lowest 
income groups, and consequently would reduce the cost of caring for their 
offspring. To conservatives, the primary benefit of eugenic policy was in 
terms of savings in government expenditure (Kevles, 1999). Eugenics was  
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very much based on the principle of efficiency: a simple and cost-effective 
sterilisation prevented the cost of care of “deficient” offspring in the future 
(Allen, 1997). In the 1870s, a eugenicist named Dugdale claimed to have 
traced the family of one Ada Jukes, a “degenerate” American woman who 
lived in the early 1700s. Among her descendants were “64 mentally 
diseased, 174 sex perverts, 196 illegitimates, 142 paupers, and 77 criminals 
and murderers” (Allen, 1997, p. 82), who had cost the state of New York 
over $1.3 million (Kuhl, 1994). Eugenicists claimed that her sterilisation 
would have saved the state all but $150 of that amount (Allen, 1997).  
The “efficiency” of eugenics appealed not only to political 
conservatives, but also to progressives. Progressives believed that through 
the application of scientific discoveries, society could be improved. There 
was widespread belief in eugenic claims that social problems were 
attributable to genes (or to use the terminology of the day, “germ plasm”), 
and that inherited conditions might be remedied by selective breeding 
(Kevles, 1999). The result was that progressives, as well as conservatives, 
were attracted by eugenicist solutions to perceived social problems.  
Eugenic beliefs were translated into practice through the 
establishment, in the early years of the twentieth century, of institutes the 
aim of which was to determine the links between phenotype and genotype. 
Information was publicly disseminated on the undesirability of “defective” 
persons reproducing. The recent development of standardised intelligence 
testing by Binet in 1904, accompanied by introduction of the concept of  
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mental age by his colleague Simon, heightened interest in the application of 
science for the betterment of mankind (Kevles, 1995).  
Binet and Simon’s test was introduced to the United States in 1908 by 
Henry Goddard, who was director of the Training School for Feeble-minded 
Girls and Boys at Vineland, New Jersey (Engs, 2005; Kevles, 1995). 
Goddard tested Vineland children and members of their families, and 
researched their family history. In 1912 he published The Kallikak Family, 
which traced the family history of one pupil. Kallikak was a pseudonym 
derived from the Greek kalos (good) and kakos (bad) (Kevles, 1995). The 
“bad” Kallikaks were descended from offspring conceived by an affair 
between a Revolutionary War soldier named Martin and a nameless 
feebleminded girl. Goddard traced 480 of these descendants and considered 
that only 46 of them were normal. Martin later married an “upstanding 
woman”. Four hundred and ninety-six descendants were traced, and almost 
all were respectable citizens, property owners and professionals (Elks, 2005; 
Engs, 2005; Kevles, 1995). Goddard claimed that the Kallikaks were living 
proof of the heritability of feeblemindedness and his work was widely 
publicised in popular magazines as well as in academic circles (Elks, 2005). 
Family histories such as the Kallikaks and the Jukes were used by 
eugenicists to support their calls for the introduction of compulsory 
sterilisation law (Kuhl, 1994). The eugenic social action program of research 
and public education begun by Galton was so successful that 
institutionalisation and segregation by gender became mandated by law in  
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many countries throughout the world (Allen, 1997; Jaeger & Bowman, 2005; 
Kevles, 1999).  
In Britain, the 1913 enactment of the Mental Deficiency Act meant 
that institutionalisation of feebleminded children and adults could be legally 
enforced (Jackson, 2003; Searle, 1976). In Australia, lunacy laws such as 
the Lunacy Act 1898 (NSW) and the previously mentioned Lunacy Act 1903 
(WA) provided the legal basis for similar institutionalisation of persons with 
mental illness or intellectual impairment. In New South Wales, the policy of 
institutionalisation continued well into the twentieth century. But in Western 
Australia, humane concern over the treatment of the “insane” led to the 
Royal Commission on Lunacy of 1922. The Commission report improved the 
lot of incarcerated people by acknowledging degrees of mental impairment, 
and by recommending the separation of treatable cases and incurables. It 
also led to enactment of the Mental Treatment Act 1927. Unfortunately, 
under that Act persons with intellectual impairment were still viewed as 
incurable (Gillgren, 2000).  
Despite being thought incurable, in Australia persons with intellectual 
disability were never subjected to routine sterilisation. Although a sterilisation 
law was debated in Australia throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Wyndham, 
2003), it was never enacted (Williams, 2000; Wyndham, 2003). It was also 
debated without result in Britain (Engs, 2005). Law enabling voluntary 
sterilisation was passed in British Columbia in 1933 (Wyndham, 2003). 
Involuntary sterilisation was legalised in 24 American states, beginning with  
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Indiana in 1907; some of these laws still exist though they are rarely 
enforced. A similar law was passed in the Canadian province of Alberta, 
where discharge from institutions of psychiatric or intellectually impaired 
persons became conditional upon agreement to undergo sterilisation 
(Wyndham, 2003). Involuntary sterilisation was also legalised in all the 
Scandinavian countries and, of course, in National Socialist Germany (Engs, 
2005).   
For years before the Nazi ascent to power, eugenicists of the United 
States and Germany had provided mutual support to each other, each using 
successes in the other country as an example to overcome opposition in 
their own country. The first International Congress devoted to eugenics was 
held in London in 1912. Americans were particularly well received; they had 
already succeeded in influencing legislation restricting marriage of the unfit, 
and in enabling involuntary sterilisation in six states. German eugenicists 
viewed the United States as the world leader in bringing Galton’s dreams to 
life, but despite concerted lobbying, they did not succeed at this stage in 
mandating sterilisation of the unfit in their own country. World War I 
intervened, and afterward, German delegates were either ostracised from or 
refused invitations to further international gatherings of eugenicists (Kuhl, 
1994).  
By 1925, relations were restored. Americans such as Charles 
Davenport, director of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbour, 
New York and Germans such as Fritz Lenz, co-editor of the major racial  
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hygiene journal, provided links between the two countries for the 
dissemination of information, visits and exchanges. The first American 
eugenic restrictions were placed on immigration in 1924; these were 
primarily based on ethnic origin, with applicants of non-Anglo Saxon heritage 
being deemed undesirable (Allen, 1997). In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld 
Virginian sterilisation law in Buck v Bell.
4 
 Giving the majority decision, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes stated: “It is better for everybody if society, instead of 
waiting until it has to execute degenerate offspring or leave them to starve 
because of feeblemindedness, can prevent obviously inferior individuals 
from propagating their own kind… Three generations of imbeciles is enough” 
(p. 1159).  
By the end of the 1920s, there was enormous interest in the effect of 
sterilisation and restrictions on marriage and immigration as they were 
applied in the United States (Kuhl, 1994). Germans saw that American racial 
eugenic policy, which was directed particularly against Blacks (Reilly, 1983), 
was an excellent model for parallel policies that would be directed against 
Jews and eastern European immigrants (Kuhl, 1994). This was the climate 
into which Adolf Hitler was elected as leader of the German people in 1933. 
The “efficiency” of eugenics was particularly appealing to the Nazi 
regime. Efficiency was the watchword of the German nation of this era. The 
country had suffered deprivations under the Treaty of Versailles and was in 
dire economic straits due to rampant inflation during the 1920s and early 
30s. Every citizen was expected to be productive. People who could not 
                                            
4 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
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support themselves were viewed as a burden on a society that was engaged 
in a struggle for survival (Weiss, 1990).  
In 1933, six months after the Nazi Party came to power, the German 
Reichstag passed the “Law on the Prevention of Hereditary Diseases in 
Future Generations”. This law provided for the involuntary sterilisation, by 
force if necessary, of any person 10 years and over who had one of eight 
hereditary diseases. These were: inborn mental deficiency, schizophrenia, 
circular insanity (bipolar disorder), hereditary falling sickness (epilepsy), 
hereditary St. Vitus’ dance (Huntington’s disease), hereditary blindness, 
hereditary deafness, and severe physical malformation. Medical personnel 
were obliged to report the results of every medical examination to a secret 
records office; from there evidence was passed to hereditary health courts to 
determine if sterilisation was warranted. As a result of this law, an estimated 
350,000 persons were sterilised throughout the Reich. Three percent of 
Hamburg residents were ordered to be sterilised; over 24,000 people were 
actually operated upon (Pfafflin, 1986).   
Of course, eugenic measures in Nazi Germany did not end with 
sterilisation. Support for eugenic policy based on economics became part of 
everyday life, even extending to the Reich’s “New approach to arithmetic” 
which was taught to schoolchildren. An example of this policy read as 
follows: “Of (all) mentally deranged persons, 868 are shut up for at least 10 
years, 260 for at least 20 years, 112 for at least 25 years, 54 for at least 30 
years, 32 for at least 35 years and 6 for at least 40 years. How many  
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Reichsmarks at least have these mentally deranged persons cost the state 
of Baden if 18 Reichsmarks have to be spent monthly on each one? How 
many healthy families with an annual income of 3,000 Reichsmarks could 
live for 10 years from this amount?” (Source not cited; Pfafflin, 1986, p. 3). 
This type of reasoning formed the basis for the first legalised murders of 
psychiatric patients, alcoholics and children with mental impairment, who 
were characterised as “useless eaters”.  
In 1938, a woman petitioned Hitler to allow the “mercy killing” of her 
badly deformed grandchild. He acceded to her request, authorised similar 
killings, and introduced mandatory reporting to the records office of a 
number of conditions including “severe idiocy”, mongolism, microcephaly, 
hydrocephaly, and deformity. Each record was assessed by three members 
of the Reich Committee for Scientific Research into Serious Illness of 
Hereditary and Constitutional Origins. If all three marked a plus sign on the 
record, the child was taken to a “special children’s ward” where the 
diagnosis was confirmed and the child was killed (Pfafflin, 1986).  
With regard to adult citizens, over 70,000 psychiatric patients were 
put to death in the gas chambers between 1940 and 1941. It was reported 
that as a result, over 88 million Reichsmarks would be saved annually. After 
1941 authorisation for “euthanasia” was not required: death by poisoning 
and starvation became part of the practice of psychiatry in the Third Reich. 
The killing of patients in hospitals and asylums in captured territories by 
Einsatzgruppen (killing squads) was also undertaken because these persons  
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were unproductive and so were regarded as deserving of elimination. The 
killing of concentration camp prisoners for racial and eugenic reasons need 
scarcely be mentioned as it is so well known. Millions were put to death; it is 
not known exactly how many persons were killed due to mental impairment 
but estimates number in the hundreds of thousands (Pfafflin, 1986).  
 
Post WWII: Human rights, normalization and deinstitutionalization 
As knowledge of the mass murders of disabled people and the racist-
inspired systematic killings of Jews and Gypsies emerged, many members 
of the United Nations formed the opinion that existing documents such as 
the United Nations Charter did not sufficiently articulate human rights. This 
attitude provided the inspiration for adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in December, 1948. More than thirty rights and freedoms are 
documented. The most important are considered to be the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person; the right to education; the right to participate fully 
in cultural life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane treatment or 
punishment; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and freedom of 
expression and opinion (United Nations, 2006).  
The lives of people with disabilities, however, were not greatly 
affected by this Declaration. Until the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
the majority of people with disabilities were institutionalised (Ryan & 
Thomas, 1987). In many cases, the only alternative to institutionalisation  
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was for parents to care for their disabled children at home without 
government support or services (Chenoweth, 2000). In two separate 
Western Australian cases, the strain of caring for severely disabled children 
resulted in their murder (Gillgren, 2000). In both cases, institutionalisation in 
Claremont Hospital for the Insane had been rejected by the parents as being 
no choice at all.  
Although some progressives lobbied for the removal of children with 
intellectual impairment from institutions such as Claremont Hospital, 
government officials resisted such moves, claiming the cost was prohibitive 
(Gillgren, 2000). They also pointed out that in many other countries, 
institutions were overcrowded and were shared with the mentally ill 
(Chenoweth, 2000; Williams, 2000). Instances occurred where residents with 
intellectual impairment were exposed to persons who had been found not 
guilty of murder on the grounds of insanity (Gillgren, 2000). Individual 
treatment or therapy was unknown; all inmates were treated alike regardless 
of the nature or severity of their impairments (Chenoweth, 2000). According 
to Wolfensberger (1975), segregation by gender continued to be the strategy 
of choice for the prevention of the reproduction of people with intellectual 
disability until the policy of deinstitutionalisation was implemented. 
In 1952, the first example of a Western Australian move away from 
state care in a large institution occurred. Following a philanthropic donation, 
fifty children with intellectual disabilities were relocated from Claremont 
Hospital to normal housing and provided with special education in the Perth  
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suburb of Guildford. Parents formed the Slow Learning Children’s Group 
which soon became a major service provider funded by the government. The 
evidence suggests that most Western Australian progress in social policy on 
the treatment of people with intellectual impairment during the early and 
middle years of the twentieth century was due to private pressure rather than 
to government action. But the majority of persons with intellectual disability 
were still incarcerated in Claremont, where conditions of overcrowding were 
worse than ever (Gillgren, 2000).  
Political debate over mental health treatment policy surrounded the 
drafting of the WA Mental Health Act 1962 which repealed the Lunacy Act 
1903. Little attention was given to intellectual disability, which was still not 
differentiated from mental illness, despite the fact that several politicians had 
raised the issue and advocated the differential treatment of persons with 
these conditions. In an effort to reduce overcrowding at Claremont Hospital 
provision was made for construction of residential facilities to house persons 
with intellectual disabilities, but the planned residences were still based on 
the institutional model (Gillgren, 2000). 
Due to the widespread belief in the incurable nature of intellectual 
disability, by the 1960s the living conditions of many institutionalised persons 
in Western Australia had changed little since the days of the Fremantle 
Asylum. In the latter part of the decade, however, the appointment of mental 
health officials who recognised the educational needs and potential of 
children with intellectual impairment, accompanied by recognition that  
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disabled persons had rights, provided a catalyst for changes to their living 
conditions.   
In the social climate of the late 1960s, placement of mildly 
intellectually disabled people in institutions began to be seen as a violation 
of their human rights (Chenoweth, 2000). The rights of people with disability 
were clearly stated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons, which Australia signed in 1971 and 1975 
respectively. The latter document states that “disabled persons have the 
same fundamental rights as their fellow citizens of the same age, which 
implies first and foremost the right to enjoy a decent life, as normal and full 
as possible” (Article 3), and that “disabled persons have the same civil and 
political rights as other human beings” (Article 4). The Declaration on the 
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons states that “The mentally retarded 
person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the same rights as other 
human beings” (Article 1) and that “the mentally retarded person has a right 
to… such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable him 
to develop his maximum ability and potential” (Article 2). As previously 
mentioned, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
enunciates the rights to protection from exploitation, to privacy, to access to 
sexual and reproductive health services and to social protection.  
At the end of the 1960s the standard of living of persons with 
disabilities was as poor as it had been in the late 1940s, when a Western  
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Australian reporter named Turner had gained access to the environments in 
which disabled people lived by obtaining a position as an attendant at 
Claremont Hospital. Each of his reports contained accounts of the regular 
verbal and physical abuse of residents by staff (Gillgren, 2003; Ryan & 
Thomas, 1987). There were also reports of widespread sexual abuse (see, 
for example, Carmody, 1990; McCarthy, 1999), and of a very low standard of 
hygiene (Ryan & Thomas, 1987). In the United States and England, there 
were separate reports that living conditions had not improved and that 
persons with disabilities were still subject to regular abuse (Chenoweth, 
2000; Ryan & Thomas, 1987). These statements could equally be applied to 
conditions at Claremont Hospital (Gillgren, 2003). 
An outcome of these reports was that in the late 1960s in the US, a 
government-appointed advisory committee was established, out of which 
emerged new ideas about the principle of normalisation. One of the 
committee members was Wolfensberger, whose policy of normalisation was 
instrumental in bringing about the deinstitutionalisation of a large number of 
people with disabilities. A description of normalisation theory and the role it 
took in the formulation of social policy within Australia is available in 
Chapter 1. 
In Western Australia, the goal of moving all persons with intellectual 
impairment from Claremont Hospital to hostel accommodation was 
accomplished by 1984. Although the hostel was another form of institution, 
the Division for the Intellectually Handicapped had developed a grading  
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scheme, whereby residents who acquired and improved their living skills 
could graduate to a more skilled hostel, and eventually move into the 
community. Several hundred persons completed this transition. However, 
deficits in social skills became apparent as people moved into the 
community. Common problem areas were decision making, human relations, 
and sexuality (Stella, 2000). 
Parents were concerned about the issues of sexuality in general and 
about sexual exploitation in particular. These concerns were addressed 
though meetings and discussion between stakeholder groups including 
parent groups and government officials, and resulted in the development of 
a policy for education in human relations and sexual matters. This was the 
first Australian policy on this subject, and became the model for other states. 
The pragmatic outcome was the development of courses for newly 
deinstitutionalised people and those about to move into the community 
(Stella, 2000). 
Normalisation is based on the precept that persons with disabilities 
should be afforded the opportunity to live as normal a life as possible. Life in 
the community inevitably led to sexual experimentation. It became accepted 
among stakeholders that while sexual expression should not be 
unnecessarily restricted, there was also a need for protection of persons with 
mental impairment. However, there remained the possibility that the rights of 
persons with disability may have to be limited in some circumstances, such 
as when the person was being exposed to danger. Article 1 of the  
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Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971) states: “The 
mentally retarded person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the 
same rights as other human beings”. An ethical approach to caregiving 
dictates that any limitation of the rights of disabled persons must be clearly 
justified (McSherry & Somerville, 1998; Somerville, 1994).   
The law has never sought to draw clearcut boundaries across the 
chart, so as to create categories similar to the age-groups of children. 
There are no generalized “packages” of law which apply to any 
particular range of disability. The law does not generalize to any great 
extent. It will define whether a particular individual has legal capacity 
for one particular purpose, at one particular time, and in one particular 
set of circumstances. It will define whether one particular form of legal 
intervention is or is not appropriate (Ward, 1984, p. 6). 
 
Use of current statute  
Law governing sexual acts involving persons with mental impairment 
is a neglected area in the practice of law and in academic discussion. In 
Victoria only 17 prosecutions under the relevant sections took place over the 
eight year period 1996 to 2004 (McSherry & Naylor, 2004). Similarly, authors 
of legal textbooks generally have dedicated minimal space to the topic. I do 
not intend the following as criticism, but rather as evidence that this area of 
law is underused and this in part may be because it has lacked critique. In 
their 56-page chapter on sexual offence law, Whitney, Flynn & Moyle (2000) 
devoted only 9 lines to Western Australian provisions and 15 lines to  
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Queensland provisions. Waller and Williams’ (1993) discussion of sexual 
offences against persons with mental impairment was contained in a 17-line 
paragraph of their 942-page treatise on criminal law. A comparatively longer 
section was dedicated to these types of offences by Bronitt and McSherry 
(2001). They devoted 2 pages of their 879 page first edition to these 
offences. A similar section is devoted in their second edition (Bronitt & 
McSherry, 2005). An 8-page discussion of sexual offences against persons 
with mental impairment is to be found in McSherry & Naylor (2004), which 
may be a reflection of the interest of these authors in this topic and an 
increasing general interest that has been generated by the few authors who 
have examined this area of law. To date it appears that little research has 
been done on this area of law. Prior to the publication of the articles 
contained in this thesis, the status quo in the literature was as described 
above.  
In 2005, the Victorian Law Reform Commission conducted an inquiry 
into the law defining sexual offences. The Commission published the results 
of their inquiry including a large section on offences committed against 
incapable persons. This appears to be the most detailed and comprehensive 
examination of these offences defined by Australian law that is available. 
The Commission recommended that the existing prohibition of sexual acts 
between workers at residential facilities and residents contained in the 
existing s 52 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria) would be extended “to cover 
any person working at a facility or program that provides services to people  
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with cognitive impairment, rather than just workers at residential facilities” 
(VLRC, 2005, p. 337). Section 52 would apply to paid and voluntary workers. 
Thus, consensual sexual acts involving a person with mental impairment and 
a worker who provides only indirect services to residents might become 
illegal if this recommendation was strictly interpreted. Not only medical, 
therapeutic and supervisory staff but also administrative staff, cooks, 
gardeners and the like would be proscribed from entering into sexual 
relations this recommendation was to be implemented and enforced. 
The use of the criminal law to restrict the consensual sexual 
expression of anyone who is capable of consent is, of course, not tenable 
under the UN Conventions outlines in preceding sections. It is also doubtful 
that it was ever the intention of lawmakers in the various jurisdictions. If the 
person is not harmed the law should not be used to prevent their consent. 
However, the law does not approve of affronts to human dignity (Laster & 
Erez, 2000). Difficulties arise in situations where the person is an eager 
participant, or at least wishes to continue the relationship, but where others 
believe that the person is being exploited or unfairly dealt with.   
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The previous three chapters have attempted to situate the topic in its 
legal and historical background. As previously mentioned, in order to discuss 
Australian legislation in a coherent manner, I have categorised the 
legislation of the various jurisdictions according to their content and aim. I 
have identified three categories into which such legislation can be divided: 
those that aim to penalise sexual exploitation, those that set a minimum 
standard of knowledge that the person with mental impairment must have to 
be deemed capable of consent, and those that ban sexual acts between the 
person with mental impairment and staff who provide services to that 
person. In Chapter 4, a discussion of the concept of sexual exploitation and 
its application in the law of sexual offences against persons with mental 
impairment is presented. In it my coauthors and I examine the notion of 
sexual exploitation, the extent to which such a notion can function as an 
enforceable concept, and whether it is essentially a paternalistic restriction 
on the sexual freedom of persons with intellectual disability.  
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Chapter 4: The concept of sexual exploitation in legislation 
relating to persons with intellectual disability
5 
                                            
5 Published paper: 
Graydon, C., Hall, G., & O’Brien-Malone, A. (2006). The concept of sexual exploitation in 
legislation relating to persons with intellectual disability.  Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law, 13, 150 – 174.  
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Abstract 
The focus of this paper is on the use of the concept of sexual exploitation in 
legislation concerning sexual expression by persons with mental impairment, 
with particular emphasis on persons with intellectual disability. Two main 
statutory approaches have been adopted in Australian jurisdictions. The first 
is prohibition of sexual acts between a person with intellectual disability and 
others who, by virtue of their employment, are in a position of ascendancy 
over that person. The second is the prohibition of sexually exploitative acts 
by any person towards a person with an intellectual disability. The major aim 
in this article is to critically examine these approaches and evaluate them 
according to the standards of being non-discriminatory, minimally restrictive 
of rights, and enforceable. It is argued that comprehensively cataloguing 
sexually exploitative acts is untenable, with the result that prohibition of all 
sexual exploitation is unenforceable. The alternative, namely legislation that 
prohibits sexual relations with any person employed to render any kind of 
service to the intellectually disabled person, would further restrict an already 
limited number of potential sexual partners. We suggest that a more useful 
approach would be to prohibit sexual activity in one-on-one relationships 
whose scope is commonly understood to exclude such acts, while allowing 
relations between workers or caregivers and the persons to whom they do 
not directly render services. This mechanism would have to be narrowly 
defined to have the desired effect of affording protection to vulnerable 
persons while preserving their right to sexual expression.   
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The concept of exploitation is central to the law regarding sexual offences 
against persons with mental impairment.
6 All Australian states and territories 
and many overseas jurisdictions, including Canada and England, have 
enacted legislation that, under certain circumstances, criminalizes sexual 
activity with a person with impaired mental functioning, over and above 
offences that may be committed against members of the general population. 
Although details differ between jurisdictions, the common theme underlying 
the legislation is the protection of vulnerable persons against their being 
taken advantage of — that is, against sexual exploitation. 
The diversity of approaches and provisions enacted in these various 
jurisdictions indicates the difficulty involved in balancing the right to sexual 
expression of persons with mental impairment, while meeting their need for 
protection from exploitation. Our major aim in this article is to examine what 
legislative protections with regard to sexual exploitation should be in place 
for persons with mental impairment. In the absence of legal guidance, either 
by statute or by precedent, as to the meaning of sexual exploitation, we have 
drawn on definitions and concepts from disciplines such as philosophy and 
psychology to underpin our discussion. 
The complexity of framing legislation in this area is reflected in the 
fact that the categories of persons protected by legislation differ between 
                                            
6 Although the Victorian Law Reform Commission (2005) rejects use of the term “mental 
impairment” in favour of “cognitive impairment” which they see as less stigmatising, we have 
chosen to retain mental impairment because it is the term used in Australian legislation. In 
addition, over time, any initially inoffensive term chosen to denote disability gains pejorative 
status; attitudinal change rather than a change of terminology is required to alter this 
(Jaeger & Bowman, 2005).   
 
61
jurisdictions. In some states, for example Tasmania, the term mental 
impairment covers senility, intellectual disability, mental illness and brain 
damage (Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924 s 126). The New South 
Wales Crimes Act 1900 s 66F, however, pertains only to persons with 
intellectual disability, defined as persons who have appreciably below 
average general intellectual function and who require supervision or social 
habilitation in connection with the activities of daily life. 
In this paper we will focus solely on sexual acts where the apparent 
willingness of the person with mental impairment may have been exploited. 
In addition, we focus on the law as it relates to persons with intellectual 
disability, rather than on the broader class of persons with other forms of 
mental impairment. One of the characteristics of intellectual disability is that 
it is stable and lifelong, and persons with intellectual disability may have a 
continuing inability to consent to sex. In contrast, other conditions of mental 
impairment are frequently temporary, so that a person suffering a psychotic 
episode, for example, may temporarily lack the capacity to consent to sex, 
but will very likely regain it when the episode ends. Persons whose degree 
of intellectual disability is such that it is questionable whether they have ever 
possessed the capacity to consent to sex are perhaps the most challenging 
class of individuals to be catered for by legislation, because intellectual 
disability carries with it characteristics that are not present in other forms of 
mental impairment, and which may increase vulnerability to exploitation. 
These characteristics are briefly reviewed below.  
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Part I: A Population in Need of Protection?  
Effects of Intellectual Disability  
Socialised to acquiesce. People with intellectual disability are less 
free to make choices about their lives than other people. When children, 
their lives are more highly supervised and controlled than their same aged 
peers (Clarke, Olympia, Jensen, Heathfield, & Jenson, 2004). When adults, 
they have fewer employment options, fewer places of residence from which 
to choose (Rourke, Grey, Fuller, & McClean, 2004), fewer recreational 
opportunities, and so on, than other people. Although ethical caregivers will 
promote decision-making opportunities at all stages of life, people with 
intellectual disability are, of necessity, much more likely to have decisions 
made for them than are other people (Rourke et al., 2004). As a result, 
individuals with intellectual disability become accustomed to following 
instructions without question. Some people with intellectual disability have a 
great desire to please and they become particularly adept at discerning what 
response is wanted by another person. These factors, separately or in 
combination, lead to an increased risk that, in sexual matters, persons with 
intellectual disability may be more compliant with instructions from others 
than would be their same-aged peers. 
Limited decision making ability. A related issue is that people with 
intellectual disability exhibit limited ability to make a considered choice. This 
is almost certainly because their limited intellectual abilities result in their  
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having difficulty envisaging consequences, goals, and alternative courses of 
action and the advantages and disadvantages of these (Jenkinson & Nelms, 
1994). It may also be that their inexperience in decision-making contributes 
to their difficulties in making considered choices. Jenkinson and Nelms 
investigated decision-making style by presenting their participants with a 
series of vignettes, five of which represented major decisions with long-term 
consequences, and five of which were minor decisions. Twenty-five adults 
with intellectual disability and 14 non-disabled adult university students 
participated. Results showed that, in comparison with the students, 
participants with intellectual disability tended either to try to avoid making a 
decision at all, or rushed into one alternative without considering its 
advantages and disadvantages. Significantly, rushing into one alternative 
was more common with vignettes that depicted some kind of threat to the 
person and which required assertive action for a successful resolution. It is 
interesting that participants displayed stress, even though the choices did 
not truly affect their lives. It seems reasonable to infer that when authentic 
decisions are faced, the reactions and strategies found in this study would, if 
anything, be amplified. 
Easily manipulated. People with intellectual disability may lack the 
ability to resist a tempting offer. One tactic for gaining the consent of a 
person with intellectual disability is to offer them a reward for having sex 
(Thompson, 2001). The offer of a desired object such as a toy, as occurred 
in the case of R v Beattie (1981), or a packet of cigarettes, money, or a soft  
 
64
drink may be successful in obtaining sex with people with intellectual 
disability because the person with intellectual disability may not see the 
transaction as an unequal exchange. Such an offer may be enticing because 
they may have no other means of obtaining the desired object.  
Persons with intellectual disability can also be easily manipulated 
because they may lack the ability to identify situations of risk. Therefore, 
they are more likely than other adults to engage in dangerous behaviours, 
such as entering a stranger’s car. Once in such a situation, they are less 
able to extricate themselves from the unwanted encounter (Kempton & 
Gochros, in Furey, 1994).  
 
Issues of Dependency 
A person with intellectual disability is dependent on others in a variety 
of ways. Because of this, they are vulnerable to sexual exploitation 
especially when approached by a person who renders them services. If they 
resist an advance, they risk the withdrawal of those services — services 
which may be essential to their health and wellbeing. They also risk 
retaliation in more subtle ways, for example by being made to wait 
unnecessarily for services to be performed. They may be unable to complain 
about such treatment, either because of they are unaware of complaint 
channels or because they lack the necessary verbal ability (Rosser, 1990).  
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Issues Stemming from Limited Knowledge 
Lack of knowledge about sex. Completion of sex education courses is 
less frequent in people with intellectual disability than in the general 
population. An English study (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002) found that just 
over 50% of adults with intellectual disability reported that they had received 
sex education, compared to 98% of non-disabled English 16-year-olds. 
Similarly, an Australian study (McCabe, 1999) revealed that only about half 
the adult participants with intellectual disability reported they had received 
sex education. Williams (1991) suggested that the lower rate of sex 
education in the population of persons with intellectual disability may reflect 
the attitudes of caregivers who either think that sex education is irrelevant for 
the person in their care, or wish to keep the person “innocent”. The aversion 
of carers to the involvement of people with intellectual disability in a 
discussion of sexual matters is reflected in the difficulty O’Callaghan and 
Murphy and McCabe had in obtaining participants for their studies.  
In relation to overall sexual knowledge, McCabe (1999) found that 
people with mild intellectual disability had less experience of, and less 
knowledge about, sex than people with physical disability, who in turn had 
less experience and knowledge than non-disabled individuals. This finding 
was consistent with that of O’Callaghan and Murphy (2002), who found that, 
in comparison with 16-year- olds, adults with intellectual disability had 
significantly less knowledge of sex and its consequences. In the 
O’Callaghan and Murphy study, some items were mnemonically demanding,  
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or required the ability to interpret line drawings and to articulate answers, 
and some items and scoring were value laden. Nevertheless, these recent 
results are consistent with older research (see, for example, Gillies & 
McEwen, 1981). The apparent lack of knowledge about sex, even among 
those who have attended sex education classes, might be because delivery 
of factual information does not necessarily lead to understanding and 
retention of it (McCabe, 1999). Of course this latter point is true of all 
persons, not only those with intellectual disabilities. McCabe also suggested 
that persons with intellectual disability do not discuss what they have learnt 
in sex education classes with family or friends, so that material is not 
expanded upon or internalised. Most participants with disability revealed that 
their sole sources of information regarding sexuality were sex education 
classes and the media. In contrast, persons without disability also gained 
information from family and friends. McCabe suggested that because 
sexuality was not discussed openly with persons with disability, they 
experienced negative feelings about the topic as a whole, and especially 
about their own sexuality.  
Thompson (2001) presented qualitative evidence gleaned from 
interviews conducted as part of a counselling service for sexually active men 
with intellectual disability. Thompson’s analysis suggests that only the most 
able men had even a basic knowledge about women’s bodies. The men 
whom Thompson interviewed generally had only one goal: their own 
orgasm. In addition, the men were insensitive to their male or female  
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partner’s emotional and physical feelings, and very often did not realise that 
pregnancy or disease transmission were possible outcomes of intercourse. 
Overall, sex was conducted with little communication except that of 
resistance. Although the proportion of the sample that had received sex 
education was not mentioned by Thompson, these findings may be a 
reflection of a lack of sex education, an interpretation consistent with the low 
rate of participation reported above. A second explanation is that, when sex 
education is provided to this population, the focus is on the mechanical 
aspects of sex rather than on emotional experiences. Alternatively, 
Thompson suggested that the men’s insensitivity may have been gender-
related rather than an artefact of their intellectual function, as there is 
evidence that women with intellectual disability are skilled at interpreting 
verbal and non-verbal cues during sex (McCarthy, 1999). 
Further, accurate assessment of how much persons with intellectual 
disability do know about sex is difficult, since persons with intellectual 
disability may display knowledge that is more apparent than real. That is, 
when questioned, they may echo what they have been taught, giving an 
impression of much greater understanding than is really the case. This 
problem is, of course, present in any attempt to assess genuine 
understanding by any person; however, the distinction between real and 
apparent knowledge sometimes demonstrated by persons with intellectual 
disability has been judicially acknowledged in R v Richardson (1990) when 
King CJ commented, “It is quite possible, of course, that a mentally deficient  
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person will use words indicating an apparent understanding which does not 
really exist.” 
Little knowledge of rights and of the law. People with intellectual 
disability may not understand that they can refuse an unwanted sexual 
encounter. Johnson, Andrew, and Topp (1988) cited these words of a young 
woman with intellectual disability: “The taxi driver touched me [sexually]. I 
didn’t know if I could say no or not.” Similarly, expert evidence was 
presented in R v Eastwood (1998) that the complainant did not know that 
she could refuse intercourse if it was offered or requested by another 
person. 
Moreover, the level of knowledge of the law relating to sexual matters 
among adult persons with intellectual disability is much lower than that of 16- 
and 17-year-olds (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). The fact that behaviours 
such as genital exposure and masturbation, or even taboo behaviours such 
as sexually approaching a child, are sometimes publicly performed by 
persons with intellectual disability has been interpreted as evidence that 
these individuals do not know such behaviours are illegal (Cambridge & 
Mellan, 2000). 
Finally, persons with intellectual disability may have difficulty 
distinguishing when consent to sexual activities has, or has not, been given. 
When shown line drawings depicting a range of sexual encounters, people 
with intellectual disability had difficulty discriminating between consensual 
and non-consensual acts (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). For example, it  
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was common for participants to say that what were clearly consensual acts 
should be reported to staff, parents or police. This group did not appear to 
derive as much assistance as did a sample of teenagers from cues such as 
facial expression and postures. It is possible that difficulties with 
comprehension were symptomatic of difficulties interpreting the drawings. 
However, the addition of narratives to the presentation of line drawings 
produced no change in the performance of the group with intellectual 
disability. For every vignette, the group with intellectual disabilities performed 
at a lower level than did the teenagers when asked for factual information, 
such as what was happening. Their interpretations of the situations, such as 
imagining how each of the depicted persons felt, were also less plausible. 
The results indicated that even if the person with intellectual disability knows 
that sex without consent is illegal, they have difficulty judging whether or not 
consent has been given. 
These results may, however, reflect difficulty viewing the scenes and 
narratives objectively. If a person with intellectual disability has been taught 
that it is wrong to engage in sexual contact and that they should report any 
such incident, they may label all sexual depictions as wrong. In other words, 
they may have evaluated the vignettes against their own moral values (or 
those of their caregivers) rather than against legal standards. If empirical 
support could be obtained for such an interpretation, it would emphasise the 
necessity of including instructions differentiating moral and legal standards in  
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sex education programs specifically designed for persons with intellectual 
disability.  
 
Summary 
A combination of the effects of intellectual disability, both on cognition 
and on lifestyle, issues of dependency, and a lack of knowledge of sexual 
matters, of rights and of the law, leads to greater vulnerability to sexual 
exploitation in persons with intellectual disability than is generally the case in 
the rest of the population. This list of contributory elements is best viewed as 
inclusive rather then exclusive, and is not exhaustive, nor are all aspects 
necessarily present in any particular person. It seems overwhelmingly clear, 
however, that the question of whether this population is in need of special 
protection in law must be answered in the affirmative. 
 
Part II: Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation by Any Person 
It appears likely that the increased vulnerability of persons with 
intellectual disability to sexual exploitation was one reason for the enactment 
of legal provisions aimed at preventing this occurrence. One of the principles 
of a liberal society is freedom of individual choice (Rawls, 1999), and most 
individuals are legally capable of making choices. If a capable person 
willingly consents to engage in what many would regard as their own 
exploitation, they are free to do so, at least within some limits. It is when 
doubt exists as to the person’s mental functioning that the law sees fit to  
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intervene even within those limits. Under these circumstances, the law does 
not approve of exploitation, even if the person is willing to engage in it, and 
legislation has been set in place to protect persons who are unable to 
adequately guard their own interests in sexual transactions. The difficulty lies 
in framing provisions which afford the required protection, but do not 
unnecessarily restrict sexual choice.  
On the face of it, the most straightforward approach is to assess 
capacity to consent to sex. Some authors have attempted to establish 
criteria by which capacity to consent might be assessed (see, for example, 
Kennedy & Niederbuhl, 2000; O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). The task has 
proved a difficult one. The Victorian Law Reform Commission (2005) 
rejected a number of submissions that relied on establishment of capacity to 
consent, indicating that this requirement would increase the difficulty of 
prosecuting offenders who sexually exploit persons with mental impairment. 
If, for example, expert testimony was entered that conflicted as to the 
complainant’s capacity to consent, the conviction of an accused person who 
claimed they believed the complainant consented would be highly unlikely. 
Additional difficulties are that the nature of consent is by no means 
established in law (Leader-Elliott & Naffine, 2000), and agreement has not 
been reached on the prerequisites for capacity to consent, for example, what 
underlying knowledge is necessary for consent to be real. The Royal 
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, in its submission to the 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria (1988, p.19), stated:  
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Consent to sexual intercourse must contain a full understanding of the 
consequences of pregnancy and child rearing and the ability to 
understand the effect of impaired mental functioning on the 
development of a child resulting from such intercourse. 
However, in most States, the knowledge required for legal consent to a 
sexual act is only that the person understands the nature of that act.
7  
Another approach would be to assess whether a person is able, in a 
general sense, to give consent. However, an individual might be legally 
capable of decision-making in one area of life but not in another (Somerville, 
1994), and thus this approach also does not yield a satisfactory solution. 
One method of avoiding questions of consent and of capacity to consent, 
which involve assessment of mental states and the competence of the 
person, is to frame legislation that is more reliant on assessment of 
circumstance and context — to ask in fact whether an act constitutes sexual 
exploitation. This is the basis for one of form of legislation adopted within 
Australian jurisdictions.  
As noted earlier, some states have criminalised sexually exploitative 
acts committed by any member of the general population against a person 
with mental impairment or intellectual disability.
8 The wording of these 
provisions differs from state to state but is broadly similar in aim, namely to 
                                            
7 ACT Crimes Act 1900 s 67; NSW Crimes Act 1900 s 66F; NT Criminal Code s 130; Qld 
Criminal Code 1899 s 216; Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126; Vic Crimes Act 1958 s 50; 
WA Criminal Code s 330. The sole exception is South Australia, where the nature and 
consequences of the act must be understood (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 49). 
8 NSW Crimes Act 1900 s 66F; WA Criminal Code s 330; Qld Criminal Code Act 1899 s 
216).  
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deter any person from exploiting members of a vulnerable population. A 
number of issues are raised by this approach.  
 
Categorising exploitation. 
The problem of definition. There are emerging definitions of 
exploitation in the law but these mainly pertain to sexual slavery or servitude 
(see for example the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 270.4). 
No definition of the sexual exploitation of a person with intellectual disability 
appears to exist. This is likely to be because examples of exploitation are so 
varied as to necessitate assessment on a case-by-case basis. The fact that 
exploitation has not been judicially defined indicates that the term has no 
special legal meaning. Given the lack of legal status of the term, we have 
drawn on definitions taken from the disciplines of philosophy and politics. 
The entry under ‘Exploitation’ in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
reads, in part: 
[T]o exploit someone or something is to make use of him, her, or it for 
your own ends by playing on some weakness or vulnerability in the 
object of your exploitation. A manipulative friend, lover, or parent 
exploits someone's feelings of guilt or need for affection…. If we think 
it is wrong to exploit a person, that is only because we think that 
someone's vulnerability should not be used to bring his or her life or 
labour under another's control (Wood, 1995, ¶ 1, 3).   
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Reeves (2003, ¶ 1 in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics) defines 
exploitation as "taking unfair advantage of persons, their characteristics, or 
their situations…. A particular problem is the identification of exploitative 
transactions within consensual exchanges." For the purposes of this article, 
let us expand the category of consensual exchanges to include exchanges 
which are not overtly non-consensual but which involve a person with an 
intellectual disability severe enough to instil doubt as to their capacity to 
consent. 
On the rare occasions when the legislation pertaining to the sexual 
exploitation of persons with intellectual disability is invoked, one of the 
difficulties facing justice personnel lies in the identification of purportedly 
exploitative relations which are, nonetheless, apparently consensual. In 
reported Australian cases, judicial use of the term exploitation in a sexual 
context is uncommon. When it does occur it is used almost exclusively in 
relation to cases involving the sexual abuse of children (see, for example, R 
v Howes [2000]; R v ADW [1999]; Ryan v The Queen 1999; R v Barnes & 
Purnell [1998]; and R v Dawson [2000]). A literature search revealed only 
one Australian case, namely R v Grech (1999), in which both the person with 
intellectual disability and the alleged offender were adults, where specific 
mention was made of the term “sexual exploitation”. This case involved a 
young man with intellectual disability and a staff member at his residence. 
With cases involving children, one feature is easily identified as exploitative 
— the fact that children who are unable to give legal consent have been  
 
75
used by the stronger party, the adult, for sexual gratification. But cases in 
which an adult person with intellectual disability is involved pose greater 
difficulties. When is it appropriate for the law to intervene and override that 
person’s decisions about their sexual activities? When is it paternalistic to do 
so? How is the concept of sexual exploitation to be put to practical use in the 
courtroom?  
Pragmatic use of the term “exploitation”. Attitudes within the 
community vary widely as to what is legally acceptable, what is morally 
acceptable, what is one but not the other, and what is never acceptable. For 
instance, it seems likely that a small number of people view heterosexual 
intercourse between a married couple for the sole purpose of procreation as 
the only acceptable form of sexual activity, whereas a small number of 
others might approve of any sexual act whatsoever. Most people’s attitudes 
probably fall somewhere between these extremes, with the greatest number 
falling somewhere toward the “middle of the road”. A similar distribution can 
be found in relation to a large number of variables. It seems reasonable to 
assume that community attitudes to what constitutes sexual exploitation is 
one of these variables. Because of this, precise definition of exploitation 
based on community norms is difficult. Indeed, submissions to law reform 
commissions working on sexuality and disability legislation have reflected 
just such a range of attitudes (see, for example, Law Reform Commission of 
Ireland, 1990; Law Reform Commission of Victoria, 1988).  
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It can be seen that categorisation of a behaviour as exploitative is 
necessarily based on personal opinion. This may be one reason so few 
cases are prosecuted under the current legislation. However, a further 
difficulty in employing this terminology is that anyone can feel they have 
been sexually exploited, a point which is discussed in the following section. 
We are all vulnerable to sexual exploitation. Traditionally, exploitation 
has been viewed as occurring prior to the act, for example, through the use 
of deception or coercion to gain consent. Recently, however, the philosopher 
Klepper (1993) offered the opinion that this view neglected exploitative acts 
that occurred during or after consensual sex. Two examples he cited were: 
ignoring one’s partner’s needs and pleasure; and revealing intimate details 
of the act to a third party. It is reasonable to assume that consent would not 
be given to either of these behaviours, which treat the person as a sexual 
object. There is a tacit understanding that each person will treat the other as 
an end in themselves. We expect that our partner will attempt to please us 
as we do them. Likewise, Klepper argues, our societal norm is that we do 
not talk about intimate encounters and therefore we do not expect details of 
our sexual actions to be revealed to other persons. Behaviours that violate 
socially accepted standards such as these may be exploitative.  
The value of Klepper’s analysis lies in its exposure of the extent to 
which exploitation is possible when we trust another person to act in 
accordance with social and cultural expectations. It demonstrates the ease 
with which individuals without any particular vulnerability may be exploited.  
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Such general vulnerability may be compounded by the presence of 
intellectual disability. This may disadvantage its possessor in interactions 
with people who do not have that disability, or do not have it to the same 
degree. The South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935, s 142) 
contains a section that addresses dishonest exploitation of a position of 
advantage. It applies to “the advantage that a person who has no disability 
or is not so severely disabled has over a person who is subject to a mental 
or physical disability.” If a person with intellectual disability is indeed at a 
disadvantage in all interchanges, one conclusion seems to be that any 
sexual act with such a person constitutes exploitation.  
Is all sex necessarily exploitative? The view that all sexual acts that 
involve persons with intellectual disability are exploitative seems to be the 
basis of a submission published by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland 
(1990, p. 17): 
 
In typical circumstances the girl is spotted and induced into sexual 
intercourse or other acts by a male who has no interest in her 
personally and who has no intention of offering her any attempt at a 
long term relationship or marriage. The essence of the wrong done is 
that, unlike a normal girl, the handicapped one cannot see clearly the 
intentions of the predatory male, is too weak willed to struggle against 
physical inclination and is not the personality equal of the male in any 
struggle for friendship or commitment. If a handicapped girl is  
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exploited in these circumstances, she may have unrealistic 
expectations which can be fuelled by a predatory male and be 
subjected to hurt or exploitation greater than a mentally able person 
(Law Reform Commission of Ireland, 1990, p.17).  
 
If this view is accepted, it is difficult to see how a person with intellectual 
disability would be able to exercise the right to sexuality at all. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that “handicapped” persons are subject to greater 
emotional hurt than other people. Bruised feelings are not confined to 
persons with intellectual disability, nor are they confined to “girls”. Men, 
whether disabled or not, also suffer emotional hurt. And it is not only women 
with (or without) intellectual disability who may be deceived. The position 
shown in the quote is based on an assumption that a female must want 
commitment, and that a long term relationship or marriage is her only 
legitimate goal. Yet the females referred to may not have the capacity to 
understand what marriage involves and may not be legally allowed to marry. 
The commentator does not acknowledge that sex may be engaged in for 
simple physical relief and nothing more. There appears to be a belief that the 
woman should struggle against physical inclination, and in any encounter is 
destined to be a victim. In such a view, women with intellectual disability are 
the equivalent of children, and their male counterparts are not even 
recognised. Yet it appears that the Law Reform Commission of Ireland 
heeded this anecdotal submission, rejecting a more liberal approach and  
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recommending that it become an offence for any person to have sexual 
relations with a person incapable of protecting themselves against sexual 
exploitation. The Western Australian Criminal Code s 330 (1) contains a 
similar provision — in that legislation, a reference to an incapable person is 
to a person who is incapable of understanding the nature of the sexual act, 
or of protecting themselves against sexual exploitation. Any sexual act with 
such a person may be the subject of a charge under this legislation. 
The Irish and Western Australian provisions are similar to the 
approach that has been taken in Queensland.
9 There, the current statute 
prohibits any person from having unlawful carnal knowledge of an 
intellectually impaired person. However, a defence is available if the act did 
not in the circumstances constitute sexual exploitation of the intellectually 
impaired person. It is difficult to see how, in the absence of any legal 
definition of sexual exploitation, it can be proved that an act is not 
exploitative, any more than it can be proved that it is.  
Adults with intellectual disability are subject to the same sexual 
desires as other adults. They may wish to express those feelings, possibly 
with a partner, as other adults do. However, if the law is framed in a manner 
which allows any sexual act with such a person potentially to be seen as 
exploitative, then it is difficult to see how adults with intellectual disability can 
fulfil their sexual needs. Although making an offence of sexually exploitative 
behaviour affords, in principle, the most protection to those in need, this 
                                            
9 Qld Criminal Code Act 1899 s 216.  
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legislation is almost unenforceable. It also neglects the needs and rights of 
persons with intellectual disability for sexual expression.  
In the next section, one alternative approach, which is in use in 
several Australian jurisdictions, is examined. 
 
 
Part III: Banning Relationships with Persons in Authority 
As previously noted, one alternative is to ban sexual acts between people 
with some form of mental impairment and those who hold a position of care, 
supervision, authority, or responsibility towards them.
10 Perhaps the most 
cogent Australian example of this approach is Victorian legislation, which 
contains two relevant sections. Section 51 of the Crimes Act 1958 prohibits 
sexual penetration of a person with mental impairment by a person who 
provides medical or therapeutic services to them, where the person with 
impaired mental functioning is not their spouse or de facto spouse. The 
services provided must be related to the impaired mental functioning. 
Section 52 of the Crimes Act 1958 prohibits sexual relations between a 
worker at a residential facility and a resident who is not their spouse or de 
facto spouse. Consent is not a defence to charges under either section 
unless the accused believed on reasonable grounds that he or she was the 
spouse or de facto spouse of the person with intellectual disability.  
                                            
10 This approach is taken in the following legislation: NSW Crimes Act 1900 s 66F; Vic 
Crimes Act 1958 ss 51 & 52; Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126; NT Criminal Code s 130.  
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In R v Patterson (1999), Mullaly J ruled that in order to secure a 
conviction under s 51 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria), the prosecution 
must prove that: the complainant was a person with “impaired mental 
functioning”; the accused was providing medical or therapeutic services to 
the complainant; the services related to the complainant’s impairment; the 
act of sexual penetration occurred when the accused was providing services 
to the complainant, although not necessarily at the exact time of giving the 
service; the accused knew that the complainant was a person with impaired 
mental functioning; the accused knew that he or she was providing medical 
or therapeutic services to the complainant; the accused knew that the 
services related to the complainant’s impairment; and the acts were 
conscious, voluntary and deliberate. 
According to the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC; 2001), 
emphasis on the accused’s knowledge may make it difficult for this offence 
to be established and they recommended the offence be one of strict liability 
not reliant on the knowledge of the accused (VLRC, 2005). The VLRC 
(2001, 2005) appeared especially interested in making it easier to obtain 
convictions because although there is a high incidence of sexual assault 
against persons with mental impairment, the crime is underreported. They 
recommended that the existing s 52 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria) be 
extended “to cover any person working at a facility or program that provides 
services to people with cognitive impairment, rather than just workers at  
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residential facilities” (VLRC, 2005, p. 337). Section 52 would apply to paid 
and voluntary workers. 
However, we believe that any instance of sexual assault would and 
should be charged under the general law of sexual offences. Such offences 
occur in the absence of consent. There may be an overt lack of consent, 
consent may be vitiated by a number of factors including deception or 
coercion, or the person may be incapable of consent. In these cases, the 
result is sexual assault and should be charged as such, regardless of 
whether or not the accused provides services to the complainant. On the 
other hand, if the person is capable of consent and their consent was not 
vitiated for any reason including coercion, then no crime has occurred.  
We suspect that there are a number of reasons that widening the 
range of persons who are prohibited from sexual relationships with persons 
with mental impairment will not reduce the incidence of sexual assault nor 
increase reporting rates. First, reporting rates are currently low, so it is 
difficult to see how prohibiting more sexual liaisons would alter that. Second, 
sexual offences in general are notoriously underreported (Easteal, 1998a) 
and sexual offence charges are defended in court more than any other type 
of crime (Wundersitz, 1996). The difficulties of testifying in court are 
amplified for persons with mental impairment (VLRC, 2005), and conviction 
may be more difficult to secure when the victim has a mental impairment 
(McSherry & Naylor, 2004), factors which discourage reporting and 
prosecution. Third, the VLRC (2001, 2005) states that some persons with  
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mental impairment are unaware of complaint channels; it is difficult to see 
how extension of s 52 would alter that situation.   
Incorporation of the proposed extension to s 52 into law would 
effectively prohibit sexual relations between persons with mental impairment 
and workers who are not in any position of ascendancy and therefore could 
not use their employment as a coercive device. Most people find their 
partners through the circumstances of their life, for example, where they live 
and work. Extension of s 52 would mean that anyone who held any paid or 
voluntary position would be prohibited from engaging in sexual relations with 
a person with mental impairment. Workers not directly involved in the care of 
the person with mental impairment might well develop a genuine relationship 
with them but would be unable to legally engage in a sexual act. The effect 
of extension to s 52 would be to limit the sexual autonomy of persons with 
mental impairment who voluntarily wished to engage in a sexual relationship.  
 
In the past, the rights of individuals in need of special care have often 
been curtailed on the basis of unjustified beliefs. In the context of 
freedom of sexual expression, it is most likely that these individuals' 
rights will be limited on the basis of their incapacity, a concept that 
should be applied in accordance with principles of human ethics and 
human rights. For example, while it is acceptable to limit the right to 
marry where an individual lacks the capacity to understand the nature 
of the marriage contract, it is not acceptable to assume that all  
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mentally ill or retarded persons lack such capacity. Likewise, the right 
to freedom of sexual expression may be curtailed if the individual 
lacks the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, but there should 
be a presumption against limiting this right and clear justification for 
doing so would need to be provided. Such limitations are often 
justified by recourse to the notion of harm, but care must be taken 
that this is not used unethically. The main difficulty lies in drawing the 
line between true, justified prevention of harm to the individual and 
unjustified paternalism (McSherry & Somerville, 1998, p. 118). 
 
Consider if the sexual choice of non-disabled people was to be restricted 
because of the high incidence of rape and underreporting of it. One might 
imagine that anyone who suggested such a thing would face a firestorm of 
criticism by the public and in the national media. Rather than further limiting 
the sexual choice of the victim, a more useful solution to the problem of 
sexual abuse of persons with mental impairment would be to provide them 
with education about who may not have sex with them, that consent is “free 
and voluntary agreement” (McSherry, 1998a & b; McSherry & Somerville, 
1998) and what that means in pragmatic terms, about coercion, about the 
fact that they can say no, and about complaint channels. Education should 
also be provided to all workers to enable them to recognise the signs of 
sexual abuse, which have been comprehensively catalogued by Hayes 
(1993).    
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Nevertheless, there are negative effects associated with consensual 
sexual relationships in which one partner is in a position of ascendancy. In 
her examination of consensual sex in professional relationships where one 
party is subordinate to the other, Sanger (2004) discussed the arousing 
effects of power and influence and the flattering effect of capturing the 
attention and interest of an experienced, skilled and intelligent partner. She 
also examined the negative effects that can result from such relationships. 
First, there may be an appearance of, or indeed, real favouritism, which may 
have harmful effects on the colleagues of both parties and on overall morale 
within the organisation. Second, such relationships may compromise 
professionalism. Finally, initially benign power differentials may be misused if 
the relationship founders. These points are relevant to the relationships 
under consideration here. Staff may be reluctant to enforce rules on a 
resident who is having an affair with their colleague or superior, and other 
residents may feel neglected. The reputation of the whole organisation may 
be tarnished if the existence of a sexual relationship between a member of 
staff and a resident becomes common knowledge. Even if it does not, staff 
members who view such a relationship as unethical are likely to be 
uncomfortable with this situation. And as previously discussed, the person 
with disability may be punished in a variety of ways by the staff member if 
the relationship founders.  
Although the coercive power of authority quickly comes to mind, not 
all authoritative influence is coercive, and a blanket prohibition of sex  
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between parties who hold positions of responsibility and those in their care 
does have several disadvantages. First, persons with intellectual disability 
often have a restricted range of potential sexual partners. There are three 
classes of persons with whom an attachment might be formed: people 
responsible for them, others with intellectual disability, and people without 
disability. O’Callaghan and Murphy (2002) found that with the exception of 
family, professionals and carers, adults with intellectual disability have a 
much smaller number of people in their social networks than do mainstream 
16- and 17-year-olds, and of these, very few are not disabled themselves. 
Thus there is only a small chance of meeting and developing a relationship 
with a person without disability. Prohibition of sexual relationships with a 
large proportion of their social circle, namely people who hold a position of 
responsibility, may, therefore, effectively restrict an already limited number of 
possible partners to others who have some form of disability.  
A second disadvantage of legislating against relationships between 
persons with intellectual disability and those in positions of responsibility is 
that the persons involved might have genuine feelings for each other. In the 
previously mentioned case R v Grech (1999) the defendant was a team 
leader at a home run by the New South Wales Department of Community 
Services. He was charged with having a homosexual relationship with a 
resident over a period of several years. Evidence was presented that the 
defendant’s marriage had broken up as a result of this relationship, and both 
men asserted their love for each other and their wish to continue seeing  
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each other. It might be argued that an ethical person could resign their 
employment if they found themselves in such a position. However, it seems 
likely that even if Grech had resigned, the revelation of such a relationship 
would have provoked negative reactions from family members and staff (the 
precipitating factor in charging Grech was the resident’s parents becoming 
aware of the relationship). One result of resignation and/or disclosure may 
be that fewer opportunities for contact are available to the couple and the 
person with mental impairment might suffer the loss of the comforting 
presence of a genuinely caring person. This may not seem an acceptable 
risk to take.  
However, the R v Grech case was unusual. It is far more common to 
find references to non-consensual sexual acts committed against people 
with mental impairment, often by people close to them, than it is to find 
consensual ones (Carmody, 1990; Furey, 1994). Although statistical 
evidence citing abuse rates is difficult to obtain, the effect of socially 
legitimated authority on compliance is well recognised in the psychological 
literature (the classic study in this area is that of Milgram, 1963). According 
to the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (1999, p.181): 
 
Some way of distinguishing between, on the one hand, truly 
exploitative sexual contact between mentally impaired persons and 
their carers, and, on the other hand, sexual contact with a carer to 
which a person with some degree of mental impairment might  
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nevertheless freely and voluntarily consent, must be found. 
Otherwise, the Code will arbitrarily restrict the sexual autonomy of 
mentally impaired persons when it comes to their carers. 
 
McSherry and Naylor (2004, p. 244) express similar concerns:  
 
The benefit of having specific provisions criminalising sexual acts with 
those with mental impairment is that they may very well lead to more 
convictions… The problem with such provisions is that they may go 
too far in preventing those with mental impairment exercising any 
right to sexual autonomy. 
 
Recommendations made in the Model Criminal Code are that offences 
should be created only against persons directly responsible for the care of a 
person with mental impairment. A limited defence ought be available, 
however, if the person with impairment consented, and the giving of that 
consent was not unduly influenced by the fact that the person was 
responsible for the care of the person with mental impairment (Model 
Criminal Code, p. 180). 
It is difficult to see how it could be proved that being in a position of 
dependency was not unduly influential on the giving of consent. To be legal, 
consent must be freely given. When one party is in a position of power over 
the other, an element of doubt necessarily exists as to whether the consent  
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of the subordinate to the superior’s request was completely free. Because it 
would be so difficult for a defendant to avail themselves of the Model 
Criminal Code defence, it seems likely that if such legislation were enacted, 
only the most optimistic carers would risk sexual contact with those they 
care for.  
 
Part IV: Is Protection Without Discrimination Feasible? 
The Model Criminal Code recommendation has the merit of being 
non-discriminatory and would be useful if a test for exploitation could be 
developed. Without such a test, any judgment that exploitation has occurred 
is necessarily open to the criticism that such an opinion reflects the values of 
the observer. Indeed, our earlier criticism of the submission to the Irish Law 
Reform Commission was based on such an argument.  
In that submission, acceptance of sexual contact as an end in itself is 
absent. The submission supported a position which was founded on 
particular moral values rather than on legal principles. Other moral values 
may be held by other members of the community. For instance, some might 
argue that there is nothing inherently exploitative about casual sex and that 
any adult, including a person with intellectual disability, may freely choose to 
have a casual liaison.  
If the view that all casual liaisons or certain types of sexual acts are 
necessarily exploitative for persons with intellectual disability were enshrined 
in legislation, the outcome would be discriminatory — the result would be  
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that casual sex or those particular acts would be illegal for people with 
mental impairment but not for people without. Even as it stands, current law 
allows enormous scope for its interpretation to be coloured by the personal 
values of an observer. It also allows discrimination on the basis of disability. 
Persons with mental impairment may wish to engage in sexual acts but be 
prevented from doing so because of the moral values that others hold.  
The problems inherent in current legislative approaches along with 
the dearth of case law in this area indicate the need for reform. Of course, 
sexual acts involving people with mental impairment are not uniquely subject 
to sanction. Children are also protected by law, and certain professional 
relationships are subject to ethical scrutiny by governing bodies. As these 
measures are designed to protect the more vulnerable party of a dyad, and 
are therefore relevant to this discussion, an examination of these 
relationships is the focus of the following section.  
 
Part V: Relationships that might function as legislative models 
Relations involving children. All relationships contain power 
imbalances. Some imbalances are so large that certain categories of sexual 
relations have been proscribed, the obvious example being acts involving 
children. Statutory laws against sexual activity with children were enacted 
because it is considered that a child is in such a subservient position relative 
to an adult that the child cannot consent in any circumstances. The power 
imbalance between a child and an adult is too great to allow for genuine  
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choice on the part of the child, even if power is not overtly exercised by the 
adult. Typically, children are easily manipulated by an unscrupulous adult, 
have limited ability to see alternatives, are easily threatened, lack knowledge 
of their rights and of the law, and have much to lose. Their position 
resembles that of persons with intellectual disability. It might be argued, 
therefore, that the law relating to sexual acts with children provides an 
acceptable model for provisions regarding adults with mental disability. 
Acceptance of this model would certainly confer protection, but at the 
expense of the right to sexual expression. All sexual acts involving persons 
with intellectual disability would become illegal. Currently, supporters can be 
found to champion the priority of the right to protection over the right to 
sexuality, and vice versa. There are good arguments for both cases.  
If we balance the need for protection and safety against the need for 
sexual expression with another person, we may find ourselves agreeing that 
the former should take precedence over the latter. Such a judgment is 
consistent with the theoretical ideas of the prominent humanist psychologist 
Maslow (1970), for whom safety and freedom from fear were secondary only 
to the most basic physiological requirements necessary to sustain life. The 
outcome of this line of reasoning is that the need to protect persons with 
intellectual disability is paramount, and the need for sexual expression is 
secondary.  
But there are several problems with assigning priorities using such an 
approach. First, it is unnecessary to prioritise protection to such an extent  
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that the possibility of any sexual expression with a partner is eliminated. 
These rights and needs are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to find a 
middle ground that respects both. Such an approach is consistent with the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 
(1971, paragraph 1), which states that "the mentally retarded person has, to 
the maximum degree of feasibility, the same rights as other human beings". 
Although international law has no direct effect until it is incorporated into 
domestic law (Mason, 1998), which has not occurred in relation to this 
Declaration, the rights of the disabled will ideally be upheld even in the 
absence of legal obligation (McSherry & Somerville, 1998). In R v Swaffield; 
Pavic v The Queen (1998), Kirby J stated: "To the fullest extent possible, 
save where statute or established common law authority is clearly 
inconsistent with such rights, the common law of Australia, when it is being 
developed or re-expressed, should be formulated in a way that is compatible 
with such international and universal jurisprudence."  
The rights of persons with mental impairment are not equivalent to the 
rights of a child with the same mental age. Mental age is based on the IQ 
test score of the average child. When a test is first designed, a large number 
of children of the same age are tested and the average number of correct 
answers is calculated. This score is known as the norm for that age. This 
procedure is repeated for a range of ages. When a person is tested, the 
number of correct answers they give is compared to the norms. Their mental 
age is the age of children who give the same number of correct answers.  
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Mental age is sometimes incorrectly used to infer that an adult with 
intellectual disability is in all respects the mental equivalent of a child of that 
age. This is not the case; such a person may have accumulated far more life 
experience than a child, and they are physiologically not children. In 
particular, they are sexually mature. Persons with intellectual disabilities are 
interested in sexuality, in its variants and in its consequences (McCabe, 
1999). They wish to be allowed self determination and to have their 
decisions respected (Somerville, 1994). As a model for legislation, therefore, 
laws pertaining to the involvement of children in sexual acts are 
unsatisfactory.  
Professional ethics. At this point we would like to conduct a more 
searching examination of sexuality in professional relationships. Our specific 
interest here is in sexual relationships between a professional and their 
client that are either prohibited by law or which contravene professional 
ethics. Leaving aside relations that are entered into because of coercion, 
deception, irrationality, ignorance or emotional vulnerability such as that 
occasioned by grief, there is a morally suspect class of consensual 
relationships that are, at least in part, entered into as a result of the power 
structure of the professional relationship itself. Archard (1994) condemned 
such relationships as unethical. His reasoning was that “A’s giving of 
consent is attributable, wholly or in significant part, to the nature of the 
positions occupied by A and B within their relationship” (Archard, p.95). 
Consent would not have been given but for the existence of the professional  
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relationship; sex between doctor and patient, therapist and client, and 
professor and student fall into this category. The critical feature identified by 
Archard of this “exploited consent” is that the professional relationship has a 
certain scope, and that this scope is breached by sexual intimacy. The 
discovery of sexual acts between professional and client, when they involve 
only adults, generally does not lead to criminal prosecution; the skilled party 
is usually only subject to sanctions administered by the governing body of 
his or her profession.  
Archard’s analysis, although confined to professional relations, is 
particularly applicable to relationships between persons with mental 
impairment and those who care for them. These relationships are 
established for a specific purpose, are commonly understood to have a 
specific scope, and they are peculiarly open to exploitation. The 
distinguishing feature of these relationships is that they are not overtly non-
consensual but they do contain a power imbalance — one person is in a 
position of dependency and the other person holds the power to influence 
their life to a significant degree. It may be that consent would be extremely 
unlikely if the professional relationship did not exist. The category excludes 
relationships in which no professional connection exists between two people.  
 
[T]here is nothing in our understanding of the everyday relationship 
between professional and non-professional that says sexual intimacy 
is inappropriate, that is outside its proper scope… we must be careful  
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not to condemn any consensual relation whose parties are not the 
equals of one another. If we do, we condemn too much (Archard, 
1994, p. 99). 
By this reading, an example of an unethical relationship is where consent is 
given by a student to her own teacher. It would not be unethical if she 
consented to a teacher because he was a teacher, as long as he was not 
her teacher. There is no professional relationship between the two: he 
cannot favour her when he grades her work, he cannot retaliate by marking 
her down if things go wrong. There is nothing in the relationship that is 
breached by sexual contact. 
We advocate a legislative approach based on this principle. Relations 
would be allowed between persons with mental impairment and any person 
who does not hold a position of authority whose scope proscribed such 
contact. Positions of authority that would be excluded would be all those that 
incorporated ascendancy over the person being cared for; and from which, 
by virtue of that ascendancy, any coercive pressure could be exerted. This 
approach minimises the number of persons expressly excluded as potential 
sexual partners. For the same reasons it is minimally restrictive of rights. At 
the same time it is enforceable, and therefore is preferable to much of the 
current legislation. 
 
Part VI: Conclusions and Recommendations  
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One weakness of basing legislation on a concept such as sexual 
exploitation is that concepts can best be used only when they are properly 
operationalised. When precise definition is neglected or when the concept is 
found to be so broad as to be impossible to precisely define, it opens 
significant debate as to whether or not the indicated concept has been 
observed. Has exploitation occurred in a particular case? In these 
circumstances, the law becomes unenforceable. 
Much of the current law attempts to address the right of persons with 
intellectual disability to protection from sexual exploitation, but does so in a 
way which may result in undue interference with their right to sexual 
expression. The purpose of the law is not to prevent people with intellectual 
disability from making errors of judgment. Such a law would be paternalistic 
in that it would treat adults as children. It would also be discriminatory: 
people who may have a reduced capacity to foresee the consequences of 
their actions nevertheless have a right to have their decisions respected 
unless there is a very clearly justified reason for not doing so (Somerville, 
1994). The purpose of legislation is to afford protection from the peculiar 
vulnerabilities that accompany intellectual disability or, more broadly, mental 
impairment. The goal is to achieve this protective function while avoiding 
unnecessary restriction, discrimination and paternalism. 
Very often a passive, victimized role is ascribed to people with 
intellectual disability — it is assumed that, if anything, they will be taken 
advantage of. Such notions are in evidence in submissions to law reform  
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groups. However, it is difficult to argue that exploitation of a person with 
mental impairment has occurred based only on the presence of a sexual act. 
Even when acts occur that some would view as degrading, as, for example, 
in the case of R v Eastwood (1998), where a woman with intellectual 
disability was urinated upon, the same complexities arise. Some people 
without intellectual disability willingly engage in this practice, so a conviction 
based on this fact alone might be overturned. The difficulty in proving the 
existence of exploitation may be one of the reasons that very few charges of 
sexual offences against complainants with mental impairment come before 
the courts.  
The prohibition of sexual acts between persons in a position of 
responsibility and those in their care is necessary because of the potential 
within such relationships for the abuse of power. The analysis of such 
relations by Archard underlined the pervasive influence of authority on 
compliance. Even in the absence of intentional use of power differentials, 
consent may be achieved in circumstances that are suspect. The law does 
have the legitimate role of providing protection by preventing the undue 
influence of persons with a particular susceptibility.  
To that end we recommend the creation of criminal offences that 
prohibit sexual acts between persons in a relationship, either paid or 
voluntary, with a person with a mental impairment where the said 
relationship has a clearly defined and commonly understood scope which 
excludes sexual acts. This proposal redistributes criminal liability. It does not  
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disqualify people as potential sexual partners based on employment 
categories such as professional, residential worker or carer. Rather, it is 
based on the status of the relationship between the individuals involved. 
Persons who hold positions that are recognised as having a clearly defined 
scope which excludes sexual acts are only excluded from having sex with 
the particular person or persons with intellectual disability to whom their 
position applies. Under this proposal, criminal liability is extended to all 
persons who have been engaged, or who have volunteered, in a role that is 
understood to exclude sexual acts, but who would be liable under current 
legislation to conviction only if sexual exploitation could be proved.  
A potential criticism of this recommendation is that it is discriminatory 
— those who hold a position that excludes sexual acts are not free to 
engage in casual sex with persons in their care. However, to afford such a 
freedom to those who hold what are in many ways positions of trust is to risk 
the exploitation of the persons in need of protection. Declarations of the 
rights of the disabled acknowledge that it may be necessary to curtail the 
rights of affected persons, a notion which is justified by reference to harm 
occurring, either to the person or to others (McSherry & Somerville, 1998). 
Our suggestion is in keeping with this principle.  
A second point which may be seen as discriminatory is that there is 
no criminal liability for analogous acts that do not involve a person with 
mental impairment. A consensual sexual act between a professional and 
their adult client, patient or student is viewed as unethical but not criminal.  
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This might be because there are sanctions for professionals who breach 
ethical principles. Moreover, increased gravity in offences against persons 
with mental impairment is consistent with existing principles of aggravation. 
In the eyes of the law, any offence is aggravated when committed against a 
member of a vulnerable population, which includes people with disabilities 
(Walker & Padfield, 1996), and more severe penalties are available for such 
convictions. Giving criminal status to acts that would be viewed as merely 
unethical in other circumstances is consistent with this approach. It is difficult 
to see how it is possible to afford protection to persons with mental 
impairment unless there are some differences between legislation that 
applies to them and legislation that applies to the population as a whole. 
Adherence to general legal principles while increasing the severity of the 
offence and the sentence satisfies this protective requirement. 
A weakness with existing legislation that bans all sexual acts between 
any worker at a residential facility and a resident is that relationships are 
prohibited with workers who do not provide services to that particular person. 
Examples are maintenance workers, gardeners, administrative staff and the 
like, who may be in a position to form genuine friendships with residents. 
People filling these roles are not ascendant in any significant respect over 
the person with mental impairment, and sexual acts do not contravene the 
scope of the relationship. The suggested policy minimises restrictions and is 
therefore consistent with the principle of maximisation of the human rights of 
persons with disabilities.  
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Thus this approach may be employed as a basis for legislation that 
approximates the criteria of being non-discriminatory, minimally restrictive, 
clearly defined and applicable. The emphasis is on approximation: we do not 
claim that our recommendation is ideal. Any specialised clauses that apply 
only to a subsection of the population are immediately suspect as 
discriminatory. Yet the right to protection can only be preserved by the 
enactment of such special provisions. Without them, people who are 
particularly vulnerable can claim only the protection afforded to the whole 
community. We have argued that such a position is unsatisfactory. It is not 
kind to pretend that people with disabilities do not have special needs when 
in fact they do; to that end we have attempted to formulate a legislative 
approach that meets those needs while at the same time most fully supports 
the exercise of their rights.
11  
                                            
11 In the interests of minimising duplication, the reference list for this paper has been 
consolidated into the reference list at the end of the thesis.   
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The previous chapter addressed the notion of sexual exploitation and 
its practical application in legislation. I have discussed the difficulties 
inherent in enacting legislation that applies only to a subsection of the 
community while at the same time providing protection to those with special 
needs. I will return to these issues in Chapter 8. 
The focus of the following chapter is a second issue arising from 
current law, the issue of informed consent. We argue that the knowledge 
that a person is currently required to have, that is knowledge of the nature 
and character of the act proposed, in order to be deemed capable of giving 
consent to a sexual act is inadequate. I argue that this is especially so when 
compared to the standard of informed consent required for medical 
procedures.  
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Chapter 5: To what extent can consent be uninformed? The 
validity of consent to sexual acts by persons with intellectual 
disability
12 
                                            
12 Published paper: 
Graydon, C., O’Brien-Malone, A., & Hall, G. (2007, April 17). The cusp of capacity: A 
proposal for the reform of sexual offences against persons with intellectual 
disability. Presented at the 1
st World Congress for Sexual Health. Darling Harbour, 
Sydney. Available: 
http://www.wasvisual.com/lecture_summary.html?lecture_summary=8  
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the question of what knowledge a 
person should have to be deemed capable of consenting to sexual acts. 
Currently in all Australian states except South Australia, only the nature and 
character of the act needs to be known for consent to be legal. Knowledge of 
the consequences of the act is specifically not required. We argue that 
simple knowledge of the nature and character of the act is an inadequate 
basis for valid consent, and that consent to sexual acts should more closely 
resemble the informed consent required for medical treatment. Furthermore, 
although there is some variation in particulars, all Australian state 
legislations specify that a victim’s lack of knowledge must be based in some 
form of mental impairment. We argue that such legislation is discriminatory. 
The question that should be asked is whether a person has sufficient 
understanding to consent; the presence or otherwise of mental impairment 
should be immaterial. Protection should be given to all persons who lack 
knowledge of the particular sexual act that is the subject of interest, 
regardless of the reason for that naiveté.   
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Consent to sexual activity is a topic that has received both academic and 
judicial attention in recent years. This attention has both been both a product 
of, and a driving force behind, legislative reforms of the law pertaining to 
sexual offences. Changes to the law, such as recognition of rape within 
marriage, have meant that in some respects, the concept of consent has 
narrowed. No longer does a husband have perpetual sexual access to his 
wife (at least legally, if not pragmatically; Easteal, 1998). Similarly, silence is 
no longer automatically accepted as evidence of consent. Theoretically, a 
more stringent standard of consent must now be proved than was the case 
before these changes, though judicial directions such as that “rougher than 
usual handling” was an acceptable method of overcoming resistance are still 
delivered (Bollen J in R v Johns, cited in Bronitt & McSherry, 2001, p. 604).  
Within academic discourse, although authors such as Fisse (1990) 
and Williams (1983) cling tenaciously to outdated views on “seduction”, 
where the persistence of the male in the face of the female’s reluctance is 
seen as a legitimate ploy, close scrutiny of consent has led some 
commentators to reject less-than-wholehearted participation as true consent 
(see, for example, Leader-Elliott & Naffine, 2000). Other developments are: 
the recognition of consent as a continuum rather than a dichotomy 
composed of either consensual sex or rape (Kelly, 1987); advocacy of a 
positive consent standard (discussed by McSherry, 1998b); condemnation of 
judicial directions that support either overt or covert coercion of women 
(Moses, 1993); and rejection of the penetrative/coercive model of sexuality  
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in favour of one that features positive communication and mutuality (see, for 
example, Bronitt & McSherry, 2001, p. 607; McSherry, 1993; 1998b; and 
Pineau, 1989).  
Despite this attention, it seems unlikely that many women would 
applaud the current laws of sexual offences. As Leader-Elliott and Naffine 
(2000) point out, in practice silence is still construed as consent; the 
traditional “no means yes” argument is still given weight in court; and there is 
still disagreement over the vitiation of consent by the use of deception. 
Leader-Elliott and Naffine reject outright the notion of consent: “The concept 
of consent in rape continues to give latitude to the liar and to tolerate those 
who resort to intimidation” (p. 72). Given the words of Bollen J above, the 
position adopted by Leader-Elliott and Naffine seems pertinent to a law that 
still affords protection to the sexually assaultive individual.   
In an environment that in pragmatic terms still supports the male’s 
view of consent over that of the female’s, it is unsurprising that the female’s 
view of the act is viewed with suspicion (Henning & Bronitt, 1998; Kissane, 
1993; Leader-Elliott & Naffine, 2000). It is also less than surprising that the 
law appears to support the male’s point of view, and to support a very low 
standard of knowledge that is required for an individual to be deemed 
capable of consent. The basic knowledge that is required is restricted only to 
an understanding of the nature and character of the act. In this paper we 
begin by examining judicial directions and other definitions of what needs to 
be known to give consent and the vitiation of consent by ignorance. This is  
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followed by a review of the research literature on the question of what should 
be known in order that a person is considered capable of consent, both to 
sexual acts and to medical procedures. We will argue that any persons, not 
only those with mental impairment, who do not understand what they are 
consenting to and what the commonly known consequences of that act are, 
are in need of the protection of the law. For the sake of convenience, 
throughout the discussion we refer to the accused person as “he” and to the 
complainant as “she”. This measure was taken with reluctance. We do, of 
course, acknowledge that not all accused persons are male and not all 
victims of sexual offences are female.   
The law of sexual offences has its origin in the belief that it is easy to 
make an accusation of rape but difficult to disprove such an allegation 
(Williams, 1983). In law it is preferable to have a guilty rapist released, rather 
than have an innocent person convicted (Waller, 2000). In cases of sexual 
assault the law has generally taken the perpetrator’s — generally the male’s 
— perspective: it has often been enough for the accused to claim that “he 
thought” she consented for charges to be dismissed (Henning & Bronitt, 
1998; McSherry, 1998b). Such an approach has led to what might be termed 
a minimalist approach to consent. Any sign (or lack of it) made by a victim, 
whether voluntary or involuntary, real or only imagined by the assailant, has 
sometimes been enough to secure an acquittal. An extreme example was 
mentioned by Kissane (1993) where the jury convicted a man for having 
badly beaten a woman with a wheelbrace, but acquitted him of raping her as  
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part of the attack. Apparently the jury believed that the woman, although 
bashed severely, consented to intercourse. In a second case, a US grand 
jury refused to indict for rape a burglar who admitted breaking into a 
woman’s house and holding her at knife-point before having sex with her. 
The woman’s plea to her attacker to wear a condom to protect her against 
possible AIDS infection was taken by the jury to mean that she consented 
(Kissane, 1993).  
Consistent with this minimalist approach to consent, a very low level 
of knowledge about the act itself is required for a person to be considered 
capable of consent. In most Australian jurisdictions, only the nature and 
character of the sexual act must be known for a person to be considered 
capable of consent. Other factors may vitiate consent, such as deception, 
coercion, or mistake — but as far as factual knowledge about the actual act 
goes, there needs only be an understanding of the physical mechanics of 
the act and that its purpose is sexual rather than medical or hygienic (R v 
Morgan, 1970). The outcome is that almost any person, except one suffering 
from some severe form of mental impairment or one who is completely 
ignorant of sexual acts, is considered capable of consenting. 
For the protection of persons with mental impairment, special 
legislation has been enacted that criminalises sexual acts involving them. 
Within Australian jurisdictions, there are variations in specific provisions. In 
some states, such as Tasmania, the term mental impairment covers senility, 
intellectual disability, mental illness and brain damage (Tas Criminal Code  
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Act 1924). Section 66F of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900, however, 
pertains only to persons with intellectual disability, defined as persons who 
have appreciably below average general intellectual function and who 
require supervision or social habilitation in connection with the activities of 
daily life. In every Australian jurisdiction, provisions apply to persons with 
intellectual disability, and this group is the focus of much of the discussion 
that follows. 
The aim of legislation regulating sexual acts involving persons with 
mental impairment should be to achieve a balance between the right to 
sexual expression and the right to protection. One approach, adopted in 
Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, is to 
prohibit sexual relations between a person with mental impairment and 
persons involved in their care except where the couple is married.
13 A 
second approach, adopted by New South Wales and Western Australia, is to 
ban any sexual relations that exploit the person with mental impairment, and 
Queensland allows a defence if it can be shown that an act involving a 
person with intellectual disability was not exploitative. A third type of 
provision is to set a minimum standard of knowledge that must be present if 
the consent of the person with mental impairment is to be legal.  
In those Australian jurisdictions in which the law contains a 
knowledge requirement, that is, South Australia, Western Australia, and the 
                                            
13 This provision has its problems. In other areas of sexual assault law, marriage no longer 
carries with it an implied consent to intercourse: R v L (1991) 103 ALR 577; R v R (1991) 3 
WLR 767.  
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Australian Capital Territory,
14 the latter two require the person with mental 
impairment to understand only the nature and character of the act to which 
they are consenting. South Australia is unique in requiring not only capacity 
to understand the nature and character of the act, but also its consequences 
of the act. In this, the South Australian provisions bear some resemblance to 
the informed consent required for medical procedures.  
To take a typical example of a statute
15 that defines informed consent, 
the Qld Mental Health Act 2000 s137 states: Before a person gives informed 
consent, a full explanation must be given to the person in a form and 
language able to be understood by the person about— 
(a) the purpose, method, likely duration and expected benefit of the 
treatment; and  
(b) possible pain, discomforts, risks and side effects associated with the 
treatment; and  
(c) alternative methods of treatment available to the person. 
 
Defining consent 
The meaning of consent differs according to the area of law to which 
it relates (Young, 1986). Our discussion of consent and its vitiating factors is 
                                            
14 SA Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 s 49(6); WA Criminal Code s 330 (1); ACT 
Crimes Act 1900 s 67. 
 
15 Other sections of statute that refer to informed consent are: ACT Mental Health Act 1994 
s54; NSW Mental Health Act 1990 s155; Vic Mental Health Act 1986 s53B; and WA Mental 
Health Act 1996, ss95, 96, & 97.  
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confined to consent to sexual acts. An examination of the history of cases in 
which consent has been judicially discussed reveals that modern law differs 
considerably from the law of, say, one hundred years ago. It is not our 
intention to extensively review that history here (for a detailed discussion, 
see criminal law treatises such as Bronitt & McSherry, 2001, 2005; or Fisse, 
1990). We will, however, compare some older law with its modern 
counterpart to highlight some of the changes that have taken place in the 
law governing consent, using contemporary cases where it has been 
claimed that the complainant’s ignorance of facts has vitiated her consent.   
Amendment to the law of New South Wales took place following the 
case of Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957). A newly-arrived female 
Greek migrant who did not speak English attended a Registry Office with the 
defendant. He falsely informed her that they had gone through a marriage 
ceremony. On the “honeymoon”, she consented to and engaged in sex with 
him. After several days he deserted her and the facts came to light. The 
High Court held that because the complainant was aware of the identity of 
the man and the character of what he was doing, her consent was not 
vitiated, even though she had only consented on the basis of a belief that 
she was legally married and that belief had been fraudulently induced by the 
defendant. As a result of Papadimitropoulos, the Crimes Act 1900 was 
amended so that s 61HA (5)(b) now reads “a person who consents to sexual 
intercourse with another person under a mistaken belief that the other 
person is married to the person, does not consent to the sexual intercourse”.  
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An example of the extent to which fraud may vitiate consent is the 
case of R v Mobilio (1991), in which a radiographer subjected several female 
patients to vaginal examinations using ultrasound transducers. These 
examinations had no medical value and were conducted solely for the 
sexual gratification of the radiographer. He was subsequently charged with 
and convicted of rape. On appeal, the court held that any mistaken belief on 
the part of the complainant must relate to the nature and character of the act 
or to the identity of the sexual partner. Therefore, since the patients had 
consented to the insertion of the transducer into their vaginas, their consent 
was not vitiated simply because they were mistaken about the reason 
behind the act. However, it seems certain that the patients would not have 
consented had they known the real reason for the internal examination. The 
Mobilio ruling has since been reversed in Victorian law. According to the 
Crimes Act 1958 s 36(g) there is no consent where a person “mistakenly 
believes that the act is for medical or hygienic purposes”. 
In the case R v Pryor (2001), a sleeping woman was lifted from her 
bed and taken into the hallway of her home by an intruder, where 
penetration took place. The woman’s de facto husband was in the house, 
and she believed it was he with whom she was having sex. She was 
unaware that this was not the case until after ejaculation had taken place. 
When she realised that the man was a stranger, she called for help. Her 
assailant was charged and convicted of rape. The conviction was appealed. 
It was argued that since the defendant had done nothing to constitute  
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impersonating her husband, consent was not vitiated. This argument was 
rejected and the appeal was dismissed. Williams JA stated at 21: “Her 
instinctive responses did not constitute a comprehending consent… Once 
she comprehended what was happening — a complete stranger was having 
intercourse with her — she made it clear that she was not a consenting 
party.” On the basis of this ruling it appears that in cases of mistake 
regarding the facts surrounding the sexual act, criminal liability is not 
confined to cases in which a false belief has been actively induced by the 
defendant. 
In the nineteenth century, it was ruled that a man who had 
deliberately infected his wife with gonorrhea, a fatal disease at that time, was 
not guilty of either assault or rape because the wife’s consent had not been 
obtained by fraud (R v Clarence, 1888). A different approach was taken in 
the Canadian case R v Cuerrier (1998). A HIV-positive man had unprotected 
sex with two women without informing them of his condition. Both women 
consented to sex, but both testified that they would not have consented had 
they known that the defendant was HIV-positive. The failure of the accused 
to disclose his state of health was held to amount to fraud: “A consent that is 
not based upon knowledge of the significant relevant factors is not a valid 
consent” (p. 127). 
In all the cases mentioned above, there was no question that the 
parties were legally capable of consent. The issue was whether ignorance of 
some fact vitiated any alleged consent. Few cases have come before the  
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courts in which it was alleged that the complainant was incapable of consent 
due to a lack of knowledge caused by mental impairment. One such case 
was R v Morgan (1970). The County Court judge directed the jury that the 
complainant must understand five “rudimentary concepts” before valid 
consent could be given. These were: an understanding of the concept of 
virginity; an understanding that intercourse can lead to pregnancy; an 
understanding that most people view intercourse as fundamentally different 
from other affectionate acts; an understanding that some sections of society 
view intercourse as “naughty”; and an understanding that penetration is 
likely to cause rupture of the hymen. This direction was rejected on appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria stated that for incapacity to consent to be 
proved it must be shown that “she has not sufficient knowledge or 
understanding to comprehend (a) that what is proposed to be done is the 
physical fact of penetration of her body by the male organ or, if that is not 
proved, (b) that the act of penetration proposed is one of sexual connexion 
as distinct from one of totally different character” (p. 341). Interestingly, 
knowledge of the possibility of infection with a sexually transmitted disease 
was not mentioned in either the County or Supreme Court.  
The Morgan direction was recently elaborated upon in R v Mueller 
(2005), another case in which it was alleged that the complainant lacked 
capacity to consent. In the County Court, the jury was directed that “if the 
complainant has knowledge or understanding of what the act comprises, and 
of its character… then she has all that the law requires for capacity to  
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consent. That knowledge or understanding need not be a sophisticated one. 
It is enough that she has sufficient rudimentary knowledge of what the act 
comprises, and of its character, to enable her to decide whether to give or 
withhold consent” (p. 6). In the Court of Criminal Appeal this was held to be 
a correct statement of law.  
In the South Australian case R v Beattie (1981) the defendant was 
charged with rape and with having unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
mentally deficient woman. He was acquitted of the first charge but convicted 
on the second. The woman was 23 years old at the time of the offence. She 
had a mental age of 10 years, had received no sex education and had no 
sexual experience. She and some companions attended a fair, where she 
spent a lot of time attempting to win a toy frog at a hoopla stall. She spoke to 
the attendant, Beattie, who asked her if she wanted to “make love”. He led 
her without resistance to a nearby caravan. He took with him the toy frog, 
which he subsequently gave to her. In the caravan, he had intercourse with 
her. Afterward, she returned to the fair. She made no complaint about the 
intercourse to her friends and spoke to the accused again. Later, another 
man enticed her into a truck with a toy panda. She had intercourse with him. 
Subsequently a third man attempted to have intercourse with her but she 
resisted and ran away. When her mother came to pick the woman up, she 
was distressed but would not say why. Later she revealed to her parents and 
the police what had occurred.   
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The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49 (6) reads: “A 
person who has, or attempts to have, sexual intercourse with another person 
knowing that other person to be so mentally deficient as not to understand 
the nature or consequences of the act shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and 
liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years.” Beattie was 
found guilty but appealed to the Supreme Court. In delivering the judgment 
of the Supreme Court, White J laid emphasis on the woman’s lack of 
resistance as a reason for acquittal on the rape charge. However, the appeal 
against the conviction for having unlawful sexual intercourse with a mentally 
deficient woman was dismissed on the grounds that the woman obviously 
did not possess any understanding of the consequences of the sexual act in 
which she had engaged. White J at 491 – 492 stated “it was clear that she 
did not understand the consequences of the sexual act, in particular the 
primary consequence of possible pregnancy. Her delight at learning where 
babies came from was quite evident during her cross-examination. From the 
way her face lit up, it was clear that the revelation occurred there and then.”   
Whether conviction would have been made in the Beattie case had it 
occurred in a jurisdiction where only the nature and character of the act 
(rather than the nature, character and consequences of it) need to be known 
is open to doubt, as there was some evidence that the woman had had 
discussions about sexual matters with colleagues at her place of work in the 
days prior to the offence. The woman’s evidence, demeanour and 
appearance were relied upon by the court as indices of her capacity to  
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consent. Were the trial to be heard today, it is likely that the court would take 
expert evidence on the woman’s capacity to consent, though the difficulty 
inherent in accurate assessment of such capacity is well known (McSherry, 
1998a). 
The cases reviewed above suggest that consent must be based on 
knowledge; it is only the degree of knowledge that is in question. According 
to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995, p. 153), consent “is morally 
binding only in so far as it is voluntary, undertaken with full knowledge, after 
deliberation”. In case law, consent has been described as “a free and 
informed exercise of the will” (R v PS Shaw, 1995, p. 111).  
A central question regarding consent is “What is it that was consented 
to?” Wittgenstein (cited in Leader-Elliott & Naffine, 2000) encapsulated the 
problem thus: A asks B to teach some children a game. A leaves the room. 
B teaches the children gaming with dice. When A returns and discovers this, 
he says, “I didn’t mean that sort of game”. Several questions arise: to what 
did A consent when he asked B to teach the children a game? Did A consent 
to the children being taught any sort of game? Should B have used his social 
knowledge to infer that A meant a children’s game? Was A’s consent vitiated 
by the type of game they were taught? What if, in B’s culture, gaming with 
dice was commonly played by children? This example may be applied when 
accusations that any types of non-consensual acts are made, including 
sexual ones. Did B’s act differ in such a way from A’s expectations that 
criminal charges are appropriate? Wittgenstein’s example shows the  
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difficulties that can arise from two people’s differing understandings of 
consent. A number of feminist authors have examined the question of 
consent at length and usually find that in practice, B’s (the male’s) point of 
view is allowed to override A’s (the female’s) understanding (for an overview 
of the work of these authors, see Graycar & Morgan, 2002). 
In the cases reviewed above, was consent given simply to the 
physical fact of the act itself? Was it sexual intercourse with a specific 
person as in Pryor? Was it sexual intercourse with a disease-free partner as 
in Cuerrier? Was it sexual intercourse with someone to whom the person is 
legally married as in Papadimitropolous? If one was to identify a trend in the 
law of consent, it would be that over time, the consent required by the court 
is consent to the details of the specific act that has taken place. Consent 
must be given to the particular circumstances that obtained at the time. 
Indeed, it seems that in cases where it is clear that the complainant would 
not have consented had she known the facts, such as the cases cited 
above, modern courts hold her consent to be vitiated.  
Thus the trend over time is toward a standard that resembles 
informed consent. The difficulty is where to place the cutoff between real 
consent and vitiated consent. It would be unrealistic to set a standard where 
any unknown fact formed grounds for a rape charge. As an example, a 
person may not have consented to sex if they had known that their partner’s 
sole motivation was lust and that they would end the relationship afterwards. 
But that is hardly grounds for sexual assault charges. Some jurisdictions  
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have attempted to address this issue by specifying that the lack of 
knowledge must be “fundamental” or some similar term. However, the 
inclusion of such terms does not solve the problem, since it is not clear what 
features define a lack of knowledge as fundamental. 
When an ordinary type of decision is to be taken that does not involve 
anything more than common knowledge, a person who does not know such 
facts as are known to the majority of decision-makers is at a disadvantage 
akin to that experienced by an uninformed patient. A person who is unaware 
of the consequences of sexual acts is unable to make a considered decision 
because they are unaware of the risks, harms and benefits associated with 
the act. Like the uninformed patient, a sexually innocent person does not 
have the relevant information to allow them to make a decision that is in their 
own interest.  
Given the developments in the law that resulted from 
Papadimitropolous, Mobilio, Cuerrier and Pryor, it is arguable that statutes 
that do not demand knowledge of potential consequences as a prerequisite 
of capacity to consent are inconsistent with other standards of knowledge 
such as the informed consent required in medical law, where a practitioner 
may be charged with negligence if they fail to inform a patient of the risks 
associated with a proposed procedure. The proposal that the potential 
consequences of sexual acts should be known before consent can be given 
is not unique. The United Kingdom Sexual Offences Act 2003, Ch. 42, s 30 
states:   
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(1) A person (A) commits an offence if— 
(a) he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b) the touching is sexual, 
(c) B is unable to refuse because of or for a reason related to a 
mental disorder, and, 
(d) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that B has a 
mental disorder and that because of it or for a reason related to it B is likely 
to be unable to refuse. 
(2) B is unable to refuse if— 
(a) he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching 
(whether because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of what is being done or for any other 
reason), or 
(b) he is unable to communicate such a choice to A (emphasis 
added). 
 
Current law in most American states also contains the provision that 
the person has knowledge of the nature of the act and of its consequences 
(Sundram & Stavis, 1994). Indeed, some jurisdictions require that persons 
with intellectual disability provide informed consent prior to sexual relations; 
there must be evidence of the ability to understand the nature and 
consequences of the sexual act, and additionally, the ability to exercise 
choice (Parker & Abramson, 1995). Some United States states go further  
 
120
still, requiring an understanding not only of the nature and consequences of 
the act, but also an appreciation of the moral dimension of the act (Sundram 
& Stavis, 1994). 
The small body of literature that relates to the sexual knowledge of 
persons with intellectual disability suggests that if appreciation of the moral 
dimensions of the act (or to use the terminology of the original Morgan 
direction in the County Court, an understanding that most people view sex 
as fundamentally different to other affectionate acts) was introduced as a 
criterion for capacity to consent, many persons might be unable to meet that 
standard.  
With regard to the legal aspects of sex, O’Callaghan and Murphy 
(2002) found that people with intellectual disability knew significantly less 
about legal regulation of sexual acts than did a comparison group of 
mainstream 16-year-olds. It seems, therefore, that setting additional hurdles 
(such as knowledge about the legal aspects of sex) for a person to be 
deemed capable of consent would push capacity further out of reach for 
members of this population. We do not support the proposal that moral 
appreciation of the act be demonstrated because setting a standard of 
capacity that is too high infringes on the right to sexual expression. 
Furthermore, it is not a requirement that members of the general public, that 
is, those who do not have a mental impairment, must show an 
understanding of the legal and/or moral significance of the act and thus 
requiring such an understanding of a subsection of the population would be  
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discriminatory. On the other hand, current Australian law in which only the 
nature of the act must be known seems to afford little protection to those 
who need it. It is also at odds with the results of research that has been 
conducted in this area, which is reviewed in the following section. 
 
What knowledge should be required before consent may be given? 
Consent to sexual acts. The question of establishing criteria by which 
capacity to consent to sex might be assessed has been addressed by a 
number of researchers. This section contains a summary and critique of 
some studies that have been conducted in this field. 
Kennedy and Niederbuhl (2000) sent questionnaires to 305 doctoral 
level members of the American Psychological Association, asking them to 
rate the importance of 56 items theoretically related to capacity to consent. 
Responses were grouped by content. Three major factors underpinning 
capacity to consent to sexual acts were identified: basic sexual knowledge, 
ability to protect oneself, and knowledge of the consequences of sexual 
behaviour. Among the highest scoring items were that they know that 
pregnancy is possible; they can make an informed choice; and they know 
that disease can result from sexual activity. This study would have been 
strengthened if the opinions of stakeholders had been sought, in addition to 
the opinions of a group of psychologists who may have had little knowledge 
of either intellectual disability or of the law. However, it is significant to our  
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discussion that knowledge of both pregnancy and disease were thought to 
be essential knowledge before consent may be given.  
In earlier work, Kennedy (1999) had designed an assessment tool 
utilising items representative of sexual knowledge, protection and knowledge 
of consequences. The tool was named the Sexual Consent and Education 
Assessment (SCEA). It was administered to 69 persons with intellectual 
disability, among others. Each participant was deemed either capable or 
incapable of consent based on their SCEA score. This categorisation was 
then compared to a competence assessment by an independent team 
composed of family, staff, and professionals involved in each participant’s 
care. For 91% of participants with intellectual disability, the SCEA and 
team’s capacity determinations were identical. Twenty-nine persons were 
classified as competent and 34 persons were determined to lack the 
capacity to consent using both assessment methods. Two participants were 
deemed competent by the team but incompetent using the SCEA, and in 
four cases this result was reversed. The two knowledge items which best 
predicted capacity or incapacity to consent were that the individual 
demonstrated knowledge of sexual intercourse, and that they could identify 
the consequences of such activity.  
This study was conducted in the United States and, as discussed 
above, in many jurisdictions in that country knowledge of the consequences 
of sexual acts is a prerequisite for legal competence
16. This may be the 
                                            
16 Note that in the United States, competence is the legal term used. This is the reverse of 
Australian jurisdictions, where capacity is the legal term.  
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reason that knowledge of the nature and consequences of sexual acts was 
predictive of capacity to consent. Due to the way US state laws are 
constructed, the assessment team may have weighted this criterion more 
highly in making their judgment. However, knowledge of consequences was 
not, at the time of publication, a judicial requirement in the state in which 
Kennedy conducted this research. An additional explanation is that it is 
probable that a person who does not know the consequences of sexual 
activity also lacks other traits found in capable persons.  
Ames and Samowitz (1995) investigated what knowledge might be 
needed to give consent. These authors described two categories of persons 
to be assessed: those with command of verbal communication, and those 
without. These authors recommended that verbal persons should be 
assessed for capacity using indicators already mentioned, including 
understanding of the nature of the act and of its potential consequences. 
Additional indices which they recommended ought to be assessed were 
voluntariness, the ability to avoid harm, the ability to avoid exploitation, the 
ability to avoid abuse and to stop an interaction when it was no longer 
desired, and ability to choose an appropriate context for sexual activity.  
Ames and Samowitz made one notable additional recommendation to 
be applied only to persons with verbal communication: they proposed that 
these persons should demonstrate a degree of knowledge that some sexual 
activities are illegal. In contrast, persons without verbal competence were to 
be assessed through their demonstration of “responsible interpersonal  
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behaviour” (Ames & Samowitz, 1995, p. 266). In making this 
recommendation, the authors advocated a double standard. A requirement 
that verbal persons should have to demonstrate basic legal knowledge but 
non-verbal persons should not results in the higher functioning group facing 
a more stringent assessment. Understanding of legal rights and options is 
difficult even for some caregivers (Morris, Niederbuhl & Mahr, 1993). A 
further weakness in Ames and Samowitz’s proposal is that the ability to 
verbalise is not synonymous with the ability to articulate relatively complex 
concepts. In other words, just because a person is able to speak does not 
mean that they will be able to express understanding of legal issues, such as 
consent, even if they have this understanding. We suggest that adoption of 
Ames and Samowitz’s (1995) proposal would impose an unnecessarily strict 
standard for determining capacity to consent. This would undermine the right 
to sexual expression of persons with intellectual disability. 
A second problematic aspect of Ames and Samowitz’s 
recommendations is that “responsible” behaviour must be demonstrated. 
Exactly what constitutes responsible behaviour, and who is to judge, and 
what such a demonstration might consist of, are left undefined. Such 
terminology is ambiguous and judgments based upon it are bound to be 
value-laden. Moreover, numerous persons without disability engage in what 
many would consider to be less than responsible sexual behaviour. It would 
be discriminatory to insist upon a more responsible standard of behaviour 
from the intellectually disabled than from the rest of the community.  
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“People’s actual decision-making processes frequently fail to match the legal 
standards described… it is important to recognize that individuals with 
mental retardation should not be held to different standards than those 
commonly applied to individuals within the general population” (Morris et al., 
1993, p. 264). Morris and colleagues also recognised that incapacity in one 
area does not necessarily imply incapacity in another area. Moreover, as 
Kennedy (1999) pointed out, if a lack of knowledge is the cause of incapacity 
to consent, capacity may be achieved through the provision of appropriate 
education. 
O’Callaghan and Murphy (2002) conducted a wide-ranging study of 
the sexual knowledge, vulnerability, understanding of abuse and consent, 
and knowledge of the law possessed by 60 adults with intellectual disability. 
Participants had to be able to communicate with minimal assistance; their IQ 
scores ranged from 55 to 90
17 with an average of 59.8. Their data were 
compared with the data obtained from 16-year-olds attending mainstream 
secondary schools. The results showed that in every area adults with 
intellectual disability had much less knowledge than did the teenagers.  
O’ Callaghan and Murphy discussed several options for setting a 
minimum standard of knowledge that should be present for a person to be 
considered legally capable of consent. The lowest standard criterion they 
considered was that advocated in a Home Office proposal (Home Office, 
2000) which stated that to be able to consent, the person should be able to 
                                            
17 Persons whose IQ score is above approximately 70 are not usually considered to have an 
intellectual disability. In this study, 6 persons with scores above 70 participated.  
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differentiate sexual acts from personal care, and that they should understand 
that pregnancy and HIV/AIDS are potential outcomes of sexual activity. By 
this standard, 50% of the participants with intellectual disability in 
O’Callaghan and Murphy’s study would have been unable to consent, 
though all the teenagers would have been capable. This result may indicate 
that requiring that the consequences of sexual activity be set as a 
prerequisite of consent is raising the standard of knowledge too high. 
However, our argument is that O’Callaghan and Murphy’s results are 
indicative of the need for sex education programs that are tailored to the 
intellectually disabled community. 
Consent to medical procedures. Given that few studies have focused 
on establishing capacity to consent to sexual acts, we have drawn on 
studies addressing capacity to consent to therapeutic treatment. Morris et al. 
(1993) created hypothetical vignettes in which a medical problem, a 
proposed treatment, other alternatives to this treatment, and risks and 
benefits were described. There were three groups of 15 participants: staff 
members who cared for persons with disability, persons with mild intellectual 
disability, and persons with moderate intellectual disability.
18 Each 
participant was read a vignette and then questioned. The aim was to 
establish whether or not the participant understood the nature of the problem 
and its treatment, its risks, benefits and alternatives, and whether or not the 
participant was able to make a choice and justify it. Three independent 
                                            
18 “Mild” and “moderate” classifications were made if IQ scores fell in the ranges 50-55 to 
approximately 70, and 35-40 to 50-55 respectively.    
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judges used the answers to determine the presence or absence of capacity 
to give informed consent.  
Results showed that all staff members were deemed capable. Only 
six of those with mild intellectual disability were found capable, and all but 
one of the participants with moderate intellectual disability were determined 
to be incapable of giving informed consent. Competence was more readily 
achieved when vignettes reflected a situation that participants with 
intellectual disability had experienced in real life. Thus it may be that with 
education, competence may be achieved; it also suggests that appropriately 
designed and delivered education may lead to capacity to consent in sexual 
matters.  
Guardianship. In some Australian states, a determination of 
(in)capacity to give informed consent to therapeutic procedures is made by a 
Guardianship Board. This board is also charged with the nomination of 
persons who may give valid consent on an incapable patient’s behalf. Tustin 
and Bond (1991) compared assessments of capacity in 194 people with 
intellectual disability made by a Guardianship Board against determinations 
made using six alternative measures. The Guardianship Board based its 
rulings on an interview conducted by one of its members, as well as on 
information gleaned from professionals, staff and family of the person 
concerned. The comparative measures were a biographical information 
checklist, the residential manager’s assessment, scores on the Adaptive 
Functioning Checklist (Marlett, in Tustin & Bond, 1991), the person’s level of  
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independent living, the assessment of medical and dental officers, and a 
consent questionnaire devised by Tustin and Bond.  
The consent questionnaire was based on a visit to the dentist. This 
scenario was chosen as most participants had personal experience of a 
dental examination. Elements assessed in the questionnaire were the 
person’s understanding of the condition, the proposed treatment, the co-
operative responses required of the patient, the main consequences, 
possible side effects, alternative treatments, and whether they understood 
that they had the choice to give or withhold permission for the treatment. In 
addition, each person was asked if they wished to claim or waive the right to 
decide whether to allow the treatment or not. Persons who chose not to 
make a decision were automatically classed as incapable. 
In over 70% of cases the consent questionnaire correctly classified 
persons by Guardianship Board grouping. There was 100% agreement on 
persons deemed capable of consent by the Board, and on most persons 
deemed incapable. Disagreement arose over those participants who 
wavered on the cusp of capacity to give informed consent. This result may 
have been due to the hypothetical nature of the scenario used in the 
questionnaire, because some people may have had difficulty remembering 
the information given them during the experiment, they may have had 
difficulty imagining the scenario, or they may have been unable to recall 
previous dental visits.   
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Alternatively, a person deemed incapable by the Guardianship Board 
may have been rated as capable on the questionnaire because they were 
familiar with a dental visit, a possibility which would be consistent with Morris 
et al’s finding that experience of related activities increased the number of 
ratings of ability to consent. Disagreement may also have been due to the 
fact that at the time of testing, a person was capable when assessed by one 
measure, but was not when subsequently assessed with the other. It seems 
likely, however, that disparate ratings may simply be a reflection of the 
difficulty in assessing persons who are on the borderline of capacity.  
In summary, the research evidence indicates the importance of 
knowledge of the consequences of the act for valid consent to sexual acts. 
Yet under most existing Australian law, only the nature and character of the 
act must be known. A person who fulfils this criterion but does not realise the 
danger of having unprotected sex with an infected partner may have the 
legal capacity to consent,
19 and there is no doubt that a person who does not 
understand that pregnancy may occur is deemed to be capable of consent to 
unprotected penetrative vaginal intercourse.  
The standard of knowledge required for consent to medical 
procedures is much higher. Persons who are incapable of understanding the 
nature and consequences (and more) of a proposed procedure are not able 
to consent and another person must consent on their behalf (Somerville, 
1994). We are not suggesting that another person might consent to sex on 
                                            
19 There is doubt that a person who wishes to have unprotected sexual intercourse with a 
HIV-positive partner has “the legal capacity to consent to such serious harm” R v Brown & 
ors [1994] 1 AC 212.   
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behalf of a willing but incapable person (although this possibility was mooted 
by Spiecker and Steutel, 2002, but was condemned by critics; see 
Greenspan, 2002, & Leicester & Cooke, 2002). What we are proposing is 
that until a person understands that disease and pregnancy are possible 
outcomes of some sexual acts, that person should be deemed legally 
incapable of consent because they do not possess sufficient knowledge to 
allow them to make a decision which is in their own best interests. 
Furthermore, the requisite understanding for consent might come about 
through adequate and appropriately designed education; and such 
education as will most fully develop the capacity of each person should be 
provided to them. As there is evidence that information is sometimes not 
understood by the persons with intellectual disability (McCarthy, 1999), this 
information should be repeated as required. Given that in this population 
levels of knowledge are comparatively low even after sex education has 
been provided (McCabe, 1999), and information is likely to be forgotten or 
remembered incorrectly over time, especially by persons with intellectual 
disability (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002), repeated presentation of sex-
related information is particularly important.  
The education provided to persons with intellectual disability with 
respect to their sexuality might have to contain quite explicit directions 
regarding a number of issues. It is certainly necessary to ensure that the 
person knows that they can say no to anyone if they don’t want to have sex 
with them. In addition, it might be necessary to actually tell the person the  
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names of people who, according to statute, are not allowed to ask them for 
sex and the names of people who are not allowed to have sex with them; 
who they should complain to if anything happens that they are 
uncomfortable with; and to ask them on a regular basis if anything has 
happened that they didn’t like. Reassurance that they will not be punished 
for reporting an incident would possibly also be required. Given the evidence 
that the sex experienced by both men and women with intellectual disability 
is often grounded in personal gain (McCarthy, 1999; Thompson, 2001), there 
appears to be an additional need for education in more than the mere 
mechanics of sex, but also in basic social development, with specific 
emphasis on the communicative aspects of sex so that the partner may be 
recognised as more than simply a tool to be used to achieve orgasm or as a 
means of material gain but as a person with interests of their own. It may be 
thought that this is a double standard, because some people without mental 
impairment base their sexual interaction on how much money the other 
person has. However, if education in the communicative aspects of sex is 
provided, the person has a choice as to whether or not the education is 
used. Where any person, whether disabled or not, is given education, they 
are not obliged to use such knowledge. It is the person’s own choice. But if 
they are never given education, they are of course unable to use it.  For 
example, say education in arithmetic is given to a class of disabled and non-
disabled students. All students are free to use or not use the information 
given in class. It may be that disabled persons choose not to use the  
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information for a number of reasons, such as they did not properly 
understand the information. But that does not mean that this education 
should be withheld from them. In fact, it may be seen as discriminatory not to 
provide education in many aspects of life, including the communicative 
aspects of sexuality to disabled persons. 
Achievement of an understanding that their partner has their own 
feelings might be problematic for persons with intellectual disability because 
they sometimes lack understanding that their own experience is not identical 
to their partner’s experience.  
 
A possible reason why some men with learning disabilities may not 
respond more appropriately is that they find it difficult to comprehend 
that their experience is not the experience. In other words, as a 
person with learning disabilities, they may well have difficulty with 
abstract thinking and are unable to imagine that another person would 
be experiencing things differently from themselves. One indication of 
this was given by a woman who said: ‘I told him it was hurting and he 
just said “it don’t hurt”’ (KS). In other words, because it was not 
hurting him, it was not hurting… Sex education work with men with 
learning disabilities has shown that it is, in fact, quite common for the 
men to be indifferent to their partner’s quality of experience 
(McCarthy, 1999, p. 145 – 146). 
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In McCarthy’s study, “the hospital-based women not only accepted payment 
but expected money, believing this was the right thing and that it was not fair 
if men did not pay them” (McCarthy, 1999, p. 151). The perception of 
unfairness may be that without payment, having sex is an unenjoyable chore 
(McCarthy, 1999). It might be argued that our proposal that education in the 
emotional aspects of sexuality is based on a belief that persons with 
disabilities should be shaped and changed so as to be more “acceptable” to 
the rest of the community, in keeping with the principles of normalisation. As 
with any education, the aim is to impart knowledge so as to allow each 
person to develop to their full potential. This should include the potential to 
enjoy sex as much as possible. In fact, it might be argued that withholding 
sex education from persons with intellectual impairment is not only 
discriminatory but smacks of a return to repression of sexual feelings in this 
subpopulation.  
The cause of incapacity 
Our final contention in this paper is that a lack of knowledge that gives 
rise to incapacity to consent should not necessarily be causally related to 
mental disability or illness. Current law in all Australian jurisdictions with the 
exception of the Australian Capital Territory limits the cause of incapacity to 
either some form of mental impairment
20 or, even more narrowly, to 
intellectual disability
21. These provisions evolved as a protective measure for 
persons who, because of mental “differences” from the general population, 
                                            
20 WA Criminal Code s 330 (1); Vic Crimes Act 1958 s 50; Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 
126; NT Criminal Code s 130. 
21 NSW Crimes Act 1900 s 66F; Qld Criminal Code 1899 s 216.  
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were seen as particularly vulnerable to being imposed upon in sexual 
matters (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2005). However, it is possible 
for adults to be innocent of sexual knowledge for reasons other than mental 
impairment; such reasons may include parental religious beliefs or cultural 
attitudes. To confine the protection afforded by legislation to persons with 
some form of mental impairment may constitute reverse discrimination 
against people without mental impairment who do not understand the nature 
and consequences of sexual acts. Under current law these persons are not 
protected.  
It is interesting that Australian law defining incapacity applies only to 
persons whose ignorance of sexual acts has its origin in an irregularity of 
mental function. Those whose mental processes are judged as not 
conforming to the norm, as “not normal”, are seen as being in need of 
legislated safeguards. Matthews (1999) noted that, in contrast to persons 
with a physical illness whom we treat as equals and attempt to help, persons 
with mental illness are seen as being in need of protection, both from 
themselves and from others. This alleged need for protection was the origin 
of special legislation that applied only to those with mental conditions, such 
as modern day Mental Health Acts. Matthews’ argument against legislation 
that is applied only in cases of mental illness is based on two main points. 
First, he suggested that special legislation was originally a product of the old 
idea of “madness” — mad people were seen as being essentially different 
from the rest of the populace. Second, there are lingering overtones of the  
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Cartesian division of body and mind, in which mental disorder was seen as a 
corruption of the self; the actual person was changed or different to the 
“normal”. Even today, an individual with mental illness is suspected of 
irrationality, and therefore is likely to have their decisions overturned, 
although this is not the case for a person with a purely physical infirmity.   
Matthews’ argument was directed against a dichotomous division of 
illness into physical or mental genres. He pointed out that many conditions 
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV-TR, 1994) have an organic basis. Depression, dementia and 
alcoholism are examples of disorders that have a physical component but 
which affect the mind. Given the physical component it is, therefore, difficult 
to sustain any argument that these conditions, or many others in the DSM-
IV-TR, are mental illnesses per se. Matthews also opposed the restriction of 
rights made possible by mental health legislation. Such legislation is based 
on the rationale that only autonomous persons can exercise rights; therefore 
it is acceptable to restrict the rights of persons who lack autonomy due to 
mental illness. For example, it is possible to incarcerate persons against 
their will “for their own protection” (which also fulfills the function of 
protecting the public from them; Eastman & Dahr, 2000). The right to refuse 
treatment is also a right that may only be exercised by autonomous persons 
(Matthews, 1999).  
As a cause of incapacity, the absence of autonomy is a confusing 
concept. Matthews pointed out that the concept of autonomy is based on the  
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Kantian ideal of moral worth; only a selfless impersonal decision was 
considered to be moral. But in the case of treatment decisions, Kantian 
autonomy is irrelevant. The person making that decision is not concerned 
with moral worth — they are concerned with their own wellbeing. Unless 
there is reason to suspect that the person does not or cannot understand 
what is in their own best interest, treatment decisions should be respected 
because the person is capable of making a decision in their own interest, 
whether or not that decision is approved of or thought “rational” by others.   
Matthews’ argument can be applied to the issue of persons with 
intellectual disability and their capacity to consent to sexual acts. Whereas 
the mentally ill person is regarded as irrational or deluded, the person with 
intellectual disability is regarded as having only limited capacity to make 
judgments because of a lack of maturity and foresight. Persons with mental 
illness or intellectual disability are also thought to lack the logical ability to 
recognise which choices are in their own best interest. Only autonomous, or 
rational, persons are seen as capable of making decisions that go against 
the grain of “normal” thought (Matthews, 1999). In contrast, people with 
mental illness or with intellectual disability are seen as being in need of care 
and guidance. Decisions that are incongruent with the judgment of others 
are unlikely to be respected, more especially if that decision has grave 
consequences (Eastman & Dahr, 2000).   
Persons who consent to sexual acts without knowledge of the 
potential consequences are in an equivalent moral position to the patient  
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who makes a decision regarding treatment without being informed of the 
associated risks. As we have seen, outside of South Australia the person 
who agrees to a sexual act without knowing its consequences is held to give 
valid consent. In contrast, the uninformed patient may charge their doctor 
with negligence and assault.  
It might be argued that the situations are not analogous. In the 
medical scenario, there is a power imbalance between the doctor and 
patient. The doctor has specialised knowledge and is the “expert”. He or she 
is ethically bound to promote the best interest of the patient and to provide 
the relevant knowledge to the patient so that the patient can make an 
informed treatment choice. In contrast, the partner of a sexually naïve 
person is not considered to be an expert. It is reasonable for them to 
assume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that an adult person does 
possess the requisite sexual knowledge and is capable of giving consent. 
However, we suggest that if the knowledgeable party does at any stage 
realise or suspect that the other person is ignorant of the consequences of 
the act, any apparent consent should be vitiated. This proposal is consistent 
with current law. For example, in Western Australia, a person who engages 
in sexual behaviour with a person who they know or ought to know is an 
incapable person is guilty of a crime (Criminal Code s 330). South Australian 
statute provides that a person who knows that a person with intellectual 
disability is unable to understand the nature or consequences of sexual 
intercourse is guilty of an offence (Criminal Law Consolidation Act s 49).  
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In setting the standard of knowledge required for consent to be given, 
we suggest that both medical and sexual consent should be based 
knowledge equivalent to that possessed by a properly informed person. In 
medical consent, that amounts to knowledge of the risks, benefits, 
alternatives and consequences of the proposed treatment. Our proposal is 
that in order to be deemed capable of sexual consent, a person should know 
what a properly informed person knows: that pregnancy and disease are 
possible consequences of sexual activity, in addition to other legal 
requirements such as realisation that there is a fundamental difference 
between sexual acts and other social interactions. If a person does not have 
that knowledge, they should be deemed incapable of consenting, regardless 
of the reason for that lack of knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
The role of the law regulating the sexual expression of persons who 
fall near the borderline of capacity to consent is to find a balance between 
their need of protection and their need for sexual expression. Those persons 
with intellectual disability who wish to engage in sexual acts should be 
provided with such education as will promote achievement of capacity to 
consent, as should any other person who wants but has been denied sex 
education. There will, however, always be some persons who cannot 
achieve that capacity due to some form of mental impairment, and there may 
be some who do not wish to receive the requisite knowledge. These persons  
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are in need of the protection of the law. To allow the required standard of 
knowledge for consent to remain at its current minimal level does not afford 
that protection. It is our argument that one cannot consent if one does not 
know the potential consequences of one’s action, because one cannot 
protect one’s own interests in the same way that a person with knowledge of 
the consequences may. Our view — that to be capable one must understand 
the consequences of one’s action — is a view found throughout the research 
literature, and indeed, in the law of other countries including the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, the origin of a lack of knowledge that results in the 
person being deemed incapable of consent should not be confined to mental 
impairment; all who lack, for whatever reason, understanding of the nature 
and consequences of sexual acts should be afforded the protection of the 
law. 
22 
                                            
22 In the interests of minimising duplication, the reference list for this paper has been 
consolidated into the reference list at the end of the thesis.  
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Chapter 5 discussed the issue of the knowledge basis on which 
consent to sexual acts is based. In it we have argued that the current low 
standard of required knowledge is insufficient to protect some persons with 
intellectual disability, despite the fact that Australia, by signing three United 
Nations Conventions, has indicated a willingness to abide by the rights of 
disabled persons outlined within them, including the right to protection. I will 
return to this argument in Chapter 8, where suggestions for the reform of 
existing law are made. 
The focus of the following chapter is again the issue of informed 
consent, this time in relation to the person being possessed of sufficient 
understanding of the consequences of their action to protect their own 
interests. Alteration of the law to require knowledge of the nature, character 
and consequences of the sexual act is evaluated for its effect on persons 
whose levels of intellectual impairment vary from mild to profound. 
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Chapter 6: Can consent be uninformed? Suggested reform of 
sexual offences against persons with intellectual disability
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23 Published paper:  
Graydon C. (2006, October 27). Presented at the Conference on Social Change in the 21
st 
Century. Available: 
http://www.socialchange.qut.edu.au/conferences/socialchange/docs/conf_papers20
06/Graydon_FIN.pdf 
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Abstract 
 
In R v Morgan (1970), the Supreme Court of Victoria stated that for 
incapacity to consent to be proved it must be shown that a person “has not 
sufficient knowledge or understanding to comprehend (a) that what is 
proposed to be done is the physical fact of penetration of her body by the 
male organ or, if that is not proved, (b) that the act of penetration proposed 
is one of sexual connexion as distinct from one of totally different character.” 
It is my contention that this standard of knowledge is insufficient to allow a 
person to protect themselves against the commonly recognised 
consequences of sexual acts, namely pregnancy and sexually transmitted 
diseases. Although the literature suggests that increasing the benchmark of 
knowledge to encompass these facts would mean that many persons with 
intellectual disability would be deemed incapable of consent, I argue that 
consent that is not based on a standard of knowledge sufficient to allow an 
individual to safeguard their own interests cannot be considered valid 
consent. Law reform is required so that consent to sexual acts more closely 
resembles the informed consent required for medical treatment. Moreover, 
the provision of adequate sex education, repeated as required, would assist 
many people with intellectual disability to achieve understanding of both the 
nature and consequences of sexual acts. The proposed reforms would also 
allow people who, even after education, are unable to meet the requisite 
standard more certain legal protection than is currently the case.   
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In 1981, a 23 year old woman with a mental age of 10 years 8 months went 
to a country fair. She had no sexual experience and had received no sex 
education. At the fair, she spent a considerable amount of time and money 
at the hoopla stall trying to win a large green frog. The attendant struck up a 
conversation with her, and after a time asked if she wanted to “make love”. 
She agreed and accompanied him to a caravan where intercourse took 
place. He gave her the toy frog and she returned to the fair, where she 
chatted happily with friends, showed no distress, and spoke to the man 
again. Later a second fair attendant approached and offered her a toy panda 
in exchange for sex. She accompanied him to a truck and intercourse took 
place a second time. Again she was not distressed after the incident, but 
when a third man attempted to have sex with her she resisted and ran off. 
By the time her mother arrived to collect her she was visibly upset (R v 
Beattie, 1981). This narrative raises a number of questions concerning the 
sexual expression of persons with intellectual impairment. Was this woman 
capable of consent? What are, or what should be, the markers of capacity to 
consent? In particular, what facts should a person know if they are to be 
deemed capable of giving consent to a sexual act? 
 
Current law on capacity to consent to sexual acts  
In all Australian jurisdictions with the exception of South Australia, the 
benchmark of knowledge was established in R v Morgan (1970). In that  
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case, the direction given in the County Court was that the complainant must 
understand five “rudimentary concepts” before valid consent could be given. 
These were: an understanding of the concept of virginity; an understanding 
that intercourse can lead to pregnancy; an understanding that most people 
view intercourse as fundamentally different from other affectionate acts; an 
understanding that some sections of society view intercourse as “naughty”; 
and an understanding that penetration is likely to cause rupture of the 
hymen. This direction was rejected on appeal. The Supreme Court of 
Victoria stated that for incapacity to consent to be proved it must be shown 
that “she has not sufficient knowledge or understanding to comprehend (a) 
that what is proposed to be done is the physical fact of penetration of her 
body by the male organ or, if that is not proved, (b) that the act of 
penetration proposed is one of sexual connexion as distinct from one of 
totally different character” (p. 341). The Morgan direction was recently 
elaborated upon in R v Mueller (2005), another case in which it was alleged 
that the complainant lacked capacity to consent. In the County Court, the 
jury was directed that “if the complainant has knowledge or understanding of 
what the act comprises, and of its character… then she has all that the law 
requires for capacity to consent. That knowledge or understanding need not 
be a sophisticated one. It is enough that she has sufficient rudimentary 
knowledge of what the act comprises, and of its character, to enable her to 
decide whether to give or withhold consent” (p. 6). In the Court of Criminal 
Appeal this was held to be a correct statement of law.   
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Morgan sets a noticeably lower standard of knowledge than is 
necessary for informed consent to therapeutic treatment, where the person 
must understand not only the nature and character of the act, but also the 
risks, harms and benefits of both allowing and refusing the act. Similarly, 
consent for participation in research requires that before research is 
undertaken, there is the “provision to participants, at their level of 
comprehension, of information about the purpose, methods, demands, risks, 
inconveniences, discomforts, and possible outcomes of the research” 
(NHMRC, 1999, p. 12). Returning to capacity to consent to sex, the Morgan 
standard is lower than that of most American states, which require 
understanding of the nature and consequences of the act (Sundram & 
Stavis, 1994). In this country, the South Australian Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 s 49 (6) sets a similar benchmark. Under that section 
which defines the crime of knowingly having sexual intercourse with a 
“mentally deficient” person, for charges to be proved it must be shown that 
the person was unable to understand the nature or consequences of sexual 
intercourse. The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC; 1999, 
p. 38) suggested that consent be vitiated where “the person is incapable of 
understanding the essential nature of the act”. The term “essential nature” is 
left undefined, but could be read to mean understanding that sexual 
intercourse may result in pregnancy (McSherry & Naylor, 2004). Raising the 
standard of knowledge required for consent to sex make it more consistent 
with the requirements of legal consent to other activities. It would, however,  
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result in more people with mental impairment being found incapable of 
consenting to sexual acts, a point to which I shall return.  
One notable aspect of the Morgan standard is its age - it has stood 
without revision for over 35 years. Amendment to law sometimes occurs as 
a result of cases coming before the courts where the application of existing 
law, either through statute or precedent, is thought to produce a result that is 
in some way inconsistent with contemporary norms or societal beliefs. Of 
course, if this process of legal development is to occur, it is necessary for 
cases with features that might provoke legal change to come to trial. 
Although there is evidence that sexual offences against persons with mental 
impairment are frequently committed (see for example, Carmody, 1991; 
1992; Victorian Law Reform Commission, 1988; 2005), cases also have a 
high attrition rate. The person may be unable to report the crime or even to 
realise that what has happened is a crime (Graydon, Hall & O’Brien-Malone, 
2006). They may experience difficulty being believed, or may be reluctant to 
appear in court (Rosser, 1990). A person found incapable of consent may 
also be found incapable of giving evidence (NSW Law Reform Commission, 
1996).  Thus, convictions may be more difficult to secure when the victim 
has a mental impairment (McSherry & Naylor, 2004). The overall effect is 
that very few sexual offences against persons with mental impairment are 
prosecuted. During the period 1996 till 2004, an eight year period, in Victoria 
only 17 prosecutions under the relevant sections took place (McSherry & 
Naylor, 2004). As a result, the law pertaining to sexual offences against  
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persons with mental impairment tends to provoke little interest and attention, 
and can remain entirely unchanged for decades.  
In contrast, rulings on the general law pertaining to the vitiation of 
consent tend to be widely reported. These rulings sometimes create such 
widespread public comment that they result in legislated changes in statute. 
Amendment to the law of New South Wales took place following the case of 
Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957). A newly-arrived female Greek 
migrant who did not speak English attended a Registry Office with the 
defendant. He falsely informed her that they had gone through a marriage 
ceremony. On the “honeymoon”, she consented and engaged in sex with 
him. After several days he deserted her and the facts came to light. The 
High Court held that because she was aware of the identity of the man and 
the character of what he was doing, her consent was not vitiated, even 
though she had consented on the basis of a belief that she was legally 
married that had been fraudulently induced by the defendant. As a result of 
Papadimitropoulos, the NSW Crimes Act 1900 was amended so that s 61HA 
(5) (b) now reads “A person who consents to sexual intercourse with another 
person under a mistaken belief that the other person is married to the person 
does not consent to the sexual intercourse”. 
An example of the extent to which fraud may vitiate consent is the 
case of R v Mobilio (1991), in which a radiographer subjected several female 
patients to vaginal examinations using ultrasound transducers. These 
examinations had no medical value and were conducted solely for the  
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sexual gratification of the radiographer. He was subsequently charged and 
convicted of rape. On appeal, the court held that any mistaken belief on the 
part of the complainant must relate to the nature and character of the act or 
to the identity of the sexual partner. Therefore, since the patients had 
consented to the insertion of the transducer into their vaginas, their consent 
was not vitiated simply because they were mistaken about the reason 
behind the act. However, it seems certain that the patients would not have 
consented had they known the real reason for the internal examination. The 
Mobilio ruling has since been reversed in Victorian law. According to the 
Victorian Crimes Act 1958 s 36 (g) there is no consent where a person 
“mistakenly believes that the act is for medical or hygienic purposes”. 
In the Queensland case R v Pryor (2001), a sleeping woman was 
lifted from her bed and taken into the hallway of her home by an intruder, 
where penetration took place. The woman’s de facto husband was in the 
house, and she believed it was he with whom she was having sex. She was 
unaware that this was not the case until after ejaculation had taken place. 
When she realised that the man was a stranger, she called for help. Her 
assailant was charged and convicted of rape. The conviction was appealed. 
It was argued that since the defendant had done nothing to constitute 
impersonating her husband, consent was not vitiated. This argument was 
rejected and the appeal was dismissed. Williams JA stated, “Her instinctive 
responses did not constitute a comprehending consent… Once she 
comprehended what was happening – a complete stranger was having  
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intercourse with her – she made it clear that she was not a consenting party” 
(p. 21). On the basis of this ruling it appears that the accused is liable even if 
he has not actively induced the false belief on which consent is based.   
In the nineteenth century, it was ruled that a man who had 
deliberately infected his wife with gonorrhea, a fatal disease at that time, was 
not guilty of either assault or rape because the wife’s consent had not been 
obtained by fraud (R v Clarence, 1888). This ruling was recently reversed in 
the Canadian case R v Cuerrier (1998). A HIV-positive man had unprotected 
sex with two women without informing them of his condition. Both women 
consented to sex, but both testified that they would not have consented had 
they known that the defendant was HIV-positive. The failure of the accused 
to disclose his state of health was held to amount to fraud.   
The cumulative effect of the rulings referred to above is that consent 
must be not only free and voluntary (e.g., Question of Law No. 1 of 1993; 
WA Criminal Code s 324g) but is also “a free and informed exercise of the 
will” (R v Shaw, 1995, p. 111). It appears that the effect of these rulings is 
that consent may be vitiated by false beliefs as to the relationship between 
the parties, the purpose of the act, the identity of the sexual partner and their 
health status. Furthermore, at least in some circumstances, the incorrect 
belief need not have been induced by the accused. “A consent that is not 
based upon knowledge of the significant relevant factors is not a valid 
consent” (Cuerrier, p. 127).  
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What are “significant relevant factors”? 
Specific items that vitiate consent on the grounds of ignorance have 
been left undefined within law because the court would not want to limit the 
category of case that might be considered. To assist in establishing some 
parameters for significant relevant factors some consideration of concepts 
that govern decision-making is required. Somerville (1994) characterised 
voluntariness, capacity, and autonomy as “gate-keeping” concepts that 
supported other principles of decision-making, such as fairness, justice and 
respect for persons. In law, voluntariness and capacity must be present, but 
what of autonomy? Somerville makes reference to the fact that meanings 
often differ depending on the discipline of reference: what a lawyer 
understands by the term “autonomy” may not be the same meaning 
attributed by a psychologist or a philosopher. For example, the Kantian 
concept of autonomy is based on the ideal of moral worth: only a selfless 
impersonal decision was considered to be moral (Matthews, 1999). But 
consent to sex is neither selfless nor impersonal, so Kantian autonomy is 
irrelevant in this context. On the contrary, the person giving consent is 
concerned, or would be concerned if they had the relevant knowledge, with 
their own best interests. It follows that capacity to consent should rest upon 
the person having both the ability to recognise their own interests and 
sufficient knowledge to make a decision that is consistent with those 
interests.  
These interests would include the person’s own mental and physical 
wellbeing, and may extend to their financial situation. Specifically, capacity  
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to consent should rest upon understanding that pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted disease can result from sexual intercourse. Such understanding 
need not be a sophisticated one, to paraphrase Mueller, but should be 
sufficient for the person to understand the potential ramifications of his or her 
choice. Although it is not unusual for a person with unimpaired cognition to 
overlook or ignore their own interests in some situations, for example while 
they are sexually aroused, this person recognises the risks of unprotected 
sex. They are aware of the possible consequences and may avail 
themselves of prophylactic measures either at the time of the act or post 
hoc. On the other hand, a person who is not aware of the potential 
consequences of their decision is constrained not only in making the initial 
choice, but is also prevented from taking corrective action. They know 
nothing of either the risk or the remedy. Persons who consent to sexual acts 
without knowledge of the potential consequences are in an equivalent moral 
position to the patient who makes a treatment decision without being 
informed of the associated risks. But whereas the patient may sue their 
doctor for negligence and/or battery, outside of South Australia the person 
who agrees to a sexual act without knowing its consequences is held to give 
valid consent.  
 
Balancing protection against sexual autonomy 
An advantage of retaining the Morgan standard is that the sexual 
autonomy of persons with mental impairment would be preserved. Persons  
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with the requisite knowledge of the nature and character of the act would be 
free to exercise their right to sexual expression, unless of course the 
behaviour violated some other statutory provision. Keeping requirements for 
consent to a minimum allows the maximum number of persons with mental 
impairment the freedom to express their sexuality, especially since the 
average level of knowledge regarding sex appears to be lower than the 
same knowledge in the general population. Evidence obtained in Australia 
and overseas has consistently shown that only about half the population with 
intellectual disability reports having ever received any sex education, in 
contrast to almost all members of the general population (McCabe, 1999; 
O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). Some of the people with intellectual disability 
in O’Callaghan and Murphy’s study had received their only education over 
30 years previously. Persons with intellectual disability have significantly less 
sexual knowledge and experience than persons with physical disability, 
whose knowledge is again significantly less than that of non-disabled 
individuals (McCabe, 1999). In comparison to mainstream 16-year-olds, 
adults with intellectual disability have much less knowledge about a large 
number of aspects of sex including emotions, bodily functions, consent, 
consequences, legal aspects, and personal safety (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 
2002). In fact, the evidence obtained by O’Callaghan and Murphy suggests 
that increasing the standard of knowledge to encompass understanding of 
both the nature and consequences of sexual activity would mean that about 
half the population with mild to moderate levels of intellectual disability would  
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be found incapable of consent (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). Given that 
people with intellectual disability have historically had expression of their 
sexuality discouraged, have been subjected to involuntary sterilisation for 
eugenic purposes, have had many of their rights denied and have been 
devalued and stigmatised (see Graydon, 2007), it may seem unacceptable 
to raise the standard of consent to a level which is out of the reach of such a 
large proportion of this population.   
The right to sexual expression notwithstanding, this population with its 
particular vulnerabilities has a competing right to protection. Recall the 
paradox that the incidence rate of sexual offences against persons with 
mental impairment is higher than that found in the general population, and 
yet these crimes are reported at an even lower rate than other sexual crimes 
(Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2005). An advantage in increasing the 
standard to include knowledge of consequences is that it would be likely to 
lead to more convictions (McSherry, 1998a). Expert evaluation of capacity 
would probably be facilitated if it had to be demonstrated that the 
complainant possessed or did not possess at least some understanding of 
the relationships between sex and pregnancy and sex and STDs. In 
instances where such understanding could not be established, the 
prosecution’s task of proving incapacity would be an easier one.  
What position should the law take? 
Given the incongruence between Morgan and the knowledge 
necessary for consent to other acts, it is my proposal that consent to sexual  
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acts should more closely resemble the test for consent to therapeutic 
treatment. This notion might be challenged on the grounds that the situations 
are not analogous: a medical decision is potentially life-threatening whereas 
a decision to engage in sex is not. Yet serious and even fatal complications 
have always been and continue to be a possibility associated with sexual 
activity. A woman who is ignorant of the relationship between sex and 
pregnancy is unwittingly putting her health and even her life at risk. 
Admittedly that risk has been reduced over time and in modern Australia the 
death rate due to childbirth is less than 1 in every 1000 births (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2004a) but the risk does still exist. Moreover, having a 
child carries serious financial consequences for both parents; in Australia in 
2002 it was estimated that raising a child from birth to age 20 cost on 
average $264,000 (Percival & Harding, 2005). Of course, this financial 
commitment exists only if the parents actually raise the child. People with 
mental impairment and especially with intellectual disability are at 
heightened risk that their children will be removed from their care (Gallagher, 
2001), a proceeding which is understandably upsetting.  
The other commonly recognised consequence of sexual activity, 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), has remained curiously unmentioned 
in law despite the fact that the associated risk has increased significantly 
since Morgan was decided. In 1970 STDs were treatable. It was not until the 
early to mid-1980s that HIV-AIDS was recognised and the seriousness of 
infection was revealed. It is now common knowledge that one’s life may well  
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be threatened by unprotected contact with a HIV-positive partner. But the 
person who is ignorant of the existence of HIV and how it is transmitted is 
unable to make a valid choice. Ignorance renders them powerless to assess 
risk. They would be unaware that some sexual activities are associated with 
significantly greater risks than others. Some men with intellectual impairment 
regularly cottage, that is engage in homosexual prostitution in public toilets; 
these men tend to function at a lower cognitive level than the men who buy 
their services (Cambridge & Mellan, 2000). As a result, they lack power; the 
lower functioning person is almost always the receptive partner (Thompson, 
2001). They may be unaware of safe sex practices, but even if they do have 
that knowledge they may be powerless to compel their partner to use a 
condom. The standard set by Morgan allows some of the most vulnerable 
members of society to consent to acts which expose them to a high degree 
of danger. If a medical procedure had comparably serious consequences, 
the patient would have to be informed even if there was only a remote risk 
(Rogers v Whitaker, 1992). The serious consequences of sex warrant that 
an understanding of the nature and consequences of the act should underlie 
a valid consent.  
The major objection to raising the standard of consent for sexual acts 
is that approximately half the population with intellectual impairment would 
probably be unable to achieve the required standard, which would arguably 
violate the right to sexual expression and interfere with autonomy. But recall 
that only about half this population report having received sex education;  
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there may be a causal link between having received sex education and 
achieving capacity to consent. This suggestion is supported by the small 
amount of available evidence. In comparison to people who reported that 
they had not received sex education, those who had attended formal classes 
knew significantly more about all aspects of sex that were examined 
(O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2002). The level of sexual knowledge has been 
found to be negatively correlated to the incidence of sexual assault, at least 
among people with mild cognitive impairment (McCabe & Schreck, 1992). 
Thus it appears that the provision of sex education is not only an effective 
means of increasing knowledge, but also fulfils a protective function. 
However, caution should be exercised in interpreting this data. It may be that 
sex education was given only to higher functioning participants, so their 
higher level of knowledge could be attributable as much to their IQ as to the 
education. But if sex education was withheld from participants who 
functioned at a lower level, it is difficult to see how they could acquire 
sufficient knowledge to achieve capacity. People with varying degrees of 
mental impairment can certainly learn and achieve in other areas of life, so 
why not in the area of sexuality? In general, people with intellectual disability 
are interested in sex and wish to have the opportunity to gain knowledge 
about many aspects of sexuality (McCabe, 1999). It may be that sex 
education programs need to be tailored to suit the general level of cognitive 
ability in each audience. Following each presentation, an evaluation of the 
change in knowledge of each participant may be useful (McCabe, 1999).  
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Service providers may need to repeat sex education a number of times to 
allow opportunities for factual information to be understood, internalised and 
normalised.  
For people who currently do not understand the consequences of sex 
but who would be able to acquire that knowledge given appropriate 
education, introduction of a more stringent standard of knowledge actually 
supports autonomous decision making. Currently the sexual choices of such 
people may not only be dangerous but arguably lack authenticity. But given 
supplemented education, these people would be in a better position to make 
choices that are in their own best interest. For them, an increased 
knowledge requirement accompanied by augmented opportunity to acquire 
information about sexuality would be no threat to their right to sexual 
expression. On the contrary, it would support a more informed decision-
making process. On the other hand, it follows that people who are unable to 
meet the Morgan standard would be unable to meet a more stringent test of 
consent, and thus, their status as incapable of consent would be unaffected. 
People who would fall into this category are likely to have severe or profound 
levels of impairment. These people stand in need of the protection of the 
law. For them, an increase in the standard of required knowledge is likely to 
provide greater protection than is currently the case under Morgan. But the 
people that would be most affected by my proposal are those who are able 
to meet the Morgan standard but who, even with education, would be unable 
to understand the consequences of sex. Should we prioritise their sexual  
 
158
freedom at the expense of the safety of all persons with mental impairment? 
I do not believe that we should. Under Morgan, the risk to the perpetrator of 
repercussions from sexual offences against persons with mental impairment 
is low. A more stringent standard of knowledge accompanied by better 
education should have a deterrent effect. An increased standard of 
knowledge, and hence more knowledgeable consent, should mean that the 
partners of persons with intellectual disability take greater care to ensure 
that there is real consent before proceeding. They may come to understand 
that establishing consent is more than a matter of just asking if the other 
person will “make love”. It involves ensuring the autonomy of each person is 
preserved to the greatest possible degree and that each person is accorded 
the respect they deserve.
24  
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In Chapter 6 I discussed the effect of raising the standard of 
knowledge to include understanding of the consequences of the sexual act. I 
also advocated a focus on supplemented and repeated sexual education for 
those persons who wished to receive it. The projected result would be that 
their consent, if given, would be more truly authentic than that which they 
currently are able to give, and would promote their own interests in the 
decision making process. I will return to these issues in Chapter 8. 
The following chapter focuses on two issues: first, that differences 
exist between the maximum sentences available for sexual offences against 
members of the general population and offences against persons with 
mental impairment. In some states sentences are more severe for offences 
against members of the general population, which seems to indicate that 
offences committed against persons with mental impairment are viewed less 
seriously than equivalent offences against members of the general 
population. Second, I examine the fact that marriage is an available defence 
to charges of sexual offences committed against persons with mental 
impairment, although this defence has been abolished where the offence is 
committed against a member of the general population. 
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Chapter 7: Sexuality, the incapable person and the law: 
Some issues
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Abstract 
 
Persons with intellectual disability who wish to participate in sexual acts 
present a unique challenge to legislators. Although it has been argued that 
they have a right to sexual expression, it is widely accepted that these 
persons also have a right to protection from those who might take advantage 
of them. Finding a balance between these two rights has proved so difficult 
that, rather than enacting uniform legislation throughout the states, a range 
of approaches have been adopted within Australian jurisdictions. In this 
paper I will discuss two issues arising from current legislation and associated 
case law. First, I explore the perceived seriousness of these offences in 
comparison to sexual offences committed against the general population. 
Second, I examine the compatibility of the marriage defence which is 
allowed to charges under these sections of statute with other parts of the 
criminal law. In addition to advocating a positive consent standard, I suggest 
reforms that would have the effect of reducing discrimination and promoting 
consistency between different sections of sexual assault law.  
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Persons with intellectual disability have in the past had their rights to 
reproduction and sexual expression severely curtailed. The policy of 
eugenics, which entailed the so-called “improvement” of the human race 
through selective breeding, provided the rationale for unethical measures 
such as the forced sterilisation of persons with “undesirable” traits. Such 
traits included intellectual and physical disabilities, laziness, violent 
temperament, shiftlessness, abusive drinking and even epilepsy (McCarthy, 
1999; Smith, 1995). Prevention of reproduction by people with these traits 
was thought to be necessary because it was believed that such traits were 
heritable (Smith, 1995) and as such, posed a threat to the “stock of the 
nation” (McCarthy, 1999).  
The attitudes held by many powerful members of society were 
encapsulated in the majority judgment in Buck v Bell (1927, p. 1159, per 
Wendell Holmes J): “It is better for everybody if society, instead of waiting 
until it has to execute degenerate offspring or leave them to starve because 
of feeblemindedness, can prevent obviously inferior individuals from 
propagating their own kind… Three generations of imbeciles is enough.” 
Laws upholding sterilisation, and institutionalisation reinforced by 
subsequent gender segregation were passed in the United States and many 
European countries (Jaeger & Bowman, 2005). An estimated 60,000 
Swedish people, mainly women, were eugenically sterilised between 1930 
and 1970 (Kevles, 1999), and 70,000 people were sterilised in the United 
States (Bates, 1987). Early twentieth century Californian sterilisation laws  
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formed the model on which Nazi laws were based (Jaeger & Bowman, 
2005). Eugenic policies and associated measures were prevalent during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and received enthusiastic 
support from the scientific community. Indeed, the well-known journal 
Science published an editorial supporting eugenic policy in 1933 (Jaeger & 
Bowman, 2005). 
During the second half of the twentieth century, societal attitudes 
toward the sexuality of the disabled have undergone a reversal, at least 
superficially. In Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v 
JWB & SMB (1992, commonly known as Marion’s Case), the High Court of 
Australia held that giving consent to the sterilisation of persons with 
intellectual disability is beyond parental authority. Prior court authorisation of 
proposed sterilisation or any other serious irreversible treatment is required 
in contemporary Australia (Jones & Basser Marks, 2000). Such approval will 
not be forthcoming if the sterilisation is to be performed for eugenic reasons, 
for contraception, to disguise abuse, or for anticipated menstrual difficulties 
(O’Neill, 1996). In Marion’s Case, the majority of the High Court of Australia 
held sterilisation to be a treatment of last resort. Brennan J at 267 remarked: 
“Sterilisation of an intellectually disabled child requires justification of a 
compelling kind, for involuntary sterilisation is a serious invasion of that  
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child’s personal integrity and a grave impairment of that child’s human 
dignity.”
26 
McCarthy (1999) attributed the swing from eugenic policy to a policy 
of upholding sexual rights to changes in attitudes toward sexuality generally, 
and to adoption of the policy of normalisation. She also made a valuable 
contribution to the literature by suggesting that during the 1970s, the new 
availability of the contraceptive pill was influential in the relaxation of 
attitudes toward the sexual expression of the disabled. “Given the great 
fears about people with learning disabilities reproducing and the draconian 
lengths society and professionals were prepared to go to prevent this, one 
cannot but fail to see how important a role contraception has played in 
effecting change” (McCarthy, 1999, p. 57).  
The existence of a right to freedom of sexual expression has been 
convincingly argued by McSherry and Somerville (1998 p. 108): “Apart from 
the legal viewpoint, it is probably fair to say that many, if not most, people in 
democratic societies would now agree that because consensual sexual 
intercourse is a personal and private activity, a right to freedom of sexual 
expression if it does not exist, should exist.” Indeed, the bulk of the literature 
on the topic of sexuality and intellectual disability indicates that persons with 
intellectual disability are thought to have a right to sexual expression. 
However, some persons, due to the nature of their disability, may be at risk 
of being harmed in sexual encounters. Some people with intellectual 
                                            
26 There is evidence that unauthorised sterilisation does take place. An average of 27 
vasectomies and 83 bilateral orchidectomies were performed annually in Australia from 
1988 – 1994 on men younger than 20 years of age (Carlson, Taylor & Wilson, 2000).  
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disability tend to be particularly in need of protection due to their limited 
knowledge of their rights and the law, their socialisation to be acquiescent, 
or difficulty in refusing requests because of their dependence on others 
(Graydon, Hall, & O’Brien-Malone, 2006). The challenge for legislators is to 
find a balance between provision of the necessary protection and 
preservation of the right to sexual expression: 
 
The law must balance two competing interests — protecting people 
with impaired mental functioning from sexual exploitation, and giving 
maximum recognition to their sexual rights. The difficulty for the legal 
system in striking an appropriate balance between these interests is 
compounded by the considerable diversity of people with mental 
impairment in terms of extent of impairment, living circumstances, 
and sexual interest and knowledge (Law Reform Commission of 
Victoria, 1988, p. 3). 
 
Prior to the liberalisation of attitudes toward the disabled which began in the 
1960s and 70s, all Australian jurisdictions had enacted legislation defining 
specific sexual offences against persons with mental impairment. These 
provisions are, sometimes in amended form, still part of law. However, each 
state has adopted different provisions or has combined two or more types of 
statute in an attempt to provide protection while concurrently avoiding  
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unnecessary restrictions on the rights of persons with disabilities. These 
approaches are outlined below. 
Three types of statutes can be classified by the fault element they 
contain. One type of statute adopted in Australian jurisdictions criminalises 
the sexual exploitation of persons with mental impairment. It has been 
adopted by New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900 s 66F) and Western 
Australia (Criminal Code s 330), while Queensland allows a defence if it can 
be shown that an act involving a person with intellectual disability was not 
exploitative (Criminal Code s 216). I do not propose to comment here on 
statutes that prohibit exploitation as I have done so with others at length 
elsewhere (see Graydon, Hall, & O’Brien-Malone, 2006).  
A second form of provision is to set out a standard of knowledge that 
the person must have before they are deemed capable of consent. In 
Western Australia (Criminal Code s 330) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(Crimes Act 1900 s 67), the person with mental impairment must understand 
the physical nature of the act to which they are consenting. South Australia 
is unique in requiring not only capacity to understand the nature of the act, 
but also the consequences of the act (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
s 49). A critique of knowledge provisions is available (see Chapter 5). 
The final category of statute is to prohibit sexual relations between a 
person with mental impairment and persons involved in their care. Victoria 
(Crimes Act 1958 ss 51 & 52), New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900 s 66F), 
Tasmania (Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126) and the Northern Territory  
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(Criminal Code s 130) have adopted this tactic, which we have also 
discussed at length elsewhere (Graydon, Hall, & O’Brien-Malone, 2006). 
My foci in this paper are two further issues arising from the statutes. 
There are features of legislation that apply to sexual offences against 
persons with mental impairment which are difficult to reconcile with other 
statutory provisions that apply to the general population. The first issue I 
examine is the perceived seriousness of this type of offence. In this section I 
explore how myths that surround sexual offences generally might impact on 
the degree of harm that is perceived to result from these particular offences. 
I examine how this perception might provide the reason for differences 
between sentencing provisions that apply when the complainant has a 
mental impairment and when they do not. In the second section I discuss the 
fact that a defence is allowed if the accused is married to the person with 
mental impairment. As I begin, I would like to point out that I refer to the 
accused person as “he” and to the complainant as “she”. This measure was 
taken for convenience. Although the large majority of victims of sexual 
offences are female and persons accused of the crimes are almost all male, 
I do acknowledge that there are exceptions to these rules.  
 
How serious is having sex with an incapable person?  
When a sexual offence against a person with mental impairment 
becomes known to authorities, the accused may be initially charged with 
rape, or with an alternative charge under the relevant sections of committing  
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a sexual offence against an incapable person. These two different charges 
were laid in R v Beattie (1981). In that case, which occurred in South 
Australia, a woman of 23 with a mental age of approximately 11 years was 
induced to have sex with a man named Beattie whom she had met only that 
day. Later she also was persuaded by another man whom she did not know 
to have intercourse, and later still a third man also attempted to have sex 
with her. In court, it was found that she had no understanding of pregnancy 
and thus she lacked the capacity to consent under South Australian statute. 
The defendant was convicted of having intercourse with a mentally deficient 
woman. Yet as the woman was found to be incapable of consent, it follows 
that any sexual act with her would constitute sex without consent. A sexual 
act that is done without consent would usually lead to charges of sexual 
assault or rape, depending on the jurisdiction in which the act took place. 
Indeed, as the offence has been committed against a member of a 
vulnerable population, which is an aggravating circumstance (Walker & 
Padfield, 1996), it follows that under existing law the accused should be 
charged with aggravated sexual assault. But in cases where the complainant 
has a mental impairment, and there is no evidence of resistance to the act or 
distress after the incident, the offence does not seem to be thought of as 
sexual assault at all.  
This attitude might be attributable to myths about how the victim of a 
sexual offence should react to the crime. If the person, due to their impaired 
cognition, does not seem to be distressed by the act, it might be thought not  
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as serious as where the victim is fully cognizant of what has been done. In 
acquitting Beattie on the charge of rape, the fact that the complainant was 
not distressed after sexual intercourse was mentioned no less than three 
times in the judgment. The implication seems to be that as she was not 
distressed, no great harm was done.  
This was a view that has also been adopted in the past in cases 
where the victim was intoxicated or unconscious during the act and as a 
result, was unaware of what was being done. However, contemporary courts 
have held that intoxication or unconsciousness on the part of the victim are 
circumstances of aggravation, not mitigation (for a review of cases, see 
Warner, 1998). The fact that the victim was not aware of what was being 
done is held to be a breach of trust, deserving of greater rather than lesser 
penalty. I do not suggest that mental impairment is the functional equivalent 
of intoxication or unconsciousness. The parallel I wish to draw is that, rather 
than lacking awareness of the act per se, the victim with mental impairment 
may lack awareness of the significance of the act and consequently manifest 
little emotional distress. That is, however, no reason for the accused to be 
shown leniency.  
Some offences are considered to be harmful to society in general, are 
considered to be “an affront to our newly acquired consciousness of ‘human 
dignity’” (Laster & Erez, 2000, p. 242). This is true of offences committed 
against a person with a mental impairment. That impairment may negate 
their capacity to give consent and may impede their understanding of the  
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exploitative aspects of an interaction. In fact, a lack of distress may almost 
be thought of as a hallmark of cases prosecuted under mental impairment 
legislation: the victim is not averse to the sexual act, and but for the mental 
impairment that precludes consent, there would be no offence (Hall & Mizzi, 
1996). However, the fact that the person is incapable of consent means that 
an offence has occurred, regardless of their apparent willingness. 
It is enlightening to compare the maximum penalties for sexual 
offences against a member of the general population against equivalent 
offences against persons with mental impairment.
27 In Western Australia, the 
maximum penalty for the general offence of sexual penetration without 
consent is 14 years
28 and aggravated sexual penetration without consent is 
20 years.
29 These penalties are the same as those provided for sexual 
penetration of an incapable person (14 years or 20 years where the 
incapable person is under the care, supervision or authority of the 
offender).
30 It seems that in Western Australia the offences are viewed as 
equally serious in terms of the sentences available. That the offences bear 
different names is an issue I will return to later in this paper. 
The view that both crimes are equally serious does not appear to 
prevail in Victoria. There the maximum penalty for rape is 25 years.
31 In 
contrast, the maximum penalty for sexual penetration of a person with 
                                            
27 Sentences quoted are the maximum available for the most serious type of sexual offence 
committed (a) against persons with mental impairment and (b) against a member of the 
general population. 
28 Criminal Code s 325. 
29 Criminal Code s 326. 
30 WA Criminal Code s 330. 
31 Vic Crimes Act 1958 s 38.  
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impaired mental functioning by a person who provides therapeutic or 
medical services to that person
32 or who is a worker at a residential facility
33 
is 10 years. It is difficult to understand why the penalty for sexual assault 
committed by a person in a position of responsibility and trust is less than 
half that available for a convicted rapist, because committing an offence 
against a person for whom one is responsible usually carries a more severe 
penalty (Walker & Padfield, 1996) because a fiduciary duty exists.   
Queensland statute provides that the maximum penalty for rape is life 
imprisonment.
34 This is also the penalty where an offender is the guardian of 
the intellectually impaired person or has the person temporarily under their 
care. In Queensland, therefore, misuse of a position of trust is viewed very 
seriously. The penalty for “abuse of intellectually impaired persons” where 
there are no aggravating circumstances is 14 years.
35  
The penalty for rape is life imprisonment in South Australia.
36 The 
maximum sentence for having unlawful sexual intercourse with a mentally 
deficient woman is 7 years, which was the sentence handed down in Beattie. 
It is notable that no allowance is made for longer sentences for offences 
committed by a person in a position of responsibility. This may be an area in 
need of reform. 
In New South Wales, under s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900, sexual 
intercourse without consent carries a maximum penalty of 14 years, or in 
                                            
32 Vic Crimes Act 1958 s 51. 
33 Vic Crimes Act 1958 s 52. 
34 Qld Criminal Code s 349. 
35 Qld Criminal Code s 216. 
36 SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 48.  
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aggravated circumstances including the victim having a serious physical or 
intellectual disability, the penalty is increased to 20 years. On the other 
hand, under s 66F sexual intercourse with a person with intellectual disability 
with the intention of taking advantage of that person’s vulnerability to sexual 
exploitation carries a penalty of only 8 years. Where the person with 
disability is under the authority of the offender, the maximum penalty is 10 
years. Thus penalties under s 66F are substantially less than those that 
apply when the victim is a member of the general population, or where a 
person with mental impairment withholds consent.
37 The apparent 
acquiescence to a sexual act by a woman with intellectual disability might be 
a reason that charges are made under s 66F rather than under s 61. The 
belief that charges of sexual assault are unfounded unless the victim resists 
is still held by a sizable proportion of the community and within the criminal 
justice system (Easteal, 1998a; Heath, 1998; McSherry, 1998b). Yet if a 
person is incapable of consent then any sexual act involving them must fulfill 
the fault elements in s 61: the sexual act is committed without consent.  
I speculated that if a victim did not resist but was incapable of 
consent, charges would be made under s 66F rather than under s 61J. To 
examine this hypothesis, I made a search of case law. No cases were found 
where expert evidence was given that the victim was incapable of consent. 
The only case that bears some resemblance to these criteria is R v Parsons 
(1990). An 18-year-old woman whose mental age was 10 years was 
                                            
37 Note that a person with mental impairment who is incapable of consent is still capable of 
withholding consent.  
 
173
bicycling near the country town where she lived, when she encountered the 
defendant. He was aware of her intellectual disability. During the afternoon, 
he had sexual intercourse with her on two occasions. When she returned 
home that evening, due to certain undisclosed features of her appearance, 
the woman was questioned by her family. The events of the afternoon 
emerged and police were contacted. When questioned, the accused 
immediately admitted what had occurred. He was charged under s 66F with 
having had sexual intercourse with a person with intellectual disability with 
the intention of taking advantage of that person’s vulnerability to sexual 
exploitation.
38 
Why he was not charged under s 61J with aggravated sexual assault 
is unclear. It may have been because the level of the woman’s mental 
impairment was not considered to be a serious intellectual disability, but if 
that was the case and the woman was willing, it is difficult to see why 
charges were laid at all. The presence of intellectual disability should not 
preclude all mutual sexual expression, unless the person is incapable of 
consent.  
If they are incapable of consent, the physical element of sexual 
assault is present because any sexual act involving them would amount to 
sex without consent. Admittedly, no evidence was given on the woman’s 
capacity to consent, and New South Wales legislation does not contain any 
guidance on capacity. It may be that the effect of the New South Wales 
                                            
38 The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, which was 
reduced to 3 years on appeal.  
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legislation is that a person with intellectual disability must not only be 
capable of consent,
39 but also, of somehow proving that they are capable of 
protecting themselves against sexual exploitation. This has been discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
Sexual offences against incapable persons might be considered less 
serious than common sexual assault because instead of being against the 
will of the victim, these crimes are committed in the absence of will. As 
demonstrated in the cases already mentioned, the victim is often 
acquiescent during the act and not distressed afterward. There is nothing to 
distinguish it from its consensual equivalent — apart from the inability of the 
victim to consent. Under these circumstances it is easy to assume that not 
much harm has been done. This type of act appears to be as far removed as 
is possible from violent rape by a stranger, thought by many to be the worst 
possible sexual crime (Warner, 1998). It is understandable that those who 
infer the degree of harm from the degree of distress of the victim would view 
the offence as rather benign. Such thinking is incongruent with the role of the 
law, which is to protect the rights of every citizen, but in particular the rights 
of the most vulnerable members of the population. Indeed, it can be argued 
that the whole of society is harmed because the crime is a violation of our 
norms (Laster & Erez, 2000). It may be that it is easier to convict a 
defendant of committing a sexual act with a person with intellectual disability 
than it is to convict them of aggravated sexual assault. This appeared to be 
                                            
39 It is very likely that expert assessment of capacity would be called if the case was to be 
heard today.  
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the case in Beattie, where the defendant was cleared of rape charges but 
was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a mentally deficient woman.  
Nomenclature is important. The fact that the crimes have different 
names suggests that they are, in fact, different crimes. Yet both rape and 
sexual assault are acts committed without consent. Naming the offence 
“sexual intercourse with a person with mental impairment”,
40 or similar is to 
make a simple statement of fact. There is nothing about the phrase that 
conveys that wrong has been done. Even in jurisdictions where the offence 
is named so there can be no mistake that it is a crime, the separation of 
crimes into different sections of the legislation seems discriminatory. 
Differential use of language reinforces the attitude that the sexual assault of 
persons with mental impairment is dissimilar to the sexual assault of anyone 
else; and perhaps even that it is not really sexual assault at all. Such 
thinking perpetuates the differential (and shoddy) treatment of people with 
disabilities. These distinctions between the general population and the 
disabled extend not only to naming and sentencing provisions but also to the 
fact that marriage is an available defence, a fact on which I focus in the 
following section. 
 
 
 
                                            
40 Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126.  
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The marriage defence.  
Under the law of general sexual offences, marriage no longer carries 
with it an implied consent to intercourse (R v L, 1991; R v R, 1991). Indeed, 
for the general population, sex without consent is a crime under any 
circumstances. In contrast, it appears that under mental impairment statutes, 
consent is viewed as part and parcel of the marriage contract, and cannot be 
retracted. A defence is allowed if the defendant is married to or is in a de 
facto relationship with the person with mental impairment.
41 Hence, a sexual 
act between married persons where one person is experiencing a period of 
mental impairment so severe that they lose capacity to consent will be very 
unlikely to result in charges, unless some obvious and significant harm 
occurs. Palpable incongruence exists between this and other areas of sexual 
assault law.   
It might be argued that the person with mental impairment has only to 
manifest some form of protest if they do not consent. Again, this is at odds 
with sexual assault law. Under the general provisions, it is not necessary for 
the complainant to say or do anything indicative of dissent (R v Proctor, 
1998). In any case, persons with some forms of mental impairment may not 
know that they have the right to refuse sexual contact (Rosser, 1990), or 
they may be unable to indicate their dissent. Some types of brain damage, 
conditions such as schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, and 
cognitive disorders such as delirium or dementia might render a married 
person incapable of consent. Consider, for example, a person with Dementia 
                                            
41 WA Criminal Code s 330; Vic Crimes Act 1958 ss 51 & 52; Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 
126.  
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of the Alzheimer’s Type. The majority of people with this condition would 
have been fully capable of consenting to sex and to marriage prior to onset 
of the dementia. Toward the end of their life, however, they may well be 
incapable of consent and of communicating dissent. They may not even 
recognise their spouse. At this point the patient is very likely to be incapable 
of consent according to current mandates, which specify that a person must 
understand the nature of the act, or have the ability to protect themselves 
against exploitation. Yet it is not an offence for their spouse to have sex with 
them.  
The divergent treatment of offences against married persons with and 
without disability may be based upon erroneous beliefs. First, there is the 
previously discussed perception that a sexual act that is not actively against 
the will of the victim is not a serious matter. Second, “[t]here is a mythology 
which describes marital rape as less damaging or injurious than other types 
of rape” (Easteal, 1998b, p. 109). Myth and law combine to ensure two 
powerful buffers against prosecution of the husband who takes advantage of 
his wife’s incapacity. In the first place, the passivity of the wife will probably 
mean that the act will not be thought of as rape. In the second, he is her 
husband. Because such an act is physically identical to consensual marital 
sex, it is highly unlikely that charges would be laid.  
The marriage defence may have been retained because of the belief 
that the law should not become involved in private matters. It is thought that 
legal interference may put marriage at risk by disrupting harmony (Easteal,  
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1998b), though the degree of harmony in a marriage in which rape has 
occurred is questionable. Although incursion of the law into marriage has 
become more accepted, as evidenced by the abolition of marital immunity to 
rape charges, there remains a general reluctance to interfere in the sanctity 
of marriage. This view is not confined to men, as some women’s groups 
objected to the repeal of marital immunity laws (Scutt, 1977). Still, some 
authors (see, for example, Jeffreys, 1993; Scutt, 1998; and Young, 1998) 
have argued that sexual assault law was made by men for the benefit of 
men. In this view, the marriage defence is seen as an instance of the law’s 
protection of men at the expense of women.  
The continued existence of a “woman as chattel” attitude within the 
legal system has been widely documented (see, for example, Leader-Elliott 
& Naffine, 2000; Mack, 1998; Naffine, 1992; and Young, 1998). However, 
recent developments in case law suggest that the judiciary is beginning to 
view sexual crimes committed by persons in a close relationship with the 
victim as just as serious, if not more serious, than offences committed by a 
stranger. “In a number of cases… it has been suggested that the type of 
relationship may be of such a nature to suggest that the offence involved a 
gross breach of trust which the victim had placed in the applicant” (Warner, 
1998, p. 176). One can hardly imagine circumstances more aptly described 
as a gross breach of trust than those in which an incapable woman is 
subjected to sex without consent by her husband. However, the fact that the 
marriage defence is still in place in the sections of law under consideration  
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here may simply indicate that this specific part of law has not yet been 
tested.  
Is the concept of consent inherently flawed? A growing number of 
writers have pointed out flaws associated with current understandings of 
consent. Kelly (1987) identified consent as a continuum of experience, which 
ranges from free choice through pressure and coercion to physical force. 
Leader-Elliott and Naffine (2000) expanded upon this theme, arguing that a 
woman’s rejection of intimacy is still construed in the courts as consent if the 
defendant claims he “thought” she consented. In other words, the court 
views the crime through the subjective lens of the defendant’s (alleged) 
belief. The unfairness of this subjective liability led Leader-Elliott and Naffine 
to suggest an alternative classification of consent as real or apparent. Real 
consent was identified as an inner agreement, a wholehearted accord with a 
proposed course of action. Anything less was identified as apparent consent.  
Real and apparent consent accords well with a positive standard of 
consent that is advocated by a number of writers including Bronitt (1994) 
and McSherry (1998b). A positive consent standard is based on 
communication. “Instead of focusing on whether or not the complainant 
resisted or whether or not she was in a fearful or intimidated state of mind, 
the way is now open for the prosecution to concentrate on what actions the 
accused took to ensure that there was free agreement to sexual penetration” 
(McSherry, 1998b, p. 33). Indeed, this standard has been passed as law in 
Canada (Wright, 2001).   
 
180
According to Wright (2001), the application of a positive consent 
standard removes the burden of communicating dissent from the victim and 
places responsibility on the accused for ensuring that there is free 
agreement. Free agreement need not be communicated in words, but might 
be conveyed by touch or gesture, so verbal communication is not a 
prerequisite of positive consent. If such communication was legally required, 
it would reduce the occurrence of miscommunication between sexual 
partners, including persons with mental impairment. It would remove the 
reason for allowing the marriage defence to stand, since a person incapable 
of communicating consent to their spouse would be unlikely to possess the 
capacity to consent. The introduction of a positive consent standard would 
ease the task of the prosecution, since there would be an onus on the 
defendant to show that he obtained free agreement. At the same time, it 
would be easier for a defendant who did take such steps to demonstrate his 
innocence. For incapable persons, protection from predatory sexual partners 
would be strengthened. On the other hand, the sexual partners of capable 
but vulnerable persons with mental impairment would be less open to 
accusations of sexual exploitation if they could show that they obtained free 
agreement. The introduction of a positive consent standard would therefore 
appear to have advantages for both the female (including those with mental 
impairment) and the defendant.  
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Continuing discrimination.  
This analysis of sexual crime against incapable persons reveals that 
the law, in common with many other spheres of life, continues to devalue 
persons with disability and mental impairment. Only when sexual acts 
committed in the absence of consent are treated identically to those 
committed without consent will discrimination cease. To achieve this 
outcome, amendments would need to be made to the law so that offences 
against incapable persons were defined under the same sections as rape 
and allied offences, rather than retaining the separate sections and 
innocuous names that currently exist.   
The fact that these crimes appear to be less harmful than other types 
of crime may explain why so few cases have been brought to trial. There are 
numerous barriers to the progression of such a case through the criminal 
justice system. To begin with, the crime has to become known to a third 
person, and it is quite possible that an incapable victim might lack the ability 
to report it. If it does come to light, each step of the legal process involves 
overcoming the judgments of the officials involved, such as carers, police, 
prosecutors and, in New South Wales, the Attorney General’s department.
42 
Any of these people may decide not to proceed with a complaint. If the case 
does eventually come to trial, the victim might be assessed as incapable of 
consent. Paradoxically, they may also be classed as not competent to give 
evidence. The result of research suggests that sexual offences against 
                                            
42 The NSW Crimes Act 1900 s 66F (6) states that no prosecution shall be commenced 
without the prior approval of the Attorney General.  
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incapable persons are quite common, but due to a high attrition rate, very 
few cases come before the courts (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
2005). There is some support for this notion: 
A non-verbal woman with profound mental retardation, living in a state 
institution, was found in a stairwell with a verbal, relatively “street-
wise” and sexually active man. She was naked, while he was fully 
clothed. When found, he was observed stuffing her panties behind a 
large pipe near the stairwell door. Many other pairs of underwear were 
found there belonging to several other female residents. Three of 
these other residents were determined to be incapable of consenting 
to sexual activity. After initially denying that anything had happened, 
the man told a physician that he had had sexual relations with this 
woman that day and on many previous occasions. However, there 
was no physical evidence found upon a medical exam to corroborate 
this statement. Although the facility concluded that the woman lacked 
the capacity to consent to sexual activity, its staff concluded that 
because sexual intercourse had most likely not been completed, there 
was no sexual abuse and therefore no “incident” requiring a report. 
Some staff also considered her to be capable of protecting herself 
from unwanted sexual advances and this, together with their reported 
concern for her privacy, were offered as an alternative justification for 
the failure to report the incident. There was no follow-up regarding the 
other underwear found, and no special precautions were taken to  
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protect any of the women, who were determined to lack capacity to 
consent, from further incidents of this nature (Sundram & Stavis, 
1994, p. 257). 
Admittedly, this case occurred more than a decade ago. But the law of 
sexual offences against persons with mental impairment in all Australian 
jurisdictions remains unchanged since that time. There is no reason to 
believe that crimes against incapable persons are viewed any more 
seriously now than they were ten years ago.  
In summary, the law that defines sexual offences against persons 
with mental impairment differs from that which defines sexual offences 
against members of the general public in quite significant ways. In some 
states, sentences for equivalent crimes are much shorter when committed 
against a person with intellectual disability. Marriage is allowed as a defence 
to charges under the sections of the criminal law that define offences against 
persons with mental impairment. Overall it appears that in some jurisdictions 
an offence committed against an incapable person is viewed as being less 
serious than one committed against a person without impairment. The fact 
that such crimes are differentiated from equivalent offences where in both 
cases the fault element is that the acts are committed without consent 
seems discriminatory. Reform is required if the law is to uphold the rights of  
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the disabled, who remain among the most disadvantaged groups in 
contemporary Australia.
43  
                                            
43 In the interests of minimising duplication, the reference list for this paper has been 
consolidated into the reference list at the end of the thesis.  
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The focus of Chapter 7 was discrepancies between aspects of the law 
that apply to the general population and those which apply to the 
subpopulation with mental impairment. The conclusions drawn support the 
recommendations I make for law reform in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Reform proposal 
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Currently the law in all Australian jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada and other jurisdictions contains legislative provisions 
that define sexual offences against persons with mental impairment. The aim 
of these existing laws is to provide protection against sexual exploitation to 
members of an especially vulnerable population. The challenge legislators 
face is to frame laws that fulfill this protective function while concurrently 
avoiding unnecessarily paternalistic restriction of the right to sexual 
expression. I have argued in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that existing laws do not 
provide sufficient protection against sexual offences, nor do they uphold the 
right to sexual expression. Indeed, it is my contention that the fundamental 
right to sexual expression is being unreasonably restricted by this legislation, 
while on the other hand, the incidence of sexual assault causes concern 
because although many sexual offences are reportedly committed (Johnson, 
Andrew & Topp, 1988), very few offences are actually prosecuted (McSherry 
& Naylor, 2004; Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2001, 2005). Current 
Australian law is neither upholding the right to sexual expression, nor 
creating a deterrent to sexual offences against persons with mental 
impairment. 
Current law and issues that arise from it 
The fact that sections of sexual assault laws that pertain only to 
persons with intellectual disability exist means that a subsection of the 
population is treated differently to the rest of the community. Persons who 
are labelled as having a mental condition such as intellectual disability,  
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dementia, mental illness or brain damage
44 may be limited by this legislation 
in their ability to legally exercise their right to sexual expression. Such a 
limitation is not applied to the rest of the community, and as such, these 
sections of legislation may be viewed as overly protective and 
discriminatory. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that this type of legislation does exist 
in all Australian jurisdictions. Within current law that defines sexual offences 
against persons with intellectual impairment, I have identified three broad 
types of legislative provisions: those that set out a standard of knowledge 
that the individual must meet in order to be deemed legally capable of 
consenting to sexual acts; those that proscribe persons in a position of 
authority or responsibility from having sexual relations with persons in their 
care; and those that proscribe the sexual exploitation of persons with mental 
impairment by any person. 
 
Legislative provisions that define a benchmark of knowledge. The 
sections of statute that set out a standard of knowledge that the person must 
meet in order to be deemed capable of consent all require that, as a 
minimum, the person understands the nature of the act. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, there are legislative provisions in Western Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory. Under both laws, the knowledge required for 
                                            
44 The specific conditions that render prosecution possible under the sections of legislation 
under consideration here vary between jurisdictions. One consistency between Australian 
jurisdictions is that in every case, persons who have sexual relations with a person with 
intellectual disability are liable to charges. Conditions such as dementia, brain damage and 
mental illness are not always considered to be grounds for charges under these sections.  
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capacity is confined to understanding the nature of the act, or in other words, 
understanding the physical action that is to be done. In addition, some 
further knowledge regarding the character of the act may be required 
according to the judgment of R v Morgan (1970), which was discussed in 
earlier chapters. The SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 is unique in 
Australian legislation in that it requires knowledge not only of the nature of 
the act but also of its consequences.  
My argument is that capacity should be based on knowledge not only 
of the nature of the sexual act and its character, as set down in Morgan, but 
also on knowledge of the foreseeable consequences of the act. Consent that 
is based only on knowledge of the nature of the act does not allow a person 
to make a decision that is in their own best interest. This position would have 
the added advantage of bringing Australian statute into line with United 
Kingdom law, which states in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 Ch 42, s40: 
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if-- 
(a) he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b) the touching is sexual, 
(c) B is unable to refuse because of or for a reason related to the 
mental disorder, and 
(d) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that B has a 
mental disorder and that because of it or for another reason related to 
it B  is likely to be unable to refuse. 
(2) B is unable to refuse if—  
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(a) he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the touching 
(whether because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of what is being done, or for 
any other reason), or 
(b) he is unable to communicate such a choice to A (Emphasis 
added). 
 
By contrast, it appears that, under Australian law, a woman who has no 
knowledge of either pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases, under the 
law of all states except South Australia, is considered capable of giving 
consent to unprotected heterosexual penetrative intercourse. In the case of 
penetrative heterosexual intercourse, both persons should be aware that 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS are 
possible outcomes of the act. Persons engaging in anal intercourse should 
be aware of the possibility and the heightened risk of contracting HIV/AIDS 
that is associated with this form of intercourse.  
Knowledge about the consequences of the act is not useful unless it 
is accompanied by knowledge of how to prevent those outcomes and the 
ability to obtain protection if so wished, that is, the person must understand 
the use and purpose of condoms and have access to them. But there is a 
difficulty in the pragmatic application of this recommendation. It is likely that 
persons other than the person with intellectual impairment are able to control 
access to condoms and other forms of contraception, and indeed, to control  
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access to information. Many caregivers have quite negative attitudes toward 
the sexuality of persons in their care. It might be useful to provide caregivers 
with education regarding the sexuality of those they care for. It should be 
made clear in this education that sexual expression is to be expected and 
that it is healthy. It should also be emphasised that where education in 
sexual matters is withheld from the person themselves, there is a heightened 
risk of them becoming the victim of sexual offences.   
Knowledge of the consequences of sexual acts allows each individual 
to make decisions that are consistent with his or her best interest. If the 
person knowingly decides to take part in unprotected sex that is a different 
matter than if they naively take part in it and are ignorant of the risks to 
which they are exposing themselves. Moreover, the informed person is able 
to seek and use whatever prophylactic measures are available after the act, 
such as the “morning after” pill. In contrast, the uninformed individual is 
unable to avail themselves of such measures because they know nothing 
about either the possible consequences of the act or of their remedy. 
 
Legislative provisions that ban workers from having sex with those in 
their care. This type of legislation is intended to prevent persons who are in 
a position of authority over persons with mental impairment from using their 
authority in a coercive manner to obtain consent. Examples are the NSW 
Crimes Act 1900 s 66F(2)(b), Vic Crimes Act 1958 ss 51 and 52, ACT 
Crimes Act 1900 s 67(1)(h), NT Criminal Code s 130(2), and the Tas  
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Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126(1). In New South Wales, the Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, proscription of sexual acts 
involving a person in a position of power and a person in their care is 
absolute. In Tasmania, however, proscription is not absolute and a defence 
is allowed if it can be shown that “the giving of that consent was not unduly 
influenced by the fact that the person was responsible for the care of the 
person with mental impairment” (Tas Criminal Code Act 1924 s 126(2)(a)(ii). 
But if such a case came to court, it is difficult to see how it could be proved 
that a lack of influence existed. It would be difficult for the person to put such 
influence aside when deciding whether or not to consent to sex. This is 
especially so where persons with intellectual disability are involved because 
they are socialised to be acquiescent to the demands of others (Graydon, 
Hall & O’Brien-Malone, 2006). 
Victoria proscribes all sexual acts between providers of medical or 
therapeutic services and persons to whom they provide services (Crimes Act 
1958 s 51) and between workers at residential facilities and residents 
(Crimes Act 1958 s 52). The term “worker” means a person who provides 
services to residents at a residential facility (whether as an employee or as a 
voluntary worker or in any other capacity) but does not include a person who 
also receives services for impaired mental functioning [Crimes Act 1958 s 
50(1)].  
The difficulty with banning all sexual relationships between workers 
and those in their care is that persons with mental impairment, especially  
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those with intellectual disability, have a small pool of potential sexual 
partners. Potential partners may be divided into three categories: paid or 
voluntary workers, other persons with intellectual impairment, and outside 
persons. The number of persons in this latter category tends to be small. 
O’Callaghan and Murphy (2002) did not specifically ask how many outsiders 
were known, but they found that the average total number of people known, 
including neighbours, people known at clubs and people known at places 
gone to, was approximately 2.5. In the same study, the mean number of 
professionals and other workers known was 5.5. If the choices of sexual 
partner are limited only to other persons with intellectual disability or to 
unrelated outsiders, and service providers are eliminated from becoming 
involved in a sexual relationship with the person, the effect is a rather 
serious restriction on the right to sexual expression.  
My proposal is to proscribe only those occupations where 
professional ethics would dictate that there can be no sexual relationships 
with persons who are service recipients. The adoption of this proposal would 
mean that providers of medical or therapeutic services would be restricted 
by professional ethics from entering into such relationships, while workers 
such as gardeners, kitchen workers, receptionists and so forth would remain 
as potential sexual partners to persons with intellectual disability, in addition 
to other persons with intellectual disability and outsiders. 
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Law that bans sexual exploitation. This type of legislation is intended 
to proscribe all sexually exploitative acts regardless of the status of the 
perpetrator, in other words, any person having sexually exploitative relations 
(not necessarily a worker), is liable to be charged under this law. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there are legislative provisions in Western Australia 
and New South Wales that set out that any exploitation is against the law. 
Queensland allows a defence where it can be proved “that the doing of the 
act…which constitutes the offence did not in the circumstances constitute 
sexual exploitation of the intellectually impaired person” (Qld Criminal Code 
s 216(4)(b).  
There is little case law on which to rely in deciding whether or not an 
act constitutes sexual exploitation, nor have legislators seen fit to define 
sexual exploitation, as they would not wish to limit the type of case that could 
be tried under these statutes. The problem with this type of legislation is that 
the question of whether or not an act is exploitative is largely left up to 
individual jurors and courts to judge. This may lead to inconsistencies.  
Second, such law is arguably discriminatory. There is no equivalent 
statute prohibiting exploitation that applies to persons without disabilities. 
This may mean that persons with mental impairment are held to higher 
standards of behaviour than are the rest of the community. Persons with 
intellectual disabilities who are capable of consent should not be censored 
for making a “mistake” in their choice of sexual partner, nor in the sexual 
acts in which they engage. Conversely, if an incapable person was involved  
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in an exploitative sexual act, the accused should be charged with rape or 
sexual assault because they have engaged in sex without consent, as an 
incapable person by definition cannot consent to sex. 
In any case, everyone is vulnerable to exploitation because we can all 
be mistaken about facts regarding the sexual act, such as our partner’s 
motivation for engaging in the act. There are circumstances which, if known 
at the outset, would make a difference to the decision to engage in that 
particular sexual act. For example, if A had known that B was going to talk to 
his friends about the details of their sexual encounter, she may well have 
changed her mind about engaging in the sexual act. It has been argued by 
Archard (1994) and Klepper (1993) that the violation of expectations based 
on social norms constitutes sexual exploitation. As we are all vulnerable to 
this type of exploitation the law that proscribes only the sexual exploitation of 
persons with intellectual disability can be seen as discriminatory. 
 
Further issues 
There are a number of further issues that I would like to raise, the first 
being that in some jurisdictions, marriage can be used as a defence to 
charges under the relevant sections, the second being charges of 
aggravation are automatic where the victim has a mental impairment, and 
the third being that in some states the sentencing provisions for an offence 
against a person with mental impairment are less severe than those for an 
equivalent offence against a member of the general population.  
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The marriage defence 
In some states, the existence of a marriage between the alleged perpetrator 
and the complainant may be used as a defence to charges of committing a 
sexual assault against a person with mental impairment. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania have 
this type of legislative provision. The wording of the Western Australian 
provisions is as follows: “It is a defence to a charge under this section to 
prove the accused person was lawfully married to the incapable person”. I 
have argued that this defense is inconsistent with other sections of sexual 
offence law, where marriage has been abolished as a defence to charges of 
rape or sexual assault (see Chapter 7). Prior to the introduction of law 
allowing a wife to charge her husband with rape, the husband had, in effect, 
a licence to rape his wife (Easteal, 1998b). This position stemmed from the 
legal tradition that whatever occurred in marriage was private and therefore 
outside the reach of the law (Graycar & Morgan, 2002). Largely due to the 
reform efforts of feminist groups, the shield that marriage provided to 
husbands who raped their wives has been removed (Easteal, 1998b). In 
contrast, current law regarding incapacity means that an incapable wife 
might be faced with the marriage defense if her husband had sexual 
relations with her. The Victorian provision is even wider than that of WA: 
“Consent is not a defence to a charge under this section unless at the time 
of the alleged offence the accused believed on reasonable grounds that he 
or she was the spouse or the defacto spouse of the other person” [Crimes  
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Act 1958 s 51(3) and s 52(3)]. The inclusion of the phrase “believed on 
reasonable grounds” seems to imply that if the defendant alleges that he 
believed in the existence of a marriage, there is an onus upon the 
prosecution to prove that such a belief was not reasonable. This is a more 
extreme version of a defendant relying on his mistaken belief, where a 
perpetrator may admit that a sexual act took place but claim that he believed 
that the woman consented. If such an argument is successful the defendant 
will be acquitted. Consistent with the argument advanced by Leader-Elliott 
and Naffine (2000), the woman’s experience of sex without consent can be 
trumped by the perpetrator’s alleged belief in consent. Retention of a 
legislative provision that relies on the defendant’s belief allows the defendant 
to override the experience of the victim.  
Charges 
At present, in cases of sexual assault where the victim has a mental 
impairment, the charges would automatically be aggravated sexual assault, 
because the victim is a member of a group thought to be especially 
vulnerable. However, this automatic categorisation of the case as 
aggravated is discriminatory. The presence of mental impairment should not 
automatically mean that the charge is aggravated sexual assault. Instead, 
where an accused is proven to have sexually assaulted a person with mental 
impairment, the presence of the mental impairment should be regarded as a 
possible factor in aggravation. In contrast to current law, this is a non-
discriminatory manner of sentencing.  
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Available sentences 
In some Australian jurisdictions the sentences available for successful 
prosecutions of sexual acts involving persons with mental impairment are 
less severe than the sentences for equivalent acts that do not involve a 
person with mental impairment. Sexual acts that involve an incapable person 
are necessarily acts that are committed without consent,
45 because the 
person is not capable of giving consent. Therefore the fault element for 
charges of rape or sexual assault is fulfilled, and yet the available sentence 
is significantly less than that available for proven charges of rape or sexual 
assault. 
As already set out in Chapter 7, there is a substantial difference in the 
penalties for rape and sexual offences against those with mental impairment 
except in Western Australia and Queensland.  
A Model Law 
At this point I would like to propose a model law pertaining to sexual 
offences against incapable persons, which avoids as much as possible the 
weaknesses outlined above. Relevant definitions, the proposed statute and 
sentencing provisions are outlined below. 
 
                                            
45 The provision that rape or sexual assault has to be committed against the will, as 
opposed to without consent, has been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions. This change 
was to provide for circumstances where the person was seriously intoxicated, unconscious, 
asleep or otherwise unable to give or withhold consent.   
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Definitions 
“Consent” means free and voluntary agreement. Circumstances in 
which a person does not freely and voluntarily agree to an act include the 
following- 
   (a)  the person submits because of force or the fear of force to that 
        person or someone else; 
   (b)  the person submits because of the fear of harm of any type to that 
        person or someone else; 
   (c)  the person submits because she or he is unlawfully detained; 
   (d)  the person is asleep, unconscious, or so affected by alcohol or 
        another drug as to be incapable of freely and voluntarily agreeing. 
The fact that a person did not say or do anything to indicate free agreement 
to a sexual act is normally enough to show that the act took place without 
that person's free agreement; a person is not to be regarded as having freely 
agreed to a sexual act just because she or he did not protest or physically 
resist; or she or he did not sustain physical injury. The onus is upon the 
accused to show the steps that he took to ensure that there was, on the 
victim’s part, free agreement. 
“Incapable persons” means those persons who do not, at the time of 
the offence, understand the nature, character and reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of the sexual act that is the subject of the charge. This lack of 
understanding need not necessarily be due to mental impairment.   
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“Mental impairment” includes but is not restricted to intellectual 
disability, mental illness, dementia and brain damage. 
“Professional relationship” is one in which the professional ethics of 
the body that regulates said profession proscribes sexual acts between the 
professional and those to whom he or she renders professional services. 
Proposed law 
1. Any person who engages in a sexual act with a person who is 
incapable of consent is deemed to have committed a sexual act without 
consent.   
2. Any person who is in a professional relationship with a person with 
mental impairment where that relationship has been clearly defined as 
excluding sexual acts who commits such an act is deemed to have 
committed an offence. 
 
Sentencing 
1. The presence of mental impairment in the victim is to be regarded 
as a factor in aggravation when deliberating on the sentence to be handed 
down. 
2. Persons convicted of having sexual relations with an incapable 
person are liable to the same sentences as persons convicted of having 
sexual relations without consent.  
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Conclusions 
In this paper I have made a number of recommendations with the aim 
of eliminating a number of weaknesses in current law. These weaknesses 
include the difficulty in establishing that sexual exploitation has occurred, as 
exploitation cannot be defined with any precision. Second, I have argued 
that to ban all sexual relationships between any person in a position of 
authority and those subject to that authority is discriminatory and overly 
paternalistic. Instead, I have advocated that only such relationships as would 
be banned by professional ethics should be proscribed. Third, I have argued 
that for a person to be deemed capable of consent they should understand 
both the nature and consequences of the act, as well as understand that it is 
a sexual act rather than one performed for medical or hygienic purposes. If 
these proposals were adopted, there would be greater consistency between 
the law as it applies to persons with mental impairment and the general law 
of sexual offences. It would also result in less discrimination against persons 
with mental impairment. In addition, the proposed changes would have the 
effect of bringing Australian law into line with other jurisdictions, most notably 
with the United Kingdom. The criminal law should not be used to regulate 
the sexual expression of persons with mental impairment. The reduction of 
discrimination due to mental impairment is achievable. Indeed, it should be 
the legitimate goal of any proposed changes to sexual offence law.   
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In Chapter 8 I reviewed the conclusions that have been made in 
earlier chapters and proposed some reforms to existing law. In the final 
chapter I use available statistics to review the current effect of law that 
pertains to the sexual assault of persons with mental impairment.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
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How effectively does the existing law of sexual offences against 
persons with intellectual disability achieve a balance between providing 
protection while concurrently preserving the right to sexual expression?  
Not very effectively at all, if one equates efficacy with the number of 
prosecutions for the sexual assault of disabled people. Over an eight year 
period, only 17 prosecutions took place in Victoria, or an average of 2 per 
calendar year (McSherry & Naylor, 2004), even though evidence suggests 
that the incidence of sexual assault against persons with mental impairment 
is much higher than it is against members of the general population 
(Carmody, 1991, 1992; Hayes, 1993; McCarthy, 1999; McSherry, 1998a). 
This number can be contrasted against the number of sexual assault victims 
from the general population over a single calendar year. The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2004b) showed that there were approximately 18,000 
sexual assaults of mainstream women in the whole of Australia reported to 
police during 2003. Forty three percent of cases
46 were cleared by police by 
way of apprehension of the offender (Wundersitz, 1996). 
In measuring the incidence of sexual offences against persons with 
intellectual disability, there is the problem that, very often, it is either not 
noticed or not recorded that the victim has a cognitive impairment. Given 
that the presence of mental impairment is the basis of some types of sexual 
offences, it is difficult to see why it has been overlooked. To overcome this 
anomaly, 19 Victorian agencies agreed to monitor cases of alleged crime 
against persons with intellectual disability over a three month period. The 
                                            
46 This percentage is that reported for the state of South Australia.  
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result was reported by Johnson, Andrew and Topp (1988). It was found that, 
of 144 alleged crimes committed against people with an intellectual 
disability, 130 were sexual crimes. If that number were extrapolated from, it 
would translate into hundreds of prosecutions per annum if every case was 
followed through. Thus, if one is to measure the effectiveness of the law by 
the number of successful prosecutions, one would have to conclude that it 
was less than useful. Similarly, if one takes the attitude espoused by the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (2001, 2005) that effective law can be 
measured by its deterrent effect, then current law appears to be ineffective 
given the large number of alleged offences. 
It is my view that the reason that so few cases come to trial may be 
due to an amalgam of the following circumstances: (i) there are numerous 
barriers to the initial entry of the case into the criminal justice system, (ii) if 
the case does enter the system it may be dropped at any point by any one of 
a number of stakeholders including police and prosecutors, and (iii) a 
complainant who lacks capacity to consent to sex may also be ruled to be 
incapable of giving evidence if the case does come to court. It may be 
thought by those in a position of authority that pursuing charges will be 
unproductive and that it would be better for everyone concerned to forget the 
incident as soon as possible. 
The existence of separate sections of legislation that define sexual 
offences against persons with mental impairment or intellectual disability 
might be attributed to the need for a fall-back position where a charge of  
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rape might fail (recall that Beattie was primarily charged with rape and 
alternatively with having sexual intercourse with a mentally deficient 
woman). It also seems likely that these charges might be easier to prove 
than charges of rape, especially where the incapable person manifested 
apparent willingness (McSherry, 1998a). The preservation of alternative 
charges could therefore be viewed as advantageous, and yet it echoes the 
old differentiation between “real rape” where the victim resists and offences 
where there was no resistance and which, according to Easteal (1998a), a 
fair proportion of men still regard as not being rape at all. 
I have argued in Chapter 4 that society should not countenance the 
use of the criminal law as a method of regulating the sexual expression of 
capable persons with mental impairment. If it can be demonstrated that the 
capable person is being harmed by an encounter, and that bringing the 
relationship to an end would be less harmful to the person than allowing it to 
continue (Somerville, 1994), that might provide the necessary justification for 
invoking legislation to intercede in the relationship.  
The overall trend found in my analysis of sexual assault cases is that, 
in recent years, the general law of sexual offences has undergone 
considerable change with regard to the vitiation of consent by ignorance, 
mistake or fraud. It seems, in theory at least, that consent must now more 
than ever be based upon full knowledge of the act which subsequently 
occurs. Significant deviation from the act that the woman believes is going to 
occur might vitiate her consent. Just what constitutes significant deviation  
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has been tested in contemporary courts. Some well-known cases which 
turned on the vitiation of consent due to ignorance on the part of the victim 
such as Papadimitropoulis and Mobilio were discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The overall trend found in the cases reviewed is that acts that deviate from 
the expectations of the victim, whether by mistake as to the purpose, identity 
or health status of the offender are viewed as cause for criminal prosecution. 
This trend in the courts echoes changes in other parts of the criminal law. In 
some respects, the general law of sexual offences has become more 
intrusive into areas of life formerly considered to be private and thus beyond 
the reach of legal intervention, for example, the recognition of rape within 
marriage. On the other hand, the law has become less intrusive in respect to 
some consensual sexual acts performed in private by adults, such as 
homosexual intercourse.  
What changes should be made to sexual assault law? 
In this thesis I have advanced four unique modifications which, were 
they to be made, would improve existing law. I have advanced the argument 
that the concept of sexual exploitation is fundamentally flawed, and that 
liability should be redistributed to persons whose paid or voluntary position is 
commonly understood to exclude sexual acts. My proposal has the 
advantage of allowing sexual relationships with persons whose positions 
currently exclude them as potential partners, but who do not provide care to 
the person with mental impairment. Under this proposal, cooks, garden staff, 
receptionists and so on would be allowed to pursue relationships with  
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residents at a facility, while professional ethics would proscribe professional 
staff from such a course.  
Second, it is my contention that, contrary to current law, knowledge of 
the consequences of sex in addition to understanding the nature of the act is 
necessary for consent to be valid. Consent that is not supported by 
knowledge that allows the person to protect their own interests may be 
meaningless. 
Third, lesser penalties are available for sexual assault involving a 
person who is incapable of consent than the same act involving a person 
who withholds consent. My argument is that both are sexual acts without 
consent and should be subject to the same penalties. Current legislation in 
several states is discriminatory and tends to reflect that belief that sexual 
assault of an incapable person is less serious than the sexual assault of a 
non-consenting person. 
Finally, it is my contention that retention of marriage as a defence is 
discriminatory and is at odds with the rest of sexual assault law, where 
marriage as a defence has been abolished.  
 
Conclusion 
It has never been my aim in this thesis to develop a set of barriers 
which the disabled person must negotiate in order to be deemed capable of 
consenting to sex. In a case where the question of capacity is raised, there 
ought to be a framework to assist the expert whose task it is to establish  
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capacity or incapacity. This is what I have attempted to provide. Under the 
current system, assessment of capacity is left up to the individual expert. 
Although this method has the advantage of flexibility, it does allow room for 
error and for personal feeling to intrude into the assessment. If the system 
was changed so that the person had to demonstrate a certain standard of 
knowledge, this could increase the reliability and validity of such 
assessments.
47 Determination of capacity is difficult, even for experts. It is 
my hope that the suggestions contained in this thesis will allow the process 
to be easier and will allow persons with intellectual disability to have their 
voices heard. 
 
                                            
47 Aspects of the testing conditions which impact on the person’s ability to express their 
knowledge also have an impact on reliability and validity.  
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